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ESSAYS ON THE EFFECTS OF EARLY CHILDHOOD SHOCKS, FAMILY 
PREFERENCES AND PERSONAL CHOICES ON CHILD HEALTH AND 
SCHOOLING  
 
ABSTRACT  
SOLOMON TESFAY TESFU 
AUGUST 2010 
Committee Chair:      Dr. Shiferaw Gurmu 
Major Department:    Economics 
This dissertation consists of three essays investigating the role of early life events, 
family environment and personal choices in shaping a child‟s chances for human capital 
accumulation. The first essay examines how physical stature of a child measured in terms 
of age standardized height influences his/her selection for family labor activities vs. 
schooling in rural Ethiopia using  malnutrition caused by exposure to significant weather 
shocks in early childhood as sources of identification for the child‟s physical stature. We 
find no evidence that better physical stature of the child leads to his/her positive selection 
for fulltime child labor activities. On the other hand we found reasonably strong and 
consistent evidence that physically more robust children are more likely to combine child 
labor and schooling than physically weaker children. The findings indicate that, although 
better early childhood nutrition leads to higher chances of attending school, it may also 
put the child at additional pressure to participate in family labor activities which may be 
reflected in poor performance in schooling.  
 
 
xviii 
 
The second essay empirically investigates whether the quantity deficit in the 
children of the mother‟s preferred gender is compensated through their favorable 
treatment in terms of investment in schooling and nutrition (referred to as compensating 
hypothesis) and to what extent the mother uses her bargaining power in the family to 
influence this process. We use data from siblings and twins in two rounds of the 
demographic and health surveys of Ethiopia with robustness checks using a similar but 
larger data set from India. We find the mother‟s bargaining power working in the 
opposite direction to that of the compensating hypothesis in the case of child schooling 
and having no substantive role in the case of child nutritional health. Our findings  for 
child schooling make  intuitive sense in the context of Basu‟s (2006) hypothesis which 
implies that mother‟s empowerment could turn out to  be unfavorable to a child‟s 
attendance of schooling in the circumstances where the child is needed to help out with 
family activities.  
In the third essay we use date from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal 
Survey of the Youth (NLSY97) to examine the extent to which high school completion 
(and to a limited extent   college enrollment) are influenced by the choice teenagers make 
as to when to start dating and/or engage in sex, how many dating and/or sex partners to 
maintain, and how frequently to engage in sexual and/or dating activities. We use 
indicators of parental and peer religiosity as instruments for teenager‟s involvement in 
sex and dating activities. While our results for teenage dating are generally weaker than 
those for teenage sex, the overall pattern of our estimates suggests that teenage sex and 
dating could have significant effects not only on high school completion but also the 
subsequent enrollment in a college.  
1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY  
The amount of skill, knowledge and capability embodied in labor (human capital) 
is a key not only for individual success in the labor market but also for the progress of a 
society at large. A healthy and educated person with good work ethic and experience not 
only earns a higher income for him/herself in the labor market but may also contribute to 
the advancement of society. And the foundation for successful accumulation of human 
capital is laid early in life beginning with good nutrition and family-value environment 
followed by timely access to and continuous attendance of acceptable quality schooling.  
Consequently, differences in human capital accumulation start to arise early in life 
because of a number of factors that could broadly be classified into three categories. First, 
factors beyond the control of both the family and the child such as availability of 
schooling and health facilities, government policies, and differential exposure to market 
and environmental shocks could explain some of the observed differences across 
individuals in early human capital accumulation. Second, differences in family resources, 
endowments and preferences could be responsible for the differences in early human 
capital accumulation. Third, individual differences in abilities, preferences and behavioral 
choices made early in life could explain the observed differences in early human capital 
accumulation. Various components of these factors have been subject to wide-ranging 
theoretical and empirical research both in economics and other social sciences. A general 
observation that could be made from this large literature is that human capital 
accumulation is a complex process influenced by many interdependent variables that may 
vary from one place to another and from one context to another (see Heckman 2008).  
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This dissertation contributes towards better understanding the reasons behind the 
observed differences in human capital across individuals and groups by picking up one 
new question under each of the three broad categories listed above. The first essay 
examines how malnutrition caused by exposure to significant weather shocks (i.e., a 
massive drought and rainfall fluctuations) early in a child‟s life influence the subsequent 
participation of the child in schooling and child labor activities. Most of the empirical 
studies on the effect of early childhood malnutrition find negative relationship between 
schooling and cumulative long-term nutrition status and suggest that it is because parents 
are less likely to send a physically weaker child to school compared to physically robust 
child. However, in the communities where children are needed for family/child labor, 
parents may see physical strength as an important factor for the effectiveness of the child 
in non-schooling activities as well and may actually be tempted to keep some of the 
physically stronger children for such activities as demonstrated by our theoretical model. 
To test the empirical validity of this hypothesis, bivariate probit and multinomial logit 
models are estimated using data from various rounds of Ethiopian Rural Household 
Survey (ERHS).  
We find no conclusive evidence that better physical stature of the child leads to 
his/her positive selection for fulltime child labor activities. On the other hand we found 
strong and consistent evidence that physically robust children are more likely to combine 
child labor and schooling than physically weaker children. The results are consistent 
across two different identification strategies applied to data from two different cohorts of 
children.  The findings indicate that, although better early childhood nutrition leads to 
higher chances of attending school, it may also put the child at additional pressure to 
3 
 
 
 
participate in family labor activities and this may be reflected in poor performance in 
schooling. Therefore, policies that try to promote schooling through nutrition support 
programs could be more successful if they are accompanied by programs that could 
mitigate the forces that push families to resort to child labor. 
The second essay relates to the general issue of the role of family resources and 
preferences and specifically asks whether the explicitly revealed preferences of the 
mother for the gender mix of her children coupled with her bargaining power in the 
family influence the distribution of investment in human capital across her children.  The 
essay examines the important question of whether the mother uses her bargaining power 
in the family to influence the distribution of child quality in the direction of her gender 
ratio preferences when the actual gender ratio of children deviates from her preferred 
ratio.  For example, if the mother prefers to have three boys and three girls but ends up 
with one girl and 5 boys, does she try to compensate for the deficit in the quantity of girls 
by using her influence on household resource allocation to more heavily invest in her 
give daughter‟s quality (human capital)? Essay II attempts to shed some light on this 
question using data on twins and siblings from two rounds of the demographic and health 
survey of Ethiopia with some robustness checks using a similar but larger data set from 
India. Specifically, the role of the interaction between the mother‟s gender ratio gap and 
her bargaining power in the distribution of child health and schooling are examined.   
Our results provide no conclusive support to the hypothesis that the mother tries 
to compensate for the deficit in the quantity of children of her preferred gender through 
preferential treatment in their schooling and nutritional health although there are 
qualitative indications in some of our results that this could be the case. While our 
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expectation was that higher mother‟s power will reinforce the effect of mother‟s gender 
ratio gap on the distribution of child schooling and nutritional health in the direction 
implied by the compensating hypothesis, we rather find it working in the opposite 
direction in the case of child schooling having no substantive role in the case of child‟s 
nutritional health. Our results for schooling make intuitive sense in the context of Basu‟s 
(2006) hypothesis, which implies that mother‟s power could be unfavorable to a child‟s 
attendance of schooling in the contexts where the child is needed to help out with family 
activities. Although we do not want to stretch the policy implications of these results too 
far before they are confirmed in other contexts with different data sets and estimation 
techniques, they seem to indicate that women‟s empowerment programs should be 
supplemented with other policies that mitigate their needs for child labor (like income 
support programs) in order to enhance child schooling. 
Finally, the third essay investigates the effect of some choices made by the 
children themselves on their success at school. Specifically, the essay examines how 
children‟s schooling outcomes are affected by their involvement in dating and sexual 
activities as teenagers. While a number of empirical studies investigated the effects of 
other choices made by children such as drug use, alcohol drinking and smoking, and 
involvement in crime and gang membership, there is relatively little research on the 
effects of teenage dating and sex on schooling outcomes, apart from the literature on how 
teenage pregnancy and child bearing affect schooling. Even when teenage sex and dating 
do not result in pregnancy and child birth, there is reason to believe that intense 
engagement of a teenager in such activities could affect his/her schooling outcome 
because of the opportunity cost of the time spent in such activities that otherwise may 
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have been used for studying and perhaps because such activities may affect the focus and 
attention of the child.  
We use data from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of the 
Youth (NLSY97) to examine the extent to which high school completion (and to a 
limited extent   college enrollment) are influenced by the choice teenagers make as to 
when to start dating and/or sex, how many dating and/or sex partners to maintain, and 
how frequently to engage in sexual and/or dating activities. We use indicators of parental 
and peer religiosity as instruments for teenager‟s involvement in sex and dating activities. 
While our results for teenage dating are generally weaker than those for teenage sex, 
partly because of poor performance of our instruments for the former, the overall pattern 
of our estimates suggests that teenage sex and dating could have significant effects not 
only on high school completion but also the subsequent enrollment in a college. We 
observe only small changes in the estimates when we control for teenage pregnancy and 
child birth implying that the indicators of teenage sex and dating are not just capturing 
the effects of the former. The fact that parental and peer religiosity appears to constrain 
the teenagers‟ involvement in sex and dating (the effect being stronger on teenage sex) 
and the fact that the latter influence schooling outcomes implies that religious morality 
could be one (but not the only) way to influence schooling outcomes by imposing more 
discipline on the teenagers in terms of delaying initiation of sex and dating, limiting 
sex/dating partners and frequency of sex/dating. This poses an important policy dilemma 
(including some Constitutional issues) regarding the extent to which religious morality 
ought to be promoted in order to improve schooling outcomes. 
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ESSAY I: THE EFFECT OF EARLY CHILDHOOD 
MALNUTRITION ON CHILD LABOR AND SCHOOLING: 
EVIDENCE FROM ETHIOPIA  
 
 
Introduction 
Unlike the developed economies where short-term fluctuations in household 
income and living standards are largely associated with the conditions in the labor market 
and business cycles, temporary changes in livelihoods of rural communities in the least 
developed economies are often caused by changes in weather conditions. In such 
communities, large and unexpected changes in weather conditions can sometimes have a 
devastating impact on income, consumption, assets, health and survival of households 
and their members. Drought, flooding, hailstorms, cyclonic storms, and frost are some of 
the weather related shocks that frequently affect the livelihoods of rural communities in 
developing countries. A large number of studies have investigated the various impacts of 
such shocks and how households try to cope with their effects. The overall picture that 
emerges from the multitude of empirical studies is that the ultimate impact of a shock on 
the well-being of a household and its members depends on a number of household and 
community-specific characteristics such as liquidity constraints, wealth status, and the 
nature and capabilities of social support networks to which households belong (see 
Townsend 1995; Murdoch 1999; Carter and Maluccio 2003).   
One important indicator of the capability of households to absorb the effects of a 
shock is whether the nutritional status of its members, as reflected in anthropometric 
health measures, substantially deteriorates as a result of the shock. While some evidence 
shows that adults may lose some body mass (Dercon and Krishnan 2000) and may sustain 
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some long-term deficiencies in their health and fitness as a consequence of shocks, there 
is a general agreement in the literature that it is children in the early years of life who 
sustain the greatest long-term damage in their physical stature and possibly cognitive 
ability (Dasgupta 1997). The majority of empirical studies show that children in their first 
3 years of life at the time of the shock are particularly vulnerable.  This is not surprising 
given that this is a period when children are growing fast and have high nutritional 
requirements per unit of body mass (Martorell et al. 1995; Martorell 1999; Hoddinott and 
Kinsey 2001). Another reason for the high nutrition requirements for young children is 
their vulnerability to diseases because of immature immune systems and the inability to 
make their needs known.  
Some studies have examined the extent to which exposure to a shock at this early 
age affects the human capital outcomes of the person later in life. While some evidence 
from the United States shows that reversal of the effects of early malnutrition is possible 
if there are dramatic favorable changes in the environment for the child at the appropriate 
time (Golden 1994), studies from developing countries (e.g., Alderman, Hoddinott and 
Kinsey  2006) show that victims of severe shocks in early childhood often sustain long-
lasting deficiencies in their physical stature. Other studies have looked at how the effects 
of malnutrition on the child‟s health stature may be related to the child‟s schooling 
outcomes (e.g., Behrman and Lavy 1994; Glewwe and Jacoby 1995; Glewwe and King 
2001; Glewwe, Jacoby and King 2001; Alderman et al. 2001) and largely find that 
preschool malnutrition has negative effect on a child‟s school enrollment and academic 
performance. One of the often stated reasons for this relationship between schooling and 
early childhood malnutrition (stunting) is that families are unwilling or hesitant to send a 
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physically unfit child to school, in addition to the effect of childhood malnutrition on 
cognitive development that may be reflected in his/her poor performance or progress at 
school.  
The largely uneducated parents in developing countries, however, may be less 
likely to recognize the potential correlation between physical fitness and cognitive 
abilities than they are to recognize the importance of a child‟s physical strength for 
family labor. Consequently, parents may end up sending the physically weaker children 
to school and keep the robust ones for family labor or demand more of their after school 
time for family labor activities. As a result, studies that ignore the importance of physical 
stature for child labor (where child labor also matters) may end up with results that 
understate the effect of malnutrition on enrollment but overstate malnutrition‟s effect on 
school performance because it is largely the weaker children with potentially lower 
cognitive abilities (since malnutrition also hampers child‟s cognitive development, 
Dasgupta 1997) who are sent to school. Equity considerations may reinforce the 
possibility of sending a physically weaker child to school over a stronger sibling if 
parents feel that the weaker child will have a hard time succeeding in the labor market if 
he/she doesn‟t acquire additional skills. Therefore, understanding the role of physical 
stature of a child in the family‟s choices between schooling and child labor is not only an 
important research question in itself but also may help to refine and better understand the 
observed relationships between childhood malnutrition shocks and academic 
performance.  One issue in using child‟s physical stature as a covariate in the schooling 
and child labor equations, however, is that it could be endogenous in both equations 
because parents might have been making child nutrition decisions in anticipation of 
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specific role for the child. Therefore, an exogenous source of variation in nutritional 
status that is beyond the control of the parents is needed to identify its effect on schooling 
and child labor.  
In this essay we use two sources of exogenous variation in availability of food 
(and possibly other amenities) during the critical ages of the child to jointly analyze the 
effect of early childhood malnutrition on schooling and child labor.
1
 First we exploit the 
natural experiment generated by a massive drought in Ethiopia in 1984 that resulted in a 
devastating famine that killed about a million people in the country (Jansen, Harris and 
Penrose 1987). Second, we use the considerable annual fluctuations in rainfall in some 
localities in the country to identify local weather shocks and the subsequent food deficits 
in the areas and use these as exogenous sources of malnutrition. In Ethiopia about 85% of 
the people live on a subsistence agriculture that is almost fully dependent on rainfall 
conditions. As a result rainfall failures often have big effects on the welfare of 
households and their members. While grown-ups and older children might also suffer 
under famines and may sustain some long-term deficiencies in their health and fitness, 
there is a general consensus in the literature that it is the children at the early years of 
their life that sustain the biggest long-term damage in their stature and possibly cognitive 
abilities (Dasgupta 1997). The key purpose of this essay is, therefore, to examine how 
potential deficiencies in long-term health sustained from early childhood malnutrition are 
reflected in the child‟s participation in schooling and family labor. 
                                                          
1
 Porter (2007) analyzed the effect of the 1984 drought shock on the long-term indicators of child 
nutrition health using data from the first round of the Survey that I’m using. But the first stages of my 
empirical models in this paper expand her analysis by estimating the effects of localized rainfall shocks on 
the long-term nutritional status using data from a different cohort of children. 
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Literature 
The determinants of family decisions to send a child to school have been widely 
investigated in developing countries. Two broad strands of the literature are particularly 
relevant for the purpose of this essay. The first category includes studies that have 
examined the role of early childhood malnutrition on child‟s cognitive abilities, school 
enrollment and academic performance. Second, there are studies that have jointly 
analyzed the effect of various child and family characteristics as well as 
contemporaneous market and environmental shocks on child labor and schooling but did 
not explicitly address the role played by physical stature (cumulative nutrition outcome) 
of the child on the family‟s decision.  
The starting point for the studies that examine  the effect of early childhood 
malnutrition on school enrollment and academic performance is whether the former has a 
lasting effect on the physical and/or cognitive development of a child that could be 
reflected in his/her schooling outcomes.  There appears to be a broad agreement in the 
nutrition literature (see for example Martorell et al. 1995; Martorell 1997, 1999 for 
details) that malnutrition during the first three years of a child‟s life leads to long-lasting 
deficiencies in the child‟s physical stature given that height at age three is a strong 
indicator of height as an adult. While some evidence from the United States indicates that 
some catch up growth is possible under very favorable conditions (Golden 1994), a recent 
study by Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2006) that uses drought and civil war in 
Zimbabwe as exogenous sources of child malnutrition shows that children who were 
stunted before their third year will also be shorter as young adults, the period from 12 to 
24 months of age being the most vulnerable period for the child.  Another recent study by 
11 
 
 
 
Maccini and Yang (2008) used rainfall deviations from the mean in specific localities as a 
shock and found that a rainfall shock during the first year of life is strongly associated 
with adult height for men and women.  This conclusion is based on evidence from those 
born between 1953 and 1974 in Indonesia, with outcomes measured in the year 2000. The 
relationship between the timing of a child‟s malnutrition and his/her cognitive abilities 
later in life, as measured by scores on intelligence tests, was examined by Glewwe and 
King (2001) using data from Philippines. They used local price and rainfall variability as 
instruments for child‟s nutritional status, as measured by changes in height, and found 
that malnutrition in the second year of life has the largest impact on scores on a non-
verbal intelligence test taken when the child was 8 years old.    
The effect of early childhood malnutrition, as measured by the child‟s age-
conditioned height, on school enrollment and educational attainment has been analyzed 
by several studies by economists. Various approaches have been followed to address the 
endogeneity of the nutritional status of a child in schooling equations that could arise 
because of possible simultaneity in family decisions.  For example Alderman, Hoddinott 
and Kinsey  (2006) used drought and civil war in Zimbabwe as exogenous sources of 
child malnutrition in three resettlement villages and found that children who were stunted 
as preschoolers entered school later and completed less schooling on average. Alderman 
et al. (2001) used price shocks as identifying instruments for preschool malnutrition and 
found strong relationship between preschool child nutritional status and subsequent 
school enrollment in rural Pakistan. Glewwe, Jacoby and King (2001) employed siblings‟ 
difference approach and height-for-age of the older sibling as instruments for a child‟s 
nutritional status to analyze the relationship between preschool malnutrition and 
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subsequent academic achievement. Using data from Cebu Longitudinal Health and 
Nutrition Survey from Philippines they find that children who were malnourished as 
preschoolers enter school later and perform poorly on intelligence tests.  Glewwe and 
Jacoby (1995) used multiple instruments including household wealth proxies, health 
prices and mother‟s height and find that early childhood malnutrition resulted in delayed 
school enrollment in Ghana.   
None of these studies, however, addressed the possibility that the estimated 
relationship between children‟s physical stature and school enrollment could be 
understated because of the importance of physical fitness of the child for child labor in 
the family. In addition, if parents are more likely to send to school a physically less fit 
child than a more robust child because the latter is better suited for family labor, 
estimates of academic performance based on those who are enrolled is likely to be biased 
since the sample will be dominated by malnourished children with potential cognitive 
deficiencies. The possibility that families may also demand more family labor from the 
stronger children even after school may further confound the results. Therefore, 
understanding the importance of physical stature of a child for various child activities 
including schooling will be one step towards resolving the possible inaccuracies in the 
estimates for the effect of childhood malnutrition on schooling. One way to do this will 
be to jointly estimate the effect of the child‟s physical stature on schooling and child 
labor. 
Joint analysis of family decisions between schooling and child labor has been 
conducted in the context of family‟s response to exogenous income and other shocks. For 
example, Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2003) examined the response of child labor 
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and schooling to conditional cash transfers for poor families with children in Brazil. 
Using a multinomial logit model for joint analysis of child labor and schooling, they find 
that the conditional cash transfers substantially increase school enrollment and reduce 
child labor outside the household for 10 to 15 year olds. Dillon (2008) uses a multivariate 
probit model to control for cross-equation correlations in analyzing the response of child 
participation in schooling, home production and market production to household level 
shocks. He finds that production shocks in the form of pest infestation at the time of 
harvest lead to child withdrawal from schooling and increased participation in farming in 
northern Mali. Edmonds (2006), exploits the sharp discontinuity in age eligibility for 
South Africa's old age pension as quasi-experiment, and finds that anticipated pension 
income significantly decreases child labor and increases school attendance of 10–17-
year-olds. Ravallion and Wodon (2000) also analyzed the joint effect of school subsidies 
on child labor and schooling and find that the subsidy increases schooling but does not 
have significant effect on child labor.  Similarly, Dammert (2008) and Kruger (2007) 
exploit coca production shocks in Peru and variations in coffee production in Brazil, 
respectively, to simultaneously analyze the influence of household income shocks on 
family decisions towards child labor and schooling. However, all of these studies 
essentially examined the effect of contemporaneous shocks on child labor and schooling 
and none of them addressed the consequences of shocks encountered during early 
childhood on subsequent participation in schooling and child labor. In addition, none of 
these studies specifically addressed the role of child attributes in influencing the family 
decisions towards schooling and child labor.  
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One study that focuses on the role of child attributes is a recent publication by 
Bacolod and Ranjan (2008) that examines the role of child‟s cognitive ability in the 
family‟s choice between child schooling and child labor using data on child IQ scores in 
the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey from Philippines. Applying a 
multinomial logit model for joint analysis of schooling and child labor, they find that 
poor households with high-IQ children are more likely to send them to school than poor 
households with low-IQ children. On the other hand, they find that children with low IQ 
scores are more likely to be working or staying idle. However, the causality of these 
relationships is questionable given that they did not use any exogenous shock that could 
lead to ability differences among the sample children and the IQ tests were not age 
specific and some of the children already were at school when they took the tests. 
Although they try to use differences in the IQ scores of siblings in the form of 
standardized z-scores to control for unobserved household characteristics, it is plausible 
that unobserved parental preferences could change over time and some of the siblings 
may have received better preschool inputs from the parents than others. In addition, it is 
not fully persuasive that ordinary parents would be able to discern much of the ability 
differences between their children at an early age.  
This essay also focuses on the role of one of the child attributes, physical stature, 
in the parents‟ decisions on child activities. This is perhaps more appealing attribute to 
focus on than is ability because differences in physical stature will be easier for the 
parents to recognize. While it is possible that the child‟s physical stature as a measure of 
cumulative nutrition could embody some aspects of the cognitive ability of the child, as 
demonstrated by Glewwe and King (2001), for example, it is more likely that recognition 
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of the differences in physical stature rather than ability may drive parents‟ decisions to 
allocate their children between schooling and various other activities. When parents‟ 
decision is influenced by physical stature rather than ability it is possible that parents may 
actually end up keeping the physically more fit children for child labor and send the 
physically weaker children to school and if the deficiency in the physical fitness is a 
result of unfavorable childhood conditions like malnutrition then the physically weaker 
child will also be less able, leading to bias in estimates when the importance of child 
labor is ignored.  This study will try to address this issue using exogenous sources of 
variation in the physical stature of children. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The basic research question in this essay can be described in a simple household 
utility maximization model for a family with one child and unified preferences as in 
Ravallion and Woodon (2000) and  Bacolod and Ranjan (2008) among others. For 
convenience the child‟s life is classified into three periods:  preschool age, school age and 
post-school age. In the preschool period, the parents invest in the health of the child in the 
form of nutrition, health care and other treatments. The health of the child in this period 
could also be influenced by factors beyond the control of the family like weather shocks 
and availability of health care services. In the second period parents decide whether to 
send the child to school or to child labor.  In the third period, the child works and earns 
his/her own income, while parents retire and consume the return on the assets they saved 
during the earlier periods and possible transfers from their children. The focus here is on 
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the decision problem that parents face in the second period given the outcome of their 
decisions in the first period. 
Assuming that parents are altruistic towards their children and the utility parents 
derive from own consumption is linearly separable from that they derive from the child‟s 
utility as in Barro and Becker (1986), Cigno and Rosati (2005) and Dillon (2008),  among 
others, the parents‟ utility may be stated as  
                                          
t
ccp
tt yccUcuU ),,(*)( 321          t=1, 2, 3                  (1.1) 
where, p
tc is parents‟ consumption in period t, U* is child‟s maximized utility, 
cc1  is 
child‟s consumption in period 1 including healthcare, 
cc2 is child‟s consumption in period 
2 including healthcare but excluding school expenses, y3 is child‟s income in the post-
school period and β is a measure of parental altruism towards the child where we assume 
0<β≤1.  Both ut(.) and U*(.) are assumed to be quasi-concave and strictly increasing in 
all of their arguments. In period 2, 
pc1  and 
cc1  are no longer part of the decision problem 
of the parents. However, 
cc1  determines the child‟s pre-school stock of human capital in 
the form of physical stature and cognitive ability, given the child‟s genetic and natural 
endowments.  And according to the literature on nutrition physical stature at the 
preschool age (that is also correlated with cognitive ability) is a strong predictor of the 
later physical stature of the child as previously discussed. Let h1 denote this preschool 
physical stature of the child measured in terms of height-for-age. Assuming that the 
trajectory for the physical human capital of the child is completely set in the preschool 
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age and building on Glewwe (2002), the human capital production function of the child 
in period 2 may be stated as  
      ),(),( 1 QTshh
s
c                  (1.2) 
where,  γ(.) is the „learning efficiency‟ of the child that depends on the unobserved factors 
(µ) that include genetically inherited ability, child‟s motivation, etc. as well as the child‟s 
physical fitness accumulated during the preschool period (h1). On the other hand, s(.) is 
the schooling production function that depends on the amount of child‟s time spent in 
schooling and studying, s
cT , and a vector of other educational inputs and school 
characteristics, Q. In period 2, γ(.) is assumed to be predetermined while the interaction 
between γ(.) and s(.) produces new human capital. For simplicity we are assuming that 
accumulation of long-term human capital does not depend on fluctuations in consumption 
after the preschool period. That is why 
cc2  is not included as an argument in human 
capital production function for period 2.  
The human capital the child accumulates through period 2 along with the net 
parental transfers determines his/her income in the post school period, y3:   
mhy 3                                                     (1.3) 
where m is the amount of net transfers a child makes to his/her parents in the post school 
period and ω is the return to human capital. Family income in period 2, y2, comes from 
three sources. For a typical agricultural household in a developing country like Ethiopia, 
the principal source of income is family production where both adult and child labor are 
used as inputs. The other potential sources of income for agricultural households include 
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wage earnings and remittances. Letting wp and wc be the opportunity costs of the parent‟s 
time and child‟s time, respectively, the total family income in period 2 is given as, 
  RTwThwTwKTTqy
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p  )()|,( 12                (1.4) 
where q(.) is the total value of family production, 
f
pT is parent‟s time in family 
production, 
w
pT is parent‟s time in wage employment, 
f
cT is child‟s time in family 
production, K is a vector of family assets like land and livestock, and R stands for family 
income from other sources including remittances . We are assuming that the child does 
not engage in wage employment during the school period which is generally true in the 
rural Ethiopian context. As such, the child‟s opportunity cost of time in period 2, wc, is 
his/her marginal product in family production and it is assumed to depend on the child‟s 
physical fitness developed in period 1. In other words, we are assuming that wc is the 
return (in period 2) to the physical human capital of the child built in period 1. For 
simplicity we are also assuming away hired labor and non-family labor although cases of 
the latter may be observed even in subsistence agriculture mainly because of labor-
sharing arrangements. Now, letting p represent a vector of prices for the other educational 
inputs,  the cost function for schooling can be derived following the standard procedure 
for deriving cost functions (for details see Cigno and Rosati 2005, 31-32). Assuming that 
the production function for schooling stated under 1.2 is homogenous and twice 
continuously differentiable, we can minimize the cost of inputs, X, subject to a given 
level of schooling  s  as   
pQThwX sc
QT sc
 )(min 1
,
       S.T.      sQTs sc ),(                                 (1.5) 
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This gives us the conditional cost function, )),(,( 1 phwsX c  
where the cost of 
schooling depends on the input prices and the level of schooling.  X(.) is assumed to 
exhibit the standard properties of a cost function. Then, normalizing the price of 
consumption goods to 1, the budget constraint for period 2 can be stated as,  
                                 AphwsXccy c
cp  )),(,( 1222                                  (1.6) 
where A represents parental savings part of which may be transferred to the child in the 
post school period and y2 is given by equation 1.4.  In period 3 parents retire and live on 
the returns from their savings from the earlier period and transfers from the child if m is 
positive. Therefore, the parent‟s budget constraint for period 3 can be stated as: 
     mrAc p 3                                                     (1.7) 
where r is return on parental assets. The net parental transfers could be positive if child-
to-parent transfers exceed parent-to-child transfers.  Substituting 1.7 and 1.3 for pc3 and 
3y in equation 1.1 respectively, and then substituting 1.2 for h we can rewrite the family‟s 
utility function in period 2 as, 
)),((.),(*)()( 2322 mQTscUmrAucuU
s
c
cp                      (1.8) 
Note that u1(.) is no longer relevant in period 2 and hence ignored. Assuming that 
the non-negativity constraints for consumption and parental savings are non-binding and 
also assuming that the time constraint for both the parents and the child is non-binding so 
that the Lagrangian multipliers on all these constrains are 0, we can maximize
2
 1.8 
                                                          
2
 In writing the maximization problem without the expectations operator, we are assuming that parents 
face no uncertainty about the values of the third period variables like the return to human capital.  
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subject to 1.6 to obtain the conditions that determine parental decisions on consumption, 
savings and time use for themselves and for the child. The Lagrangian function for the 
maximization problem is, 
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The first order conditions that are relevant for the purpose at hand are, 
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Condition 1.14 states that the marginal product of the child‟s time in family 
production in period 2 equals the opportunity cost of the child‟s time that itself is 
assumed to depend on the child‟s physical fitness accumulated during the preschool 
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period. In 1.13 sX  is the marginal cost of schooling that is henceforth denoted by MCs 
and sh   is the marginal productivity of schooling in the production of overall human 
capital henceforth denoted by h
sMP . The marginal cost of schooling depends on the level 
of schooling, the opportunity cost of the child‟s time and price of other educational 
inputs. Dividing 1.10 by 1.11 we obtain,  
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The middle term in 1.16 is the marginal rate of inter-temporal substitution 
between current consumption and future consumption for the parents (
p
ccMRS 23 , ). The 
equation states that parents save for their future consumption until the marginal utility of 
the current consumption relative to their future consumption is equated to return on 
savings (the interest rate). The analogous condition for the child is obtained by dividing 
1.12 by 1.13, 
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The middle term in 1.16 is the marginal rate of inter-temporal substitution 
between current consumption and future income for the child (
c
cyMRS 23 , ). The term in the 
parenthesis on the right hand side of this equation may be interpreted as the marginal 
return to investment in schooling in terms of building the overall human capital of the 
child. The entire term on the right hand side then represents the marginal return to human 
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capital built through schooling. Note that the effectiveness of investment in schooling in 
building the overall human capital (knowledge and capability) of the child depends on the 
learning efficiency of the child and marginal productivity of schooling in the production 
of human capital. While some of the learning efficiency could be genetic and may be 
acquired through inheritance, part of it is built through investment in nutrition and 
healthcare during the preschool period. However, it is assumed that parents treat these as 
sunk costs when they make decisions about consumption and time use in period 2.  
Assuming that parents try to allocate the family‟s resources so as to maximize the 
life time utility for themselves and the child and given that total utility is strictly 
increasing in both the parents‟ and the child‟s consumption, they will allocate the child‟s 
time between s
cT  and 
f
cT by comparing the future marginal return to investment in 
human capital (given by the right hand side of 1.16) to the return that the child‟s 
contribution to the current income could bring in if it were to be saved for future 
consumption (r). If ]/(.)[ s
h
s MCMPr  , then parents are likely to allocate more of the 
child‟s time to generating current income through child labor and less to schooling since 
marginal return to asset savings is greater than the marginal return to human capital. On 
the other hand, if ]/(.)[ s
h
s MCMPr  , then parents are likely to allocate more of the 
child‟s time to schooling and less to family work since marginal  return to human capital 
in the future is greater than the marginal return to savings. Therefore, the optimal 
allocation of the child‟s time between schooling and current income generating activities 
is given by,  
                           (1.17) 
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A situation where a child is full-time student is a discrete case that may arise 
because of a very high marginal return to investment in schooling relative to the return 
from savings that could be made from potential contribution of the child to the current 
income. Similarly, a situation where a child works full time could arise because of a very 
high return to the child‟s current contribution to income compared to the anticipated 
marginal return to schooling. In practice, the possibility of observing these discrete cases 
is often high due to the fact that schooling requires some minimal level of time 
commitment from the child and the perfect continuity in time allocation presumed under 
the solutions above may not hold.  
The influence of our key variable of interest, preschool physical fitness (h1), on 
the parental decisions about the child‟s time allocation comes in through its effect on the 
marginal return to human capital. And h1 affects the marginal return to human capital 
through its effect on the marginal cost of schooling, efficiency of learning and marginal 
productivity of schooling in the production of human capital.  For a given ω, therefore, 
the net effect of a higher value of h1 on the return to investment in human capital depends 
on the relative strength of the following two effects.                        
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The term to the left of the question mark in 1.18 represents the effect of h1 on the 
marginal cost of schooling. This comes in through the marginal productivity of the child 
in family production activities. The higher the value of h1 the more productive the child 
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will be in the family activities and the higher will be the value of his/her wc. Therefore, a 
higher h1 leads to higher marginal opportunity cost of schooling and the sign of the term 
to the left of the question mark is positive. This tends to reduce the marginal return to 
investment in human capital. Mathematically, this is easy to see since MCs is in the 
denominator of the expression for marginal return to investment in human capital in 
equation 1.17. 
On the other hand, the expression to the right of the question mark in 1.18 
represents the effect of h1 on learning efficiency and marginal productivity of schooling 
in building human capital. The term 1(.) h , captures the effect of physical fitness on 
the learning efficiency of the child that is assumed to be positive because of the 
empirically observed positive relationship between physical stature and cognitive ability. 
Note that learning efficiency is important in learning knowledge and skills not only at 
school but also outside the school environment and 1(.) h  represents the effect of h1 
on this overall effectiveness in learning knowledge.  The second term on the right 
captures the effect of h1 on the marginal productivity of schooling in building human 
capital and this comes in through the effect of h1 on the learning efficiency. Higher value 
of h1 leads to more effectiveness in learning that itself is expected to improve 
productivity of schooling in building human capital rendering the sign of the entire 
expression to the right of the question mark to also be positive. Therefore, higher h1 tends 
to boost return to investment in human capital through its effect on γ(.) and h
sMP since 
both of  these  terms are in the numerator of the expression for the return to investment in 
human capital stated under equation 1.17. 
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The net effect of h1 on the marginal return to investment in human capital will be 
negative if its effect on MCs is stronger than its combined effect on γ(.) and hsMP .  For 
given values of r, ω and parental preferences, therefore, parents will have an incentive to 
keep a physically stronger child out of school so as to engage in the child labor activities. 
This means, parents believe that the marginal productivity of such a child in the current 
family activities is higher than whatever future gains (net of the cost of schooling) in 
earnings the child could achieve through schooling.  On the other hand, if the combined 
effect of h1 on the overall efficiency of learning and the marginal productivity of 
schooling is stronger than its effect on MCs, parents will have an incentive to send the 
child to school. Whether parents allow the child to be a full time student by letting 
him/her to focus on studying even after  coming back from attending school or ask 
him/her to work after school can be established following similar reasoning.  This is so 
because studying after school is part of the human capital building process whose 
opportunity cost could be measured by the marginal productivity of the child in family 
activities just like attending school. Therefore, the effect of physical stature of the child 
on child labor and schooling is theoretically ambiguous as opposed to the prevailing 
wisdom that it enhances the chances of attending school. 
To empirically test the implications of this theoretical model, we need to derive 
the parental demand functions for own and child‟s consumption as well as time use. 
When specific structural forms are assumed for the utility function, specific forms for the 
demand functions can be derived by simultaneously solving the relevant first order 
conditions stated above and the budget constraint state under 1.6. For a general form of 
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the utility function assumed here, however, the demand functions will take the following 
general forms. 
                                               
),,,,,,,( 1
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c                           (1.19) 
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The demand functions for other choice variables
*
2
cc , 
*
2
pc , 
*f
pT , 
*w
pT , A* and Q* 
take similar general forms.  It is important to note that these demand functions are 
interdependent because of the simultaneous nature of parental decisions. This is 
particularly magnified in the case of time use decisions because of the fixed time 
constraint.  For a child constrained with only 24 hours a day, more time for family labor 
means less time for attending school and studying then after. Therefore, joint estimates of 
the demand functions will generally provide more accurate estimates of the effects of the 
covariates on each of the parental choices than the estimates from independent equations 
for each demand function. This is so because some of the factors that influence parental 
decisions may not be observable and hence cannot be included as regressors in each 
equation. As a result the errors that include these unobservables will be correlated across 
equations and joint estimation techniques that exploit these correlations will lead to more 
accurate estimates. 
To specify such joint empirical models for parental demand for child labor and 
schooling we first define the indirect utility function for the parents, 
),,,,,,,( 1  rmwRphv p , by successively substituting the relevant demand functions into 
1.2,  1.3, and 1.7 and the resulting functions into 1.8 along with 
*
2
cc  and 
*
2
pc . The indirect 
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utility function is thus defined in terms of observables. From the researcher‟s perspective, 
however, there are unobservable elements that may influence parents‟ decisions and 
restating the utility function by adding these random components to the indirect utility 
provides the basis for the empirical models specified in the next section. 
 
Econometric Models and Estimation Methodology 
The main purpose of this essay is to analyze the effect of physical stature of a 
child in the form of height-for-age z-scores on his/her participation in child labor and 
schooling. The empirical model for the analysis has to allow for the potential correlation 
between the error terms of the schooling and child labor equations that arises because of 
the joint nature of the two decisions.  In addition, the models have to fit at least two 
common features of the data on parents‟ allocation of children‟s time in developing 
countries, as already noted by Maitra and Ray (2002), Shafik (2007), and Bacolod and 
Ranjan (2008) among others. These include a situation where the child neither works nor 
attends school and a situation where the child combines both. Recognizing these, we can 
lay down at least four scenarios for parents‟ possible child activity choices in a given 
period. First, the child neither works nor attends school; i.e., 0scT  and 0
f
cT . Let‟s 
denote parental utility from this choice of child‟s activity as v0(.). Second, the child 
attends school but does not work, 0scT  and 0
f
cT with utility v1(.). Third, the child 
works but does not attend school, 0scT  and 0
f
cT  with utility v2(.) and the final 
choice is for the child to combine both school and work, 0scT  and 0
f
cT , with utility 
v3(.).  If we denote the random components of the parents‟ utility from the child i‟s 
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activity j as εij, the additive randomized utility (see Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 504) of 
the parents from child i‟s activity j can be stated as,  
ijijij vU  (.) ,    where, i=1,…,n,     j=0,1,2,3.                         (1.21) 
Parents will choose activity j over activity k for child i if and only if  Uij(.)≥Uik(.) 
for all j≠k and j,k=0,1,2,3. Denoting the parents‟ activity alternatives for child i by yi, the 
probability that activity j is chosen over k is then, given as, 
   ][)( ikiji UUPjyP  , for all j≠k. 
    ](.)(.)[ ikikijij vvP   ,for all j≠k. 
    ][ ikijijik vvP   , for all j≠k.    (1.22) 
Assuming that the errors are distributed as type I extreme value and vij is linear in 
its arguments, the probabilities in (1.22) can be modeled as multinomial logit with 4 
outcomes (see Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 505 and Wooldridge 2002, 497).  The 
multinomial logit model with random effects for child and family level unobserved 
heterogeneities is described in appendix C. Such a model may be useful to jointly 
estimate the various child activity equations but does-not fully account for the 
correlations between errors in the equations because it assumes independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA). IIA requires that the relative probability of choosing between 
any two alternatives is unaffected by the presence of a third alternative, but that may not 
always hold in practice. As an alternative approach, therefore, a bivariate probit model is 
specified for the child-activity choices described above.  
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To specify the bivariate probit model for child work and schooling we can define 
two separate latent variables by adding unobserved random components to the indirect 
utility parents derive from child schooling and work as,    
isisis vu  (.)
*
                 (1.23)
 
iwiwiw vu  (.)
*
                 (1.24)
 
where *
isu and 
*
iwu represent additive random utility parents derive from child i‟s 
participation in   schooling and family work , respectively.  Maintaining the assumption 
that vij(.) is linear in its arguments, we can restate 1.23 and 1.24 as, 
 
issisis xu  
'*
                 (1.25)
 
iwwiwiw xu  
'*
                 (1.26)
 
where 
'
ijx represents a vector of covariates including our key variable of interest,  physical 
stature of the child (h1). The latent variables, 
*
isu and
*
iwu , are unobserved but let‟s assume 
that parents send a child to school or work only when the overall utility from doing so is 
positive. Then we can define the following dichotomous variables for child‟s 
participation in schooling and family work, respectively. 
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The four possible choices parents can make regarding child i‟s time use are now: 
si=0, wi=0; si=0, wi=1;  si=1, wi=0; and si=1, wi=1. Assuming that εiw and εis are 
distributed jointly normal with means zero, variances one, and correlation  , the 
probabilities of observing each of these joint outcomes can be specified as bivariate 
normal. For example, the probability of observing si=1, wi=1 can be stated as,  
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where (.) and Ф(.) are the standardized bivariate normal density and the cumulative 
density function for (zs, zw), respectively. We can state similar bivariate cumulative 
density and density functions for the other three possible outcomes. Following Green 
(2007), these can be generalized as, 
 30.1),,(
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where the indicator function δis=1 if si=1 and δis=-1 if si=0. Similarly, δiw=1 if wi=1 and 
δiw=-1 if wi=0. Then the log-likelihood function for the bivariate probit model can be 
stated as, 
 
i
iwiswiwiwsisis xxL ),,(lnln
''                            (1.31) 
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We estimate 1.31 and 1.22 using maximum likelihood procedures. We also try to 
estimate a semi-nonparametric bivariate model for child schooling and labor using the 
procedure developed in Gallant and Nychka (1987). In their approach, as slightly 
modified by De Luca (2008), the unknown joint density of the errors is approximated by 
the Hermite series of the form,  
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where, ϕ(.) is the standardized Gaussian density, 
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is a normalization factor that ensures h(.) integrates to 1. Equation 1.32 approximates the 
joint density of the errors   as the product of a squared polynomial and a standardized 
bivariate normal density where the latter is assumed just for convenience.  Gallant and 
Nychka (1987) demonstrate that 1.32 approximates densities with arbitrary skewness and 
kurtosis except those that are violently oscillatory.  In implementation, the vector of 
parameters ),...,,(
210100 rr
  is normalized by setting 100  since the polynomial 
expansion in 1.32 is invariant to multiplication of the parameter vector by a scalar. The 
specification of the pseudo–log-likelihood function and the detailed procedures for 
implementation of the model are explained in De Luca (2008). This approach not only 
relaxes the parametric assumption of the bivariate probit model in estimating the 
coefficients but also allows detailed examination of the characteristics of the error 
densities for different values of r1 and r2.   
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In addition to the child‟s height-for-age z scores as a measure of the child‟s 
physical fitness, the vector of covariates in all the models includes child‟s age and 
gender, number of siblings, livestock and land area owned as measures of the 
household‟s wealth status, parents‟ age and education, as well as distance to a primary 
school as a proxy for cost of schooling. The indicators for household wealth could be 
thought of as proxies for household income, discussed in the theoretical model. 
Information on household income gathered through surveys in the rural areas of 
developing countries is often unreliable and wealth indicators could be better measures of 
household well-being. Controlling for wealth indicators is important because the need for 
child labor and the ability of the families to send their children to school could vary with 
wealth status. Variation across households and changes over time in wealth indicators 
could also be correlated with nutritional status of children; thus failing to control for 
wealth indicators could bias our estimates. The theoretical model described above also 
implies that the wage rate for child labor is a relevant variable that should be accounted 
for in the empirical model since the wage paid to a child could be correlated with 
physical stature. However, child labor in rural Ethiopia almost entirely consists of unpaid 
family labor, so information on formal wage rates for children is unavailable. The child‟s 
opportunity cost of time is essentially his/her marginal product in the family production 
activity and to the extent that the marginal productivity depends on having other assets to 
work with, children in the families with more land and livestock could have higher 
opportunity cost of time than children with less assets. Therefore, inclusion of land and 
asset ownership as covariates may partly control for the opportunity cost of the child‟s 
time. 
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The vectors of coefficients from the bivariate probit and multinomial logit models 
are used to calculate the marginal effects of the covariates on the probability of observing 
each of the joint outcomes:  p(si=0, wi=0),  p(si=0, wi=1),   p(si=1, wi=0),  and p(si=1, 
wi=1). For the purpose of comparison with other studies that estimated an independent 
equation just for schooling, we also estimate the standard probit models for the child‟s 
school attendance and participation in family work. Therefore, the marginal effects of the 
covariates on p(si=1) and p(wi=1) are computed using both the joint models as well as 
independent probit models.  As briefly described in the previous section, the marginal 
effect of our key variable of interest, child‟s physical stature on child schooling and child 
labor is theoretically ambiguous.  The existing literature generally argues that better 
physical fitness enhances the chances that a child attends schooling implying that its 
effect on p(si=1) will be strongly positive. The effects of physical fitness on the joint 
outcomes have not been examined by the existing studies. Therefore, the estimates here 
help us to answer an important question of whether child‟s physical fitness enhances the 
child‟s chances of being a full time student, p(si=1, wi=0), or part-time student,  p(si=1, 
wi=1), or  even full-time worker, p(si=0, wi=1).  
One important issue that needs to be addressed in estimating these models is the 
potential endogeneity of the child‟s physical stature in both schooling and child labor 
equations. Endogeneity could arise because parents may be providing preferential 
treatment in terms of nutrition to some children (particularly when resources are limited) 
in anticipation of specific role for each child depending on their perceptions regarding the 
importance of physical fitness for each of the child‟s anticipated roles. For example, 
parents may feed the oldest child very well so that he/she quickly grows up and helps 
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them in fulfilling the family labor needs. If this is the case it may be the anticipated role 
for the child (schooling or labor) that is determining his physical stature rather than the 
other way round and the estimates may not represent a causal effect. Therefore, an 
exogenous source of variation in nutrition status that is beyond the control of the parents 
is needed to identify its effects on schooling and child labor. Exposure to a famine caused 
by a massive drought and localized rainfall shocks are used as identifying instruments as 
discussed in the next section. 
Another critical issue is how to implement instrumental variables estimation in 
the context of these heavily nonlinear models for non-binary outcomes.  There are at least 
three approaches that have been used to address this issue in various contexts. One 
possibility is to jointly estimate the first stage equation for the endogenous variable and 
the second-stage equation for the outcome variable of interest, for example,  using the full 
information maximum likelihood approach to obtain asymptotically efficient estimators 
as initially proposed by Hausman (1975) . However, the application of this method 
generally depends on some arbitrary assumptions about the joint distribution of the errors 
in the two equations the validity of which cannot be readily verified.  
The other commonly applied method is what may be called „two-stage predictor 
substitution‟ (2SPS) where the endogenous regressor in the second-stage equation is 
replaced by its predicted value from a separately run auxiliary regression correcting the 
standard errors for the resulting measurement error bias (for some of the recent 
applications of this method see Lu and McGuire 2002; Meer and Rosen 2004; Savage and 
Wright 2003; Gramm 2003).  Unlike the linear models where the two-stage predictor 
substitution leads to consistent estimates, however, the consistency of such estimates in 
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the non-linear context has not been well established. In fact Terza, Basu and Rathouz 
(2008) show that such a method generally leads to inconsistent estimates in the non-linear 
models. On the other hand, they demonstrate that an alternative method that requires 
inclusion of the residual from the first-stage auxiliary regression in the second-stage 
equation provides consistent estimates. The two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method 
has been recently used by a number of empirical studies (see Stuart, Doshi, and Terza  
2009;  Shea et al. 2007;  Gibson et al. 2006; Shin and Moon 2007;  DeSimone  2002;  
Baser et al. 2004) but its theoretical properties in such applications have not been 
formally examined until the latest work by Terza, Basu and Rathouz (2008). 
According to Terza, Basu and Rathouz (2008) the 2SRI method provides 
consistent estimates because the unobserved factors that led to endogeneity of the 
regressor can be controlled for by the residuals from the first stage auxiliary regression as 
long as we can find valid identifying instruments. This method provides not only 
consistent estimates but asymptotically correct standard errors. They test their theoretical 
results about the consistency of the 2SRI and inconsistency of 2SPS estimates using 
simulated data with 5,000 and 20,000 observations. They find negligible biases in the 
2SRI estimates and several times larger biases in the 2SPS estimates for a duration model 
with multinomial endogenous treatments and ordered logit model with count-valued 
endogenous treatments.  They apply the two methods to actual data as well and find that 
the 2SPS method substantially overestimates the effect of the endogenous variable. 
Therefore, we use the 2SRI method to address the potential endogeneity of the child‟s 
physical stature in the bivariate probit and multinomial logit models for child labor and 
schooling where the first stage is a linear model for the child‟s height-for-age z scores. 
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The two-stage approach fits the models here conceptually as well because  parental 
decisions are  formulated as sequential where the early period focuses on building the 
physical fitness of the child through nutrition and health services and the subsequent 
period largely focuses on allocating the child‟s time to schooling or family labor or both.  
  
Identification Strategy 
The findings in the literature on nutrition indicate that there is strong relationship 
between height-for-age in early childhood and height-for-age later in life (e.g., See 
Martorell et al. 1995; Martorell 1999, 1997). In fact Martorell et al. conclude that 
“regardless of the choice of reference population, growth is markedly retarded only in 
early childhood; adolescence is not a period when growth is significantly constrained” 
(p.1060S). This implies that factors that significantly affect the child‟s nutritional status 
during early childhood are likely to be strongly correlated with the child‟s cumulative 
nutrition outcome, say height-for-age, later in life. Therefore, if one could find exogenous 
shocks that could substantially influence the child‟s nutrition during early childhood, 
these shocks must be correlated with the child‟s cumulative nutrition outcomes later in 
life and hence can be used to identify the effect of the latter on other outcomes for the 
child like schooling and child labor. Using contemporaneous shocks in such contexts may 
not be appropriate because they may influence the schooling and child labor outcomes 
directly, for example by putting the household under resource pressure. On the other hand 
shocks that happened well in the past are less likely to be directly correlated with current 
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child labor and schooling outcomes except through their long-lasting effect on the child‟s 
physical and cognitive abilities. 
The fact that the livelihoods of the rural communities in Ethiopia are highly 
dependent on rainfall conditions provides an opportunity to use rainfall related shocks to 
identify the effects of early childhood malnutrition on child outcomes later in life. Two 
approaches are followed in using the rainfall related shocks for this purpose. First, an 
attempt is made to exploit a famine caused by a massive drought in 1984 where the 
average rainfall nationwide was 22% below the long-term average, making it the worst 
drought since rainfall data started to be systematically recorded in 1961 (Webb, von 
Joachim and Yohannes 1992). While household level data on experience during the 
famine are largely unavailable, in 1995 a sample of 1477 households from 15 different 
sites in the country were asked to recall the three biggest droughts over the previous 20 
years in which they lost a substantial amount of their harvest and/or livestock. Nearly half 
the households reported to have lost substantial crop harvest and/or livestock because of 
the drought in 1984/85 agricultural seasons. The ages of the children in these sample 
households could be traced back to the time of the drought to identify the group of 
children who were particularly vulnerable (1 to 3 years old according to the literature on 
nutrition). These potentially affected children would have been 10 to 12 years old in 
1994.  
The interactions between dummy variables that identify these children and a 
dummy variable that identifies households who reported to have faced a substantial shock 
at the time are used as the first set of identifying instruments for early childhood 
malnutrition. That is, the identifying instruments are generated by interacting a dummy 
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for the reported household level shock with a dummy for being age 1, a dummy for being 
age 2 and a dummy for being age 3 in 1984. Children who were 4 to 6 years old at the 
time of the drought (13 to 15 years old in 1994) are included as controls. These are 
children who must have been less vulnerable at the time of the drought and must have not 
sustained substantial damage in their physical stature from the shock.
3
 Because of the 
observed linearity in the relationship between height-for-age in early childhood and later 
in life (Martorell et al. 1995), the age-shock interactions correlated with height-for-age in 
the early childhood period should be correlated with height-for-age in 1994 and the 
subsequent periods. To control for the genetic variation in height we also include the 
mother‟s and father‟s height as additional covariates in the first stage regressions for 
child‟s height-for age.4 This approach is implemented using data from the first round of 
the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) conducted in 1994 and another round in 
1995.  
In the absence of detailed data on household experience at the time of the drought, 
however, the famine shock may still be an imperfect way to accurately identify the 
degree of malnutrition faced by children from different households. This is so because the 
capabilities of the households to cope with crop and livestock loss might differ. Another 
issue with using the famine shocks to identify the effects of malnutrition is that children 
who survived the famine and are found alive in 1994 could be the stronger ones who 
could withstand the effects of the drought, while weaker children might have already 
                                                          
3
 Children who were born at and after 1984 may not be an effective comparison group because they may 
also have been the victims of the after-effects of the drought at their critical age. These children, 
therefore, are excluded from the sample.  
4
 Mother’s height was used for similar purpose by Glewwe and Jacoby (1995). 
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died, in which case the effect of the shock could be understated.
5
  Another concern with 
this approach is that parents‟ age recalls may entail some errors in a situation where 
formal records of child‟s birth date are not kept, as is largely true in rural Ethiopia. This 
may be a more serious problem particularly when age recalling involves longer time 
periods.  
As a way of validating our results from the 1984-drought based identification 
strategy, therefore, an alternative strategy based on localized rain-fall shocks is 
implemented using data from a different cohort of children who were 1 to 6 years old at 
the time of the first round of the survey in 1994. The fact that the birth dates for these 
children are relatively close to the survey period is expected to make it easier for the 
parents to accurately recall the child‟s age and hence minimize the potential age-recall 
error bias. The localized rainfall shocks are defined on the basis of the deviations of the 
annual rainfall in the locality from its long-term mean.
6
 Both substantial rain deficits and 
excessive rains are considered rainfall shocks since both can lead to crop failure. 
Substantial rain deficit is represented by a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the rainfall 
shortfall from the long-term mean is bigger than 1 standard deviation and excessive 
rainfall shock is represented by a dummy taking a value of 1 if the excess of rain over the 
long-term mean exceeds 1 standard deviation. Because of the erratic nature of rainfall in 
most localities in Ethiopia, the long-term standard deviations of rainfall are quite large 
representing more than 15% of the mean annual rainfall on average. Therefore, rainfall 
deficits and excesses exceeding 1 standard deviation represent substantial shock that may 
                                                          
5
 But the data on mortality history gathered during the 1995 round of the survey don’t show any 
unusually high mortality in 1984 for the age group included in our sample. 
6
 A similar strategy was followed by Maccini and Yang (2009). 
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lead to crop failures and significant reductions in consumption in rural Ethiopia. For 
example, Dercon (2002) finds that a 10% decrease in rainfall from the long-term mean 
decreases food consumption by up to 5% and localized rainfall shortfalls of this 
magnitude or bigger are quite common in Ethiopia.  
Therefore, the rainfall shocks faced by a child during the first 3 years of life are 
taken as exogenous indicators of early childhood malnutrition and hence used as 
instruments for the child‟s age-standardized heights in the child labor and schooling 
models. In this case height-for-age measured towards the end of the preschool period are 
used since the anthropometric data were gathered for all members of the sample 
households in 1994, 1995 and 1997. The genetic variations in children‟s height are 
controlled for by mother‟s and father‟s heights in this approach as well. Malnutrition 
induced by exogenous rainfall shocks is expected to explain what is left of these natural 
differences in the heights of children.  The schooling and child labor models for this 
cohort of children are estimated using data from the latest two rounds of the survey 
conducted in 1999 and 2004. The age range for this cohort in 2004 is similar to the age 
range for the older cohort in 1994. Therefore, results from the two identification 
strategies are expected to be at least qualitatively comparable although rainfall shortfalls 
might be weaker instruments than the major famine shock.  
 
Data and Summary Statistics 
The analysis in this essay is based on data from the various rounds of the 
Ethiopian rural household survey (ERHS) conducted by the Economics Department of 
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Addis Ababa University in collaboration with the Center for the Study of African 
Economies at the University of Oxford, the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). ERHS is a unique 
longitudinal data set in Ethiopia the first round of which was conducted in 1994 
(subsequently referred to as 1994a) and covered 1477 households from 15 different sites 
across the country. Another round was conducted later in 1994 (henceforth referred to as 
1994b) followed by one round each in 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2004. The attrition rate was 
small between successive rounds and the 6
th
 round in 2004 managed to successfully re-
interview about 1370 of the households in the original sample. The 15 sites (called 
peasant associations) were selected to represent the major farming systems
7
 in the county 
and households were randomly selected from the list of households in each peasant 
association. While strictly speaking ERHS is not nationally representative
8
, the major 
statistics from this survey are very close to those from nationally representative surveys 
(see Dercon 2000).  
All the rounds of the ERHS data contain detailed information on household 
demographics, asset ownership, as well as income and consumption. Information on 
height and weight for all household members was gathered in all the rounds except in 
1999. The anthropometric data in the ERHS are directly collected by the enumerators 
using measuring scales. While this may not totally eliminate measurement errors, it is 
expected to minimize it compared to the surveys where data on respondent heights and 
weights are collected through self-reporting. Information on exposure to significant 
                                                          
7
 These are the grain-plough areas of the Northern and Central highlands, the Enset-growing areas and 
the sorghum-hoe areas. 
8
 The pastoralist farming system was not represented, 
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drought shocks was gathered during the 1995 round. In this round households were asked 
to list three most important droughts (listed in the order of severity) over the last 20 years 
because of which they suffered substantial loss of harvest and/or livestock.  
The analysis that uses the 1984 drought as exogenous source of malnutrition 
focuses on the cohort of children who were 10 to 15 years old during the 1994a round 
(henceforth called the older cohort)  who must have been 1 to 6 years old during the 1984 
drought. Those who were age 1 to 3 may be considered as the treatment group because 
this is the age range that evidence from the nutrition literature shows is the critical period 
where malnutrition can have a lasting impact on the child‟s stature. Those who were 4 to 
6 could be considered as the comparison group because there is not strong evidence that 
malnutrition beyond age 3 has a lasting impact on the child‟s physical stature. For the 
analysis where localized rainfall shocks are used as exogenous sources of malnutrition 
data from the cohort of children who were 1 to 6 years old during 1994a round 
(henceforth called the younger cohort) are used.    
Data on child activities were collected in 1994a, 1995, 1999 and 2004. Child 
activity data for the analysis involving the older cohort comes from 1994a and 1995 
rounds. However, the level of detail in the data on child-activity was different in the two 
rounds. In 1994a, data on child activities were collected as part of main activities for all 
household members and the main activity categories for children included student, farm 
worker, domestic worker, domestic and farm worker, off-farm business worker, and not 
involved in work
9
. This round did not ask questions on activity combinations of children. 
                                                          
9
 While some of the activities such as farming could vary seasonally, most of the activities in which 
children participate like herding cattle, fetching water and fuel wood, watching the little kids and other 
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On the other hand the 1995 round collected data on not only the main activity of the child 
but also on secondary and tertiary activities. Specifically, the 1995 round asked the 1
st
, 
2
nd
 and 3
rd
 activity of the child ranked in terms of hours spent on each. These activity 
combinations were collected for both students and non-students. As a result, it is possible 
to identify children who combined schooling and child labor in 1995 but not in 1994a. 
Child activity data for the analysis involving the younger cohort comes from the 1999 
and the 2004 rounds. Both rounds collected data on both main and secondary activities of 
all household members including children out of which data on activity combinations for 
children in the sample cohort are compiled.  
Height-for-age z-scores for children were calculated using the software, 
ANTHRO
10
, which uses in-built median heights and weights for similar age groups and 
gender from the healthy U.S. population as references.  The age-standardized height for 
each child thus represents the number of standard deviations by which the child‟s height 
deviates from the median height of the healthy U.S. children with similar age and gender. 
For the older cohort age-for-height z-scores from 1994a and 1995 rounds are used. An 
ideal data for the purpose at hand would have been to use height-for-age data collected 
after the critical period (age 3) but before the school age
11
 since the height of the child in 
this period will fully reflect the outcome of his/her early childhood nutrition experience. 
Unfortunately, such data are unavailable for the older cohort but the analysis based on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
domestic chores are year round activities and there will always be something for children to do 
throughout the year. Therefore, seasonality is assumed away in our analysis. 
10
 The software is provided by WHO and is available at 
http://www.who.int/childgrowth/software/en/index.html, accessed April, 2009. 
 
11
 While there is no official school starting age in Ethiopia, it is rare for a child in rural Ethiopia to start 
school before age 7 because of the long distances children have to travel to get to the nearest elementary 
school. 
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child heights measured in 1994 and 1995 but identified through a malnutrition shock 
experienced during the early childhood period will still be informative because of the 
observed linear relationship between height-for-age at the end of the critical period and 
height-for-age later in life.   
On the other hand, data on the preschool height and weight are available for the 
younger cohort. Therefore, the analysis involving data from the younger cohort uses child 
height-for-age measured after the critical period but before the school age. For those who 
were 4 to 6 years old during 1994a, height data reported in 1994a or 1994b (if height is 
missing in 1994a) are taken. For those who were 3 years old during 1994a, height data 
reported in 1995 round are taken while for those who were 1 or 2 years old during 1994a, 
height data reported in 1997 are taken. Therefore, estimation results from the younger 
cohort are expected to directly reflect the effects of early childhood malnutrition on the 
child activity choices. 
The monthly data on rainfall for the stations closest to the survey sites were 
obtained from the Ethiopian Meteorological Agency for the period from 1970 to 2006. 
The key rainfall data needed for the purpose at hand were for the 8 years or 96 months 
from 1988-1995 for each of the 15 sites when the children in the younger cohort were at 
their critical stage of development
12
. From the total of these1440 key monthly rainfall 
records, however, 249 were missing 
13
(see tables B1&B2 in appendix B for details) and 
                                                          
12
 For those who were 1 year old during 1994a round the critical years were taken to be 1993, 1994 and 
1995. For those who were 2 years old the critical years were 1992, 1993 and 1994. For the 3 year olds the 
critical years were 1991, 1992 and 1993. For the 4 year olds the critical years were 1990, 1991 and 1992. 
For the 5 year olds the critical years are 1989, 1990 and 1991. For the 6 year olds the critical years are 
1988, 1989 and 1990. 
13
 While this is a lot of missing data by any standard and could possibly lead to understatement of the 
effects of the rainfall shocks, our results remain nearly unchanged when we re-estimate our models for 
45 
 
 
 
replaced by the long-term average for the same month from the same station. The annual 
rainfall data were then obtained by adding up the monthly data for each year.   Annual 
rainfall deviations for each locality were calculated by subtracting the long-term mean 
rainfall for the locality from the annual rainfall. Then, three variables representing rainfall 
deviation that prevailed during the 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years of each child in the younger 
cohort were defined. Three dummies identifying substantial rain-deficit during the 1
st
, 2
nd
 
and 3
rd
 years of the child are then defined to take a value of 1 if the absolute value of the 
rain deviation for the respective year was greater than 1 long-term standard deviation for 
the rainfall in the locality. Three other dummies identifying excessive rain during 1
st
, 2
nd
, 
and 3
rd
 years are also defined to take a value of 1 if the rainfall deviation the child faced 
during the respective year was greater than 1 standard deviation. These six dummies 
represent the local rainfall shocks
14
 that children in the younger cohort experienced 
during the critical period of their development.  
In addition to the child‟s height-for-age z-scores, a number of control variables 
are included in the estimated econometric models reported in the next section. These 
include land and livestock ownership as well as the distance to the nearest primary 
school. Data on agricultural land area owned by the household were collected in local 
units that varied across survey sites. The land areas measured in local units were 
converted into hectares using the land conversion units gathered through the community 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the younger cohort by excluding all the major cases with missing rainfall data as we report in the next 
section.   Glewwe and King (2001) also used rainfall data with large number of missing observations as an 
instrument for child malnutrition in Philippines and pointed out that the instrument could have 
understated the effects of child malnutrition on cognitive development.    
14
 The identification strategy based on the localized rainfall shocks assumes that the households lived at 
their current site for at least the first 6 years of the child’s life. According to the data collected on the 
migration history of the household head and his/her spouse during the 1994b round, the household head 
was either born in the survey site or arrived before 13 years except 2 cases where the head arrived before 
7 years and 5 years.  Therefore, mobility doesn’t seem to be an issue in our sample.  
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questionnaire of the ERHS. The various types of livestock owned were also converted 
into equivalent units and aggregated using the tropical livestock equivalent units that are 
available in the 1999 round of the survey. Data on distance to the nearest primary school 
were gathered only in the 1997 and 2004 rounds. Therefore, the distances to primary 
schools for the 1994a and 1995 rounds are approximated by the distances observed in 
1997. The distances to primary schools in 1999 were also approximated by the distances 
observed in 1997 except when the data gathered in 2004 indicated that a closer school 
was constructed between 1997 and 1999 in which case the distance information for 1999 
were updated to the latest. 
The summary statistics for child activities and the covariates used in the first and 
second stages of the econometric models for the older cohort are presented in table 1 
below.  In the sample of households interviewed for the 1994a round, there are 1232 
children of the older cohort with complete information for the variables of interest.  
About 24% were students whereas 69% were participating in family labor activities full-
time. About 7% were neither working nor attending school. For this round we do not 
have information as to who among the students were combining work with schooling. On 
the other hand, 1116 children of the older cohort have information for the variables of 
interest in the data for the 1995 round out of whom 25% were full time students and 9% 
were combining schooling and family work. The proportion of students is 10 percentage 
points higher during the 1995 round. The rapid change may have to do with the 
aggressive primary school expansion program initiated by the new government at the 
time. We observe similarly rapid growth in the percentage of students between 1999 and 
2004 for the younger cohort. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for the Variables Used in the Econometric Models for the  
               Older Cohort  
  
1994a 
(Obs=1232) 
     1995 
(Obs=1116) 
Variable                Description Mean St.dev Mean St.dev 
Student dummy=1 if student at school   0.24 0.43 0.34 0.48 
Working dummy=1 if working  
  
0.89 0.31 
Neither a student nor working dummy=1 if neither student at  
    
 
school nor working  0.07 0.26 0.02 0.13 
Student Only dummy=1 if student at school   
    
 
and not working  
  
0.09 0.29 
Work only dummy=1 if working and not   0.69 0.46 0.64 0.48 
 
student at school  
    Student and working dummy=1 if student at school   
    
 
and working  
  
0.25 0.44 
Child activity activity=0 if idle, =1 if student    
    
 
only , =2 if work only, =3 if student 
    
 
and working  
  
2.13 0.63 
Main activity of child main activity=0 if idle,  =1 if  
    
 
student, =2 if working 1.61 0.62 1.62 0.51 
Sex sex=1 if male 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 
Age  Age 12.40 1.76 13.10 1.63 
Agri. land area owned Agricultural land area owned 1.87 1.76 2.12 2.15 
Livestock units owned Tropical livestock units owned 4.89 6.68 4.77 6.35 
Father's education dummy=1 if child's father has   
    
 
completed at least primary 
    
 
education 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 
Mother's education dummy=1 if child's mother has   
    
 
completed at least primary 
    
 
education 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 
Distance to primary school Distance to the nearest primary  
    
 
school in kilometers 6.00 4.27 6.16 4.40 
Household size Household Size 8.26 3.24 8.73 3.39 
Number of siblings Number of siblings of the child 5.04 2.85 5.28 2.93 
Age of  father Age of child's father 49.30 9.82 49.93 9.93 
Age of  mother Age of child's mother 40.05 8.43 40.81 8.61 
Sex of household head dummy=1 if h.hold head is male 0.82 0.39 0.81 0.39 
Drought Affected in 1984 dummy=1 if household lost crop   
    
 
and/or livestock because of 1984 
    
 
drought 0.60 0.49 0.62 0.48 
First Year in 1984 dummy=1 if child was in his/her  
    
 
first year in 1984 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42 
Second Year in 1984 dummy=1 if child was in his/her  
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second year in 1984 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.37 
Third Year in 1984 dummy=1 if child was in his/her  
    
 
third year in 1984 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41 
Drought Affected at 1st Year dummy=1 if child was in 1st year    
    
 
IN 1984 and belonged to drought 
    
 
affected household 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.35 
Drought Affected at 2nd Year dummy=1 if child was in 2nd year   
    
 
in 1984 and belonged to drought 
    
 
affected household 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.31 
Drought Affected at 3rd Year dummy=1 if child was in 3nd year   
    
 
in 1984 and belonged to drought 
    
 
affected household 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.34 
Height-for-age  Child's Height-for-age z-scores -1.96 1.54 -2.12 1.44 
Height-for-age(Dr84)  Obs.94=742, Obs.95 =697 -1.99 1.52 -2.11 1.47 
Height-for-age (No Dr84)  Obs.94=490, Obs.95 =419 -1.91 1.55 -2.15 1.38 
Height-for-age(Dr84, A1-3) Obs.94=406, Obs.95 =426 -1.93 1.60 -2.05 1.48 
Height-for-age (No Dr84, A1-3 )  Obs.94=259, Obs.95 =249 -1.75 1.61 -1.98 1.39 
Height-for-age(Dr84, A4-6) Obs.94=336, Obs.95 =271 -2.07 1.44 -2.21 1.65 
Height-for-age (No Dr84, A4-6 )  Obs.94=231, Obs.95 =170 -2.09 1.42 -2.39 1.35 
Height of mother  Height of mother in centimeters 156.7 7.31 156.8 5.71 
Height of father  Height of father in centimeters 168.2 5.35 165.9 7.84 
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey. 
Notes: Dr84 identifies children affected by the 1984 drought; A1-3 identifies children who were 1 
to 3 years old at the time of the 1984 drought while A4-6 identifies children who were age 4 to 6 
at the time; Obs.94/Obs.95 stand for the number of observations in the category during the 
1994a/1995 rounds. 
 
 
The average height-for-age z-score for the older cohort is -1.96 during the 1994a 
round and -2.12 during the 1995 round. This means that children in this cohort are about 
2 standard deviations shorter on average than the healthy American children of the same 
age. According to the WHO standards
15
, children with height-for-age z-score less than -
2.00 are considered stunted (display retarded growth). About half (49% in 1994a and 
53% in 1995) of the children in this cohort were stunted. The evidence in table 1 also 
                                                          
15
 See the WHO growth standards at http://www.who.int/childgrowth/standards/en/, accessed April, 
2010. 
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shows that about 60% of the children in this cohort belonged to households that lost 
substantial amount of crops and/or livestock because of the 1984 drought out of which 
well over one half were at the critical age (age 1 to 3) at the time of the drought. There 
are also some indications that those who were affected by the drought at their critical age 
were more stunted than children of the same age who were not affected by the drought. 
According to the height measurements from the 1994a round for example, children 
affected by the drought at their critical age had average  height-for-age of -1.93 compared 
to -1.75 for children of the same age who were not affected by the drought. The pattern is 
similar in 1995 as well although the difference is smaller in the latter case and the 
standard errors are a bit large in both cases perhaps because of small sample sizes for 
each category. The first stages of the econometric models reported in the next section 
formally estimate the effect of the drought on height-for-age z-scores. 
The summary statistics for the variables used in the econometric models for the 
younger cohort are presented in table 2 below.  Out of the 1184 children in this cohort 
with complete data for all the variables of interest during the 1999 round, 14% were full-
time students while 18% were combining schooling and family work for a total of 32% 
participation in schooling. About 21% were neither working nor attending school while 
48% were full-time participants in family activities. In 2004 there were 1057 children of 
this cohort with complete information of which 70% were students (13% attending 
fulltime and 57% combining schooling and work). Again we observe rapid increase in 
school participation between 1999 and 2004.   
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Variables Used in the Econometric Models for the  
               Younger Cohort 
  
1999 
(Obs=1184) 
2004 
(Obs=1057) 
Variable              Description Mean St.dev Mean St.dev. 
Student dummy=1 if student at school 0.32 0.47 0.70 0.46 
Student Only dummy=1 if student at school   
    
 
and not working 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.33 
Working dummy=1 if working 0.65 0.48 0.86 0.34 
Work only dummy=1 if working and not  
    
 
student at school 0.48 0.50 0.29 0.45 
Student and working dummy=1 if student at school  
    
 
and working 0.17 0.38 0.57 0.49 
Neither  student nor working   dummy=1 if neither student at  
    
 
school nor working 0.21 0.40 0.01 0.12 
Main activity of child main activity=0 if idle, =1 if  
    
 
student, =2 if working 1.27 0.78 1.28 0.48 
Child activity activity=0 if idle, =1 if student   
    
 
only, =3 if work only,=3 if  
    
 
student and working 1.62 1.00 2.42 0.76 
Child's Height-for-age  Child's Height-for-age z-scores -2.22 2.06 -2.25 2.04 
Sex sex=1 if male 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.50 
Age  Age 8.24 1.77 13.24 1.77 
Household size Household Size 8.83 3.49 7.20 2.35 
Number of siblings Number of siblings of the child 4.45 2.08 4.66 2.14 
Sex of household head dummy=1 if h.hold head is male 0.81 0.39 0.79 0.41 
Father's education dummy=1 if child's father has  
    
 
completed at least primary  
    
 
education 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38 
Mother's education dummy=1 if child's mother has  
    
 
completed at least primary  
    
 
education 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 
Distance to  primary school Distance to the nearest primary  
    
 
school in kilometers 4.69 3.67 3.74 3.04 
Age of  father Age of child's father 47.96 10.97 52.81 11.01 
Age of  mother Age of child's mother 37.92 8.42 42.80 8.32 
Agri. Land area owned Agricultural land area owned 1.46 1.40 1.44 1.70 
Livestock units owned Tropical livestock units owned 4.08 4.03 6.21 7.57 
Rainfall deviation at 1st year Deviation of rain from long run    
    
 
local mean during 1st year 21.89 171.13 22.50 172.69 
Rainfall deviation at 2nd year Deviation of rain from long run   
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local mean during 2nd year -3.66 160.23 -2.51 152.11 
Rainfall deviation at 3rd year Deviation of rain from long run   
    
 
local mean during 3rd year -23.58 169.76 -21.53 164.68 
Substantial rain def. at 1st year dummy=1 if rain deficit at 1st   
    
 
year exceeds local st.dev 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.32 
Substantial rain def. at 2nd year dummy=1 if rain deficit at 2nd   
    
 
year exceeds local st.dev 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37 
Substantial rain def. at 3rd year dummy=1 if rain deficit at 3rd   
    
 
year exceeds local st.dev 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 
Substantial rain sur. at 1st year dummy=1 if rain surplus at 1st   
    
 
year exceeds local st.dev 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 
Substantial rain sur. at 2nd year dummy=1 if rain surplus at 2nd  
    
 
year exceeds local st.dev 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 
Substantial rain sur. at 3rd year dummy=1 if rain surplus at 3rd   
    
 
year exceeds local st.dev 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 
Height of mother  Height of mother in centimeters 156.57 6.44 156.45 6.56 
Height of father  Height of father in centimeters 166.23 7.90 166.20 7.80 
Source: Ethiopian Meteorological agency for the rainfall data, Ethiopian Rural 
Household Survey for all the Other Variables. 
 
The average pre-school height-for-age z-score for the younger cohort was about -
2.2 indicating that stunting of children in Ethiopia is not limited to children who suffered 
under unusual environmental shocks but rather a widespread phenomenon that afflicts 
children of all ages. In fact, about 59% of the children in this cohort were stunted during 
the preschool period and one of the principal causes of stunting is early childhood 
malnutrition.  And malnutrition in most localities in Ethiopia is caused by rainfall 
fluctuations and the resulting crop failure and livestock death. The large average standard 
deviation reported for annual rainfall in table 2 is indicative of the degree of 
unpredictability of rainfall in some of the regions covered by the ERHS survey. Because 
of this unpredictability at least some of the children born in any given year are likely to 
face some major crop failure in their locality during their critical years.   
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The evidence in table 2 shows that a sizable proportion of the children in the 
younger cohort faced substantial rainfall deficits and/or excessive rains during their first, 
second or third years. About 12%, 16% and 19% experienced substantial rain deficits in 
their 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years, respectively. On the other hand, 13%, 11% and 9% 
experienced excessive rains during their 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years, respectively. Both 
substantial rain shortages and excessive rains are considered a shock because farmers 
develop their cropping patterns on the basis of their expectations about rainfall in their 
locality that is often based on their individual and collective experience over so many 
years. Therefore, any variation in rainfall that falls within its long-term standard deviation 
will generally be anticipated by the farmers but rainfall deficits and surpluses exceeding 
the long-term standard deviation will be unanticipated and are likely to lead to crop 
failures. The effects of these early childhood rainfall shocks on the cumulative nutritional 
health of the children are estimated in the first stage of the econometric models for the 
younger cohort.  
 
Estimation Results 
In this section we present the estimated econometric models of child labor and 
schooling for both the older and the younger cohorts. To address the potential 
endogeneity of height-for-age in the schooling and child labor equations we estimate the 
models in two-stages the validity of which is previously discussed. In the first stage we 
regress the height-for-age z-scores of the children on the instruments and the other 
covariates in the second stage of the corresponding equation using the same sample 
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observations. The first stage results are interesting in themselves because they show how 
weather shocks experienced early in life influence the subsequent physical stature of the 
child. In the next section, therefore, we briefly present the first stage results for the 
models reported later in this section.  
 
First Stage Results 
The first stage for each model estimated in two-stages is an OLS regression of the 
height-for-age z-scores on the relevant instruments and other covariates in the model. For 
the older cohort, the instruments are generated by interacting the dummy identifying the 
drought-affected children with three age dummies identifying those children who were at 
the critical stage of development at the time of the 1984 drought. The drought dummy 
itself is also included to see if the height-for-age was systematically different for drought 
affected children of all ages (not just those in the critical stage). The three age dummies 
are also included to see if height-for-age is systematically different for those who were at 
the critical stage in 1984 (not just those who were affected by drought). In addition, we 
include the mother‟s and father‟s height to control for the genetic variation in children‟s 
height so that the malnutrition caused by the drought explains only what is left of the 
natural differences in the heights of the children.  
The procedure I followed in the case of the younger cohort is slightly different 
because of the way the rainfall shocks at the critical ages are defined. For the older cohort 
I essentially treated those who were age 4-6 and those who were at the critical stage but 
unaffected by the 1984 drought as comparison groups and those who were affected by the 
1984 drought at the critical age as the treatment group. For the younger cohort as well the 
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treatment comes from a rainfall shock experienced during the critical ages but the time at 
which they experienced the shock varies depending on their age and locality. Therefore, 
we don‟t have specific shock-period and age-cohort dummies to control for. The control 
group here as well consists of those who did not experience substantial rainfall shock 
during their critical years.  Like the case with the older cohort we include mother‟s and 
father‟s height to control for the genetic variation in the heights of children. The first 
stage results for both cohorts are presented in table 3 below.  
Table 3. The Effect of Exposure to Drought and  Rainfall Fluctuations in Early Childhood 
on  Height-for-age Z- scores (First Stage Results)                  
 Older Cohort Younger Cohort 
 I  
(94a&95)  
II 
(1995) 
III 
(94a&95)  
IV 
(99&04) 
V  
(99&04)  
Drought Affected in 1984 0.171 0.294* 0.170   
 (0.151) (0.173) (0.151)   
First Year in 1984 0.129 0.242 -0.058   
 (0.303) (0.366) (0.228)   
Second Year in 1984 0.462* 0.431 0.322   
 (0.261) (0.311) (0.214)   
Third Year in 1984 -0.202 -0.106 -0.294*   
 (0.199) (0.224) (0.171)   
Drought Affected at 1st Year -0.094 -0.077 -0.094   
 (0.202) (0.216) (0.201)   
Drought Affected at 2nd Year -0.592*** -0.487** -0.590***   
 (0.227) (0.246) (0.227)   
Drought Affected at 3rd Year 0.098 -0.055 0.098   
 (0.193) (0.207) (0.193)   
Substantial rain def. at 1st year    0.047 0.061 
    (0.223) (0.220) 
Substantial rain def. at 2nd year    -0.401** -0.402** 
    (0.179) (0.180) 
Substantial rain. def. at 3rd year    -0.243 -0.237 
    (0.178) (0.178) 
Substantial rain surp. at 1st year    -0.030 -0.034 
    (0.178) (0.178) 
Substantial rain surp. at 2nd year    -0.227 -0.221 
    (0.180) (0.179) 
Substantial rain surp. at 3rd year    -0.094 -0.085 
    (0.251) (0.250) 
Height of Mother 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
Height of Father 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.027*** 0.027*** 
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 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age -0.078 -0.059 -0.125*** -0.020 -0.007 
 (0.063) (0.083) (0.041) (0.032) (0.017) 
Sex -0.229*** -0.171** -0.230*** -0.223* -0.222* 
 (0.075) (0.081) (0.074) (0.119) (0.118) 
Household Size -0.034 -0.023 -0.033 0.016 0.012 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) 
Number of Siblings 0.053** 0.040 0.052** -0.034 -0.030 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.035) (0.035) 
Sex of Household Head -0.032 -0.026 -0.033 -0.102 -0.102 
 (0.133) (0.152) (0.133) (0.157) (0.157) 
Father's Education 0.346* 0.369** 0.338* 0.200 0.203 
 (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.188) (0.188) 
Mother's Education -0.060 -0.164 -0.064 -0.343 -0.340 
 (0.439) (0.491) (0.438) (0.260) (0.260) 
Age of Father 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age of Mother 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.009 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) 
Agri. Land Area Owned 0.005 0.021 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.023) (0.032) (0.032) 
Livestock Units Owned 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
Year=1995 -0.103     
 (0.069)     
Year=2004    0.108  
    (0.167)  
Constant -6.894*** -7.488*** -6.365*** -11.453*** -11.535*** 
 (1.739) (2.149) (1.663) (1.901) (1.873) 
F-stat for joint sig of instruments 2.900*** 2.470*** 2.910*** 7.620*** 7.610*** 
 (p=0.005) (p=0.008) (p=0.002) (p=0.000) (p=0.000) 
Observations 2348 1116 2348 2241 2241 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes: Site dummies were included in all the equations as controls for community fixed effects. 
Equation I represents the first stage for the multinomial logit and probit models estimated using 
pooled unbalanced panel data from 1994a and 1995 rounds. Equation II presents the first stage 
results for the bivariate probit, multinomial logit and probit models estimated using cross-
sectional data from 1995 round. Equation III presents the first stage results for the random effects 
probit and random effects multinomial logit models estimated using unbalanced panel data from 
1994a and 1995 rounds. Equation IV is the first stage for all the models estimated using pooled 
panel data for the younger cohort whereas equation V is the first stage for the random effects 
probit and random effects  multinomial logit models for the same cohort. All first stage equations 
were separately estimated by OLS and the resulting residuals were used in the second stage 
equations as suggested by Terza,  Basu and Rathouz (2008). 
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The first three columns in table 3 present the first stage results for the models 
estimated using data from the older cohort while the last two columns present the first 
stage results of the models for the younger cohort. All the first stage equations were 
estimated using OLS, correcting the standard errors for the household level clustering. 
Equations I and III are similar except that equation I includes year dummy for the survey 
round.  Equations IV and V are also the same except that the former includes year 
dummy for the survey round. The year dummy is included in all the models estimated 
using the pooled panel data in an attempt to control for the potential confounding effects 
of the time-varying unobserved characteristics of the family and the child.  
The set of instruments defined on the basis of exposure to the 1984 drought for 
the older cohort and localized rainfall shocks for the younger cohort are jointly 
significant in the first stage equations and generally have anticipated signs.  In the results 
for the older cohort we have consistently negative signs for a big drought experienced 
during the 1
st
, and 2
nd
 years while the signs for the 3
rd
 year are mixed. For the younger 
cohort we have consistent negative signs for excessive rains experienced during the 1
st
 
,2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years and substantial rain deficits  during the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years.  The sign for 
substantial rain deficit during the 1
st
 year is positive but small compared to the other 
coefficients. In the results for the older cohort it is important to note that the drought 
dummy itself has in fact a positive sign implying children who belonged to the drought 
affected families in general had in fact bigger average height-for-age z-scores than those 
who belonged to the non-affected families. Therefore, isolating the effect of the drought 
on the group at the critical age was important for identification of its effect because that is 
where the negative effect is visible (as also suggested by the nutrition literature).    
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One remarkable observation about these first stage results is the fact that weather 
shocks appear to have their strongest effect on the child‟s physical stature during the 
second
16
 year of his/her life for both the older and the younger cohorts. We find that both 
the 1984 drought and substantial localized rain shortages have large and statistically 
significant negative effects on the child‟s subsequent height-for-age when experienced 
during the 2
nd
 year.  According to these results being exposed to a significant drought 
during the second year reduces height-for-age z-scores of children by more than 0.5 
points on average which represents about 25% of the mean height-for-age for this group 
of children. The effect of substantial rainfall deficit during the second year is somewhat 
similar (0.4 points or about 18% of the mean height-for-age z score for the younger 
cohort).  Even the excessive rain has relatively larger negative effect during the 2
nd
 year 
although it is not statistically significant at the conventional levels with a t-ratio of 1.26. 
In the case of the older cohort this large negative effect of drought during the 2
nd
 year is 
observed despite the fact that second year olds in general had higher average height-for-
age z-scores as demonstrated by the positive coefficient on the dummy for age-2 in 1984. 
This evidence supports the hypothesis that unavailability of additional food for the child 
will be more detrimental to the child‟s growth in the second 2nd year than the 1st because 
of the increasing inadequacy of breast-feeding as a source of nutrition for the child.  
 
  
                                                          
16
 Alderman et al for Zimbabwe and Glewwe and King (2001) for Philippines find similar results.  
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Main Results and Discussion 
This section presents estimation results for the econometric models of child 
activity choice described in the section on econometric models and estimation 
methodology. Two sets of results are obtained for each of the bivariate probit, 
multinomial logit and probit models for child activity choices. First, each model is 
estimated through the standard maximum likelihood method, ignoring the potential 
endogeneity of the child‟s height-for-age. Second, all the models are re-estimated in two 
stages (using the procedure previously described) so as to address the potential 
endogeneity of our key variable of interest. In each case the standard errors are corrected 
for household level clustering. 
For the older cohort the bivariate probit and multinomial logit models with four 
child activity classifications (si=0, wi=0; si=0, wi=1;  si=1, wi=0; and si=1, wi=1) are 
estimated using cross sectional data only from the 1995 round because the 1994a round 
did not collect data on child activity combinations.  On the other hand, a multinomial 
logit model just for the main activity
17
 of the child (where main activity could be „neither 
work nor a student‟ or „student‟ or „work‟) is estimated using pooled panel (unbalanced) 
data from 1994a and 1995 rounds because child‟s main activity data are available in both 
rounds. Similarly, the probit models for child schooling are estimated using pooled panel 
from both rounds since data on schooling are available in both rounds. For the younger 
cohort all the models for child activity choices are estimated using pooled panel 
(unbalanced) data from the 1999 and 2004 rounds.  All the models estimated with pooled 
                                                          
17
 Child’s main activity is always ‘student’ if the child is attending school but for a child who is working 
his/her main activity is ‘work’ only if he/she is not combining work and schooling. 
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panel data include year dummies intended to control for the possible over-time variation 
in the un-observed child and family characteristics.  In addition, the multinomial logit 
models for child activity choices and probit models for schooling are estimated with 
random effects to see if controlling for unobserved family and child heterogeneities 
substantially alters the results.  
The multinomial logit models where the unobserved family and child 
heterogeneities are treated as nested random intercepts are estimated using the GLLAMM 
program in Stata. GLLAMM which stands for Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed 
Models,  is conveniently designed for estimating models where the random effects can 
arise at multiple levels as in the case of family and individual members of the family (see 
a description of the model in Appendix C).  However, for multi-response models like the 
multinomial logit and bivariate probit, the log likelihood functions do not easily converge 
particularly when multiple random effects are involved. With the data used for analysis in 
this essay most of the multinomial logit models, where the random intercepts were 
assumed not to vary across equations, ultimately converged but the Bivariate probit 
models failed. Therefore, only the multinomial logit and probit models with random 
effects are reported with the rest of the results.  
The coefficient estimates for the bivariate probit models for child activity choices 
are presented in table 4 below. For the multinomial logit and probit models the 
coefficient estimates are presented in table A7, table A8, and table A9 in appendix A.  
However, joint estimation of child schooling and child labor equations as bivariate probit 
seems to be more appropriate as demonstrated by the highly significant correlation 
between the errors in the schooling and child labor equations reported in table 4. The 
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multinomial logit model does not take these across equation correlations into account 
because of the IIA assumption.  Therefore, my discussion of the results mainly focuses on 
the estimates from bivariate probit model although the key results for the other models 
are also reported for comparison.  
Table 4. Bivariate Probit Estimates for Child Schooling and Work 
 Older Cohort Younger Cohort 
 I II III IV 
  
Biprobit 
2-Stage 
Biprobit 
 
Biprobit 
2-Stage 
Biprobit 
Student     
Child's Height-for-age z-scores 0.121*** 0.199 0.086*** 0.251*** 
 (0.032) (0.223) (0.018) (0.095) 
Sex 0.330*** 0.344*** 0.284*** 0.324*** 
 (0.082) (0.090) (0.066) (0.070) 
Age 0.040 0.048 0.196*** 0.199*** 
 (0.025) (0.034) (0.018) (0.018) 
Agri. Land Area Owned -0.014 -0.016 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.024) (0.024) 
Livestock Units Owned 0.011 0.011 0.023*** 0.024*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
Father's Educ.-at Least Primary 0.855*** 0.824*** 0.400*** 0.349*** 
 (0.176) (0.197) (0.104) (0.107) 
Mother's Educ.-at Least Primary 0.061 0.074 0.419*** 0.472*** 
 (0.404) (0.403) (0.142) (0.143) 
Distance to Primary School 0.034 0.033 -0.027* -0.027* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.016) (0.016) 
Household Size 0.011 0.013 -0.025 -0.030* 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) 
Number of Siblings 0.010 0.006 0.046** 0.052** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) 
Age of Father -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age of Mother 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Sex of Household Head -0.005 -0.007 0.109 0.113 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.095) (0.094) 
Year=2004   0.055 0.043 
   (0.105) (0.105) 
Resid. from Height-for-age eqn.  -0.079  -0.169* 
  (0.227)  (0.095) 
Constant -1.449** -1.291* -2.376*** -1.892*** 
 (0.568) (0.747) (0.266) (0.390) 
Work     
Child's Height-for-age z-scores 0.030 0.065 0.014 0.162 
 (0.045) (0.268) (0.015) (0.103) 
Sex -0.276*** -0.270** -0.072 -0.035 
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 (0.107) (0.117) (0.062) (0.065) 
Age 0.032 0.035 0.138*** 0.141*** 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.018) (0.018) 
Agri. Land Area Owned 0.002 0.001 0.082** 0.081** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) 
Livestock Units Owned 0.012 0.012 0.001 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) 
Father's Educ.-at Least Primary -0.088 -0.099 -0.157* -0.200** 
 (0.241) (0.274) (0.090) (0.095) 
Mother's Educ.-at Least Primary 0.378 0.380 0.092 0.140 
 (0.456) (0.459) (0.143) (0.148) 
Distance to Primary School -0.012 -0.012 0.041** 0.041** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.021) (0.021) 
Household Size -0.043 -0.041 0.014 0.010 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.017) (0.017) 
Number of Siblings -0.001 -0.002 -0.036 -0.030 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.023) (0.023) 
Age of Father -0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age of Mother 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) 
Sex of Household Head 0.238 0.237 0.025 0.025 
 (0.164) (0.164) (0.099) (0.099) 
Year=2004   0.093 0.080 
   (0.108) (0.109) 
Resid. from Height-for-age eqn.  -0.037  -0.152 
  (0.268)  (0.105) 
Constant 1.207 1.273 -0.897*** -0.467 
 (0.736) (0.881) (0.258) (0.389) 
Athrho     
Constant -0.964*** -0.964*** -0.512*** -0.521*** 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.053) (0.053) 
Observations 1116 1116 2241 2241 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
Notes: Dummies representing exposure to a big drought in 1984 at 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years are used 
as identifying instruments for child‟s height-for-age in equation (II) . Dummies for substantial 
rain deficit and rain surplus at 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years are used as instruments in (V). Mother‟s height 
and father‟s height were also included in all first stage equations to control for genetic variations 
in height. Site dummies were included in all equations to control for community fixed effects. 
The two-stage models are estimated using the approach suggested by Terza,  Basu and Rathouz 
(2008) as previously discussed.  
 
 
The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates for the types of non-linear models 
reported here are not very informative in themselves. Therefore, from the results obtained 
for each model estimated using pooled panel data or cross-sectional data, we have 
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calculated the marginal effects of our key variable of interest, child‟s height-for-age, on 
activity choices at each value of the regressor keeping the values of the other covariates 
at their mean values. For the multinomial logit models with random effects, marginal 
effects are not calculated because of the lack of meaningful ways to approximate the 
values of the multiple random effects at which the marginal effects could be evaluated. 
However, the estimated coefficients for the multinomial logit models with random effects 
are generally very close to the corresponding coefficients obtained from the pooled data. 
This is particularly true for our key variable of interest, child‟s height-for-age (see table 
A7 and A8 in Appendix A). Therefore, partial effects of child‟s height-for-age on child 
activity choices obtained from the pooled data don‟t seem to be unreasonable.  Similar 
issue arises in the case of random effects probit models because the values of the random 
intercepts are unknown here as well. But there is a common practice of computing the 
marginal effects for such models by assuming a zero value for the random effect of the 
particular case for which the marginal effect is being computed. Therefore, the marginal 
effects for random effects probit models obtained through this procedure are reported 
with the rest of the results. Following the standard practice in the literature we focus on 
the discussion of the marginal effects of height-for-age at mean but also present the 
average marginal effects and the marginal effects at sample minimum and maximum 
values for all the models.  
The marginal effects at the mean of height-for-age obtained from all the models 
for the older cohort and the younger cohort are presented in table 5 and table 6 below, 
respectively.  The average marginal effects and the marginal effects at sample minimum 
and maximum values are reported in tables A1-A6 in appendix A.  The marginal effects 
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of height-for-age obtained from probit models for participation in family work activities 
are also reported in these tables
18
.   
One general pattern we observe in these results is that the absolute magnitudes of 
the estimates are much larger in the two-stage models in all the cases perhaps implying 
that failing to address the endogeneity of child‟s height-for-age  could substantially 
understate its estimated effect on the child‟s participation in schooling and family labor 
activities
19
. On the other hand, the two-stage estimates generally have bigger standard 
errors leading to lack of (or less) statistical significance for some of the marginal effects 
obtained from the two stage models, particularly for the older sample. Another notable 
pattern in these results is the general similarity in the signs and magnitudes of the 
estimated partial effects for the younger and the older cohort. The fact that we find 
generally similar results for two different cohorts is somewhat remarkable given the 
differences in sources of identification and the time periods at which children‟s heights 
were measured for the two cohorts.   
Table 5.  Marginal effects (at the mean value) of Child's Height-for-age z-scores on the Choice  
                 Probabilities of Various Child Activities  (Older Cohort) 
    p(stud=1, p(stud=1, p(stud=0, p(stud=0, 
 Model p(stud=1|x) work=0|x) work=1|x) work=1|x) work=0|x) p(work=1|x) 
Biprobit 0.043*** -0.001 0.044*** -0.040*** -0.003** 0.004 
 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.007) 
Biprobit, two-stage 0.071 -0.004 0.075 -0.065 -0.006 0.010 
 
(0.080) (0.035) (0.066) (0.079) (0.007) (0.041) 
Mlogit - -0.000 0.050*** -0.050*** -0.000 - 
  
(0.000) (0.011) (0.011) (0.000) 
 Mlogit, two-stage - 0.001 0.052 -0.053 -0.000 - 
  
(0.002) (0.076) (0.076) (0.000) 
                                                           
18
 The coefficient estimates for these models are not reported but available from the author upon 
request. 
19
 Alderman et al. (2001) find similar disparity between simple probit estimates and two-stage probit 
estimates of the effect of child’s height-for-age on school enrollment in rural Pakistan. 
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Mlogit (Main act.) 0.041*** - - -0.038***   -0.003* - 
 
(0.009) 
  
(0.009) (0.002) 
 Mlogit, two-stage 
(Main act.) 0.091 - - -0.083 -0.009 - 
 
(0.059) 
  
(0.058) (0.010) 
 Probit 0.041*** - - - - 0.007 
 
(0.008) 
    
(0.006) 
Probit, two-stage 0.090** - - - - 0.007 
 
(0.054) 
    
(0.041) 
RE probit 0.040*** - - - - - 
 
(0.009) 
     RE prob., two- 
Stage 0.064 - - - - - 
 
(0.058) 
     ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes: Table 4 above and  Tables A7, A8, and A9   in appendix A respectively present coefficient estimates 
for bivariate probit, multinomial logit, multinomial logit (Main activity), and Probit  results from which 
these  partial effects were obtained. The partial effects reported in this table were calculated at the mean 
value of the child‟s height-for-age z- scores and other regressors and the standard errors were calculated by 
the delta method.  All models included controls for community fixed effects, child age and sex, land and 
livestock owned, household size and number of siblings, education of father and mother, distance to primary 
school, age of mother and father, and sex of household head. 
 
The results for both the older cohort (in Table 5) and the younger cohort (in Table 
6) confirm the findings in the earlier studies that access to better nutrition during early 
childhood enhances the child‟s chances of attending school later in life. This is true both 
in the joint models for child labor and schooling as well as the separate probit models for 
just child schooling (see 1
st
 columns in tables 5 and 6).  Focusing on the two-stage 
bivariate probit estimates, reducing the gap between the height-for-age of the sample in 
the older cohort and healthy American children with the same age by 1 standard deviation 
will increase the probability of school attendance by the former by 7.1%.  For the 
younger cohort the corresponding estimate is 10%. Given the average height-for-age z 
scores of about -2, these estimates would mean that eliminating this height deficit through 
better nutrition and care in the early childhood would boost the chances of attending 
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school by about 14.1% for the older cohort and by about 20% for the younger cohort.  
The signs and statistical significances of the estimated marginal effects of height-for-age 
on schooling obtained from the multinomial logit and probit models are similar to the 
estimates from bivariate probit models but slightly different in magnitudes. Although 
some of the estimated marginal effects are not statistically significant at the conventional 
levels of significance, it is important to note that the standard errors obtained through the 
delta method are generally noisy and may not be as informative
20
 as the signs and 
magnitudes of the estimates.  
Table 6.  Marginal effects (at the mean value) of Child's Height-for-age z-scores on the Choice  
                 Probabilities of Various Child Activities  (Younger Cohort) 
    p(stud=1, p(stud=1, p(stud=0, p(stud=0, 
 Model p(stud=1|x) work=0|x) work=1|x) work=1|x) work=0|x) p(work=1|x) 
Biprobit 0.034*** 0.004 0.030*** -0.026*** -0.008*** 0.004 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) 
Biprobit, two-stage 0.100*** -0.013 0.113*** -0.064* -0.036*** 0.048 
 
(0.038) (0.023) (0.032) (0.035) (0.012) (0.031) 
Mlogit - 0.012*** 0.022*** -0.028*** -0.005*** - 
  
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) 
 Mlogit, two-stage - 0.025 0.060 -0.061 -0.024*** - 
  
(0.029) (0.038) (0.040) (0.007) 
 Mlogit (Main act.) 0.034*** - - -0.029*** -0.005*** - 
 
(0.008) 
  
(0.008) (0.001) 
 Mlogit, two-stage 
(Main act.) 0.085** - - -0.062 -0.023*** - 
 
(0.041) 
  
(0.040) (0.007) 
 Probit 0.034*** - - - - 0.002 
 
(0.007) 
    
(0.004) 
Probit, two-stage 0.097** - - - - 0.043 
 
(0.039) 
    
(0.031) 
RE probit 0.042*** - - - - 0.002 
 
(0.008) 
    
(0.005) 
RE prob., two- 
stage 0.119** - - - - 0.043 
 
(0.048) 
    
(0.028) 
                                                          
20
 That is partly why we present the plots of the entire distributions of some of the marginal effects later 
in this section. 
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***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes: Table 4 above and Tables A7, A8, and A9   in appendix A respectively present coefficient estimates 
for bivariate probit, multinomial logit, multinomial logit (Main activity), and Probit results from which these 
partial effects were obtained. The partial effects reported in this table were calculated at the mean value of 
the child‟s height-for-age z- scores and other regressors and the standard errors were calculated by the delta 
method.  All models included controls for community fixed effects, child age and sex, land and livestock 
owned, household size and number of siblings, education of father and mother, distance to primary school, 
age of mother and father, and sex of household head. 
 
 
While the marginal effects at the mean of the child‟s height-for-age on his/her 
participation in family labor activities are also positive as shown along the last columns 
of tables 5 and 6 and the corresponding tables in  appendix A, these effects are generally 
small in magnitude and mostly insignificant. This is so because about 89% of the children 
in the pooled sample for the younger cohort and 95% of the pooled sample for the older 
cohort were participating in family labor activities. Therefore, a more meaningful 
estimate would be the partial effect of the child‟s height-for-age on the probabilities of 
being selected for full-time family labor, p(s=0, w=1|x). These estimates are obtained 
from bivariate probit and multinomial logit models and reported along the 4
th
 columns of 
the tables for the marginal effects.  The results show that the marginal effect of child‟s 
height-for-age on the probability of being selected for full-time family labor is 
consistently negative except its minimum value for the younger cohort. However, the 
two-stage versions of these estimates are statistically insignificant for the older cohort 
and mostly insignificant for the younger cohort. Based on this evidence, therefore, we 
find no support for the hypothesis that physically stronger children will be positively 
selected for full time family labor. 
On the other hand, the estimates reported along the 3
rd
 columns of the tables for 
the marginal effects consistently show that the physically stronger children are more 
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likely to combine schooling and family labor than the physically less fit children. The 
marginal effects at mean as well as the average marginal effects of height-for-age on the 
probability of combining schooling and work, p(s=1,w=1|x), is consistently positive and 
much bigger than its marginal effects on all the other choices for child activities for both 
the older and the younger cohort. The results hold both in bivariate probit and 
multinomial logit estimates although average marginal effects and marginal effects at 
mean obtained from the two-stage bivariate probit models are bigger than those obtained 
from the two-stage multinomial logit models.  
In contrast, both the marginal effects at mean and average marginal effects of 
height-for-age on the probability of being selected for full-time schooling , p(s=1,w=0|x), 
are either negative or positive but close to zero as shown along the 2
nd
 columns of the 
tables for the marginal effects.  In addition, the marginal effects on the probability of 
being selected for full time schooling in the two-stage models are rarely significant while 
the marginal effects on combining schooling and family labor are either significant at 
conventional levels or generally have standard errors smaller than the estimated partial 
effects. Therefore, there appears to be reasonably strong and consistent evidence that 
better physical stature enhances the probability that the child is asked to participate in 
family activities while attending school but no evidence that better physical fitness 
increases the chances of being selected for either fulltime schooling or fulltime family 
labor. It is important to note that better physical fitness seems to reduce the probability 
that the child remains idle, p(s=0, w=0|x), although the marginal effects of height-for-age 
on this choice are small in magnitude particularly for the older cohort.  The bottom line 
from these results is that, a point increase in the height-for-age z-score of the child will 
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substantially increase the probability of  combining schooling and family labor, will 
reduce the probability of being selected for full-time family labor, but will have little 
effect on the probabilities of being selected for full-time schooling or being idle.  
Our discussion so far was based on the marginal effects at the mean and the 
average marginal effects but this may not be fully informative if the marginal effects 
considerably vary at different values of height-for-age. To check whether the 
aforementioned relationships between the marginal effects of height-for-age on various 
child activity choices hold at points other than the mean, we plot
21
 the marginal effects 
against the values of height-for-age z-scores for our preferred two-stage bivariate probit 
model. Fig 1 and Fig 2 below present these plots for the older and younger cohorts, 
respectively.  
 
                                                          
21
 While this shows how the marginal effect on the probability of each activity choice varies with changing 
values of height-for-age, the calculation of marginal effects at each point assumes linearity and the 
possible non-linearity in the effects of height-for-age on child activity choice is not addressed here. 
Inclusion of quadratic terms in our models doesn’t seem to be informative because of the negative 
observations on height-for-age z-scores. An alternative way could be to estimate the models for various 
ranges of values for height-for-age and compare the resulting marginal effects. This is also infeasible in 
our case because of small sample size we are working with but future studies can address the issue using 
data from a larger sample.    
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Although the observed range of values for height-for-age z-scores vary for the 
younger and older cohorts (-5.98 to 3.19 for the older cohort and -7.41 to 7.28 for the 
younger cohort), Fig 1 and Fig 2 show somewhat remarkable similarity in the patterns of 
the marginal effects for the comparable ranges of values of height-for-age. The marginal 
effects of height-for-age on the probability of combining schooling and work (stud_work) 
remain positive and much bigger than the marginal effects on the probabilities of being 
selected for other activity categories at all values of height-for-age except at the extremes.  
On the other hand the marginal effects on the probability of being selected for the full-
time schooling (stud_only) remain close to zero for both cohorts while the marginal 
effects on the probability of being selected for full-time family work (work_only) remain 
mostly negative. The patterns in the marginal effects of height-for-age on the probability 
of being idle appear to differ for the two cohorts at smaller values of height-for-age but 
the overall pattern is similar here as well.  Therefore, the relationship between the 
marginal effects we observed at the mean of height-for-age is not limited to that 
particular point but holds throughout except at the extremes where we have only a few 
observations and hence all the marginal effects approach zero. In fact our conclusion 
based on the marginal effects at the mean or the average marginal effects seems to be 
reasonable since most of the marginal effects are  clustered around the marginal effects at 
the mean as demonstrated by their Epanechnikov kernel densities
22
 presented  in Figs 3-6 
for the older cohort and Figs 7-10 for the younger cohort.  
                                                          
22
  The "optimal" width is used in constructing each of the kernel densities for the MEs. The optimal width 
is the width that would minimize the mean integrated squared error.  
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Source: Calculated from Two-Stage Bivariate Probit Model for Schooling and 
Work for the Older Cohort. 
Notes: MEs stands for marginal effects and p stands for probability. 
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Source: Calculated from Two-Stage Bivariate Probit Model for Schooling and 
Work for the Younger Cohort. 
Notes: MEs stands for marginal effects and p stands for probability. 
 
With the exception of the kernel densities of marginal effects of height-for-age on 
the probability of being idle that are based on relatively smaller number of observations 
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(Fig 6 for the older cohort and Fig 10 for the younger cohort), all the other kernel 
densities are clearly uni-modal and highly skewed with the bulk of the marginal effects 
clustered around the marginal effect at the mean that itself is close to the mode of the 
distribution in each case. For example, the marginal effect at the mean of height-for-age 
on the probability of combining schooling and family work is 0.075 for the older cohort 
and 0.113 for the younger cohort in the two-stage bivariate probit models as shown in 
tables 5 and 6, respectively. The corresponding average marginal effects are 0.062 and 
0.08 as shown in tables A1 and A4 in Appendix A for the older and younger cohorts, 
respectively. The mode of the distribution for the corresponding marginal effects is about 
0.085 for the older cohort (Fig 4) and about 0.118 for the younger cohort (Fig 8) around 
which the bulk of the marginal effects are lumped. The same is more or less true for the 
marginal effects of height-for-age on the probabilities of being selected for full time 
schooling and full-time family labor. That is why the average marginal effects reported in 
tables A1 and A4 in appendix A and the marginal effects at the mean are not very far 
apart. Hence, the conclusions we arrived at on the basis of the marginal effects at the 
mean of height-for-age seem to be reasonable.  
To get some feel about the validity of the bivariate probit parametric form for the 
joint distribution of the errors in the schooling and work equations, we tried to re-
estimate the bivariate models following Gallant and Nychka‟s (1987) semi-nonparametric 
approach previously described. Strict applications of their approach requires estimating 
the models for successively increasing order of the Hermite polynomial and testing the 
superiority of a lower order against higher order using likelihood-ratio tests or by model-
selection criteria such as the Akaike information criterion or the Bayesian information 
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criterion. With our relatively small sample of observations, however, we could hardly 
obtain convergence for the non-concave pseudo–log-likelihood function with Hermite 
polynomials of more than 2 degrees. For the older cohort the pseudo–log-likelihood 
function for the two stage model failed to convergence even when we set the order of the 
polynomial at 2 for both schooling and work equations but it converged when we set 
either r1 or r2 to 1. Fig 11 depicts the error densities from the two stage model for the 
older cohort when r1=2 and r2=1 while Fig 12 presents the error densities from the two-
stage model for the younger cohort when the order of the Hermite polynomial for both 
equations is set to 2. The detailed characteristics of these densities along with the 
estimated coefficients for the covariates are presented in table A10 in appendix A. 
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In the cases where convergence was obtained, the error densities are symmetric 
and do not seem to substantially deviate from a normal distribution (in reds) with similar 
first and second moments as demonstrated in Fig 11 and Fig 12 for the older and the 
younger cohorts, respectively.  The measures of skewness and kurtosis reported in table 
A10 in appendix A are consistent with this observation. Although the magnitudes of the 
coefficient estimates from our semi-nonparametric models are not directly comparable to 
those from the bivariate probit model since the former depend on the order of the Hermite 
polynomials that we were unable to optimize, the signs and statistical significances of the 
coefficients are generally consistent with exception of the two-stage equation for the 
child work for the older cohort. Given the symmetry of the error densities and qualitative 
resemblance in the estimated coefficients, therefore, the bivariate probit model doesn‟t 
seem to be unreasonable for our data.  
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Finally, we try to check if our results for the younger cohort are being driven by 
the replacement of the missing monthly rainfall records with their long-term averages by 
re-estimating our models for the younger cohort, successively excluding the major cases 
with missing rainfall records from our estimation sample. The results from this exercise 
for our preferred bivariate probit model are reported in table B3 in appendix B. The 
corresponding first-stage results and marginal effects are reported in tables B4 and B5, 
respectively. The first adjustment we make is to limit our estimation sample to those who 
had at least 6 months of non-missing rainfall records including the main rainy 
(agricultural) season in the locality for at least 1 of the three critical years of 
development. The next adjustment we make is to limit our estimation sample to those 
who fulfill the same condition as in the first adjustment for at least 2 of the three critical 
years of development. And finally we limit our estimation sample to those who fulfill the 
same condition for all the three critical years of development. These adjustments produce 
little changes in the signs, magnitudes and qualities of the first-stage results, the 
coefficient estimates and the corresponding marginal effects as shown in the appendix. 
For example, we lose 283 observations because of the final adjustment but the marginal 
effect at the mean of height-for-age on p(stud=1, work=1) decreases from 0.113 to 0.106, 
its marginal effect on p(stud=1, work=0) decreases from -0.013 to -0.016, the marginal 
effect on p(stud=0, work=1) increases from -0.064 to -0.055 and the marginal effect on 
p(stud=0, work=0) increases from -0.038 to -0.036.  While we still kept some cases with 
smaller number of missing rainfall records in our estimation sample, if there was a major 
understatement of our estimates because of the missing rainfall records it is likely that 
larger changes in the estimates would have been observed when we removed all the 
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major cases with missing rainfall records. Hence, it doesn‟t seem that our results for the 
younger cohort are being driven by the replacement of the missing rainfall records by 
their long-term averages.  
In general, therefore, our findings from both the older and younger cohort indicate 
that better access to early childhood nutrition can improve the child‟s prospects for 
attending schooling but may also put the child in additional pressure to participate in 
family labor activities. This may take the form of asking the child to miss classes in order 
to help with family labor activities at home, for example, when agricultural activities are 
at their peak during harvesting season or the child may be asked to look after the 
livestock or fetch drinking water or fuel wood after coming back from school or during 
the weekends. While the data at hand do not contain information on the child‟s 
performance at school and hence do not allow analysis of how performance may be 
affected by the child‟s physical stature, it is quite possible that the additional pressure put 
on the child‟s time from the family labor activities could constrain the amount of time the 
child could spend on home works and other school related activities at home and hence 
lead to poor performance at school.  Therefore, policies that try to promote schooling 
through nutrition support programs could be more effective if they are accompanied by 
programs that could mitigate the forces that push families to resort to child labor. 
 
Conclusion 
This essay examines how malnutrition experienced during early childhood 
influences the subsequent participation of the child in schooling and child labor activities 
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in rural Ethiopia. The cumulative outcome of the child‟s early childhood nutritional 
experience is measured by the child‟s height-for-age z-score which is also taken as a 
measure of the child‟s physical fitness. Our theoretical model implies that the effect of 
the child‟s physical fitness on the parental choice as to whether to select the child for 
schooling or child labor is ambiguous. Bivariate probit and multinomial logit as well as 
separate probit models are estimated to empirically examine the effect of the child‟s 
physical fitness on his/her participation in schooling and family labor activities. Data 
from various rounds of a unique longitudinal rural household survey in Ethiopia 
(Ethiopian Rural Household Survey) are used to estimate the models. To address the 
potential endogeneity of the child‟s physical fitness in the models for child activity 
choices, we estimate the models in two-stages. Exposure to a famine caused by a massive 
drought in 1984 is used as an exogenous source of early childhood malnutrition for the 
older cohort of children for whom the models were estimated. Localized rainfall shocks 
were used as a source of identification for the younger cohort of children for whom a 
separate set of estimates were obtained. 
The first stage results show that exposure to significant weather shocks during the 
first three years of the child‟s life generally have a lasting negative effect on his/her age 
standardized heights measured later in life. The effect is particularly strong when the 
child is exposed to the shock during his/her second year.  Estimation results from the 
child‟s activity choice models indicate that better early childhood nutrition enhances the 
child‟s chances of attending school later in the child‟s life.  The range of marginal effects 
obtained from the two stage bivariate probit models imply that equalizing the median 
height of the children in the sample for the two cohorts with the heights of healthy 
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American children of the same age through better nutrition and care in the early 
childhood would boost the chances of school attendance among the children by at least 
14% and possibly by as much as 20%.  
On the other hand, we find no conclusive evidence that better physical fitness of 
the child leads to his/her positive selection for full-time child labor activities. We rather 
found reasonably strong and consistent evidence that physically robust children are more 
likely to combine child labor and schooling than physically weaker children. The results 
are consistent across two different cohorts of children and two different identification 
strategies.  The findings indicate that, although better early childhood nutrition leads to 
higher chances of attending school, it may also put the child at additional pressure to 
participate in family labor activities and this may be reflected in poor performance in 
schooling. Therefore, policies that try to promote schooling through nutrition support 
programs could be more effective if they are accompanied by programs that could 
mitigate the forces that push families to resort to child labor. My next work in this area 
will look at how the observed effect of physical fitness on the probability of combining 
child labor and schooling affects the child‟s school performance in the form of test scores 
and grades. 
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ESSAY II: MOTHER’S BARGAINING POWER, GENDER RATIO 
PREFERENCES AND CHILDREN’S HUMAN CAPITAL OUTCOMES: 
EVIDENCE FROM SIBLINGS AND TWINS 
 
Introduction 
A lot of theoretical and empirical research has been conducted to explain the 
influence of family demographics and resources on investment in human capital of 
children. The key theoretical development in this area has been the formulation of the 
quantity-quality trade off model of fertility by Becker (1960) and others. The model is 
based on the premise that parents are inclined towards equalizing the quality among their 
children (Becker and Lewis 1973; Becker and Tomes 1976) and it explains the 
interdependence between the shadow prices of quantity and quality per child. Becker‟s 
model has motivated a large number of empirical studies on the effects of family size on 
educational outcomes of children. The roles of child‟s gender, birth order and child age 
gaps have also been widely investigated.  
The Becker model, however, did not address how differences in parental 
preferences for gender mix of children and decision-making power in the family could 
influence the distribution of quality across children. This is so because Becker‟s model 
essentially assumed a „unitary‟ household where mother and father are treated as having a 
joint utility function. Other theoretical models like the family „bargaining model‟ 
(McElroy and Horney 1981; McElroy 1990) and „collective‟ household decision making 
model (Chiappori 1988, 1992) were later developed to explain the implications of 
differences in maternal and paternal preferences and bargaining power. The implications 
of differential bargaining power between the mother and the father for fertility and the 
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distribution of quality among boys and girls have been examined by some empirical 
studies as well (see the literature review section). While the role of explicit parental 
(maternal or paternal) preference for gender mix of children in influencing the 
distribution of quality across children has not been directly addressed in the existing 
literature, a related issue of the role of siblings‟ gender composition on child health and 
education has been lately investigated by some empirical studies (Butcher and Case 1994; 
Hauser and Kuo 1998; Kaestner 1997; Morduch 2000; Garg and Morduch 1998; Paris 
and Willis 1993). The findings from these studies are mixed and vary from country to 
country perhaps, reflecting differences in the cultural values that determine parents‟ 
attitudes towards human capital for male versus female children as well as the type of 
resource constraints that they face. In addition, none of the studies conducted so far 
provides conclusive evidence as to the causal mechanism that drives the relationship. In 
particular, the role played by the explicit parental preference for gender mix of children 
(combined with the parents‟ bargaining power in the family) in shaping the distribution 
of human capital across children has not been investigated. 
This essay attempts to expand the literature in this area and contribute towards 
better understanding of the nature of the relationship between siblings‟ gender structure 
and parental investment in their health and education using data from siblings and twins 
in a sample of Ethiopian (and Indian) households. Specifically, an attempt is made to 
examine the extent to which the interaction between a mother‟s revealed preferences for 
the gender mix of her children (vis-à-vis the actual gender mix) and her bargaining power 
in the household could lead to differences in distribution of education and health among 
her children. The key question addressed here is whether the mother uses her bargaining 
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power in the family, say in terms of controlling the distribution of nutrition inputs, to 
influence the distribution of child quality in the direction of her gender ratio preferences 
when the actual ratio deviates from her preferred ratio. For example, if the mother prefers 
to have equal number of boys and girls but ends up with 75% boys and 25% girls, does 
she try to compensate for the deficit in the quantity of girls by more heavily investing in 
the quality of girls given her influence on resource allocation in the household? This of 
course depends on why the mother has a preference for a child of one gender over 
another to begin with. For example, if the mother wants to have more girls in order to 
help her with family activities at home, we expect one girl born among many boys to 
have less chance to be sent to school than one among many girls. On the other hand, if 
the mother‟s preference for girls is a reflection of her wish to have daughters that are 
successful in life, then a girl born among many boys is likely to have a better chance to 
go to school than one born among many girls. The same reasoning applies to a boy‟s 
chance of attending school.   
The key point of departure for this study is that a mother may have distinct 
preferences not only for the number and quality of children but also for the gender mix of 
her children that may not be consistent with the father‟s preferences. Theoretically, all the 
three are choice variables that could be influenced by the actions of the mother, although 
a parent‟s ability to determine gender mix is limited. The mother could control the 
number of children through contraception and the gender ratio through selective abortion 
or, in the extreme case, by neglecting a child of the unwanted gender to death. In an 
underdeveloped country like Ethiopia, however, the technological options for abortion 
are quite limited and there is no documented evidence of extreme bias against girls or 
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boys to the extent that they are neglected to death. Consequently, the gender ratio of 
children is largely beyond the control of the mother and hence there is likely to be a gap 
between a mother‟s preferred and actual gender ratio. But the mother‟s actions can 
influence the quality mix of the children, the degree of the influence depending on the 
mother‟s bargaining power in the household. So, an important question is whether 
mothers use their bargaining power to influence the distribution of quality among their 
children so as to compensate for the imbalance between the desired and actual quantity of 
children.  This essay attempts to empirically examine this question using data from twins 
and siblings from the demographic and health surveys of Ethiopia with robustness checks 
using similar data from India. 
  
Literature 
The question addressed in this essay is related to at least two key issues that have 
lately attracted increasing attention from researchers in economics and other social 
sciences. The first is the role of mother‟s power in influencing the distribution of well-
being across children and the second is the effect of siblings‟ gender composition on the 
human capital of a child. There are several indicators of women‟s bargaining power in 
the family that have been used to analyze the effects of specific aspects of mother‟s 
power. Kishor (2000) classifies these measures into three categories – direct evidence of 
women‟s power, indicators of sources of empowerment and indicators of the setting for 
empowerment. The first represents the final outcome while the other two represent the 
processes that lead to the final outcome. The indicators of bargaining power that are often 
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used in economics literature, notably employment, education, non-labor income and 
transfers, assets brought into marriage, income shares of women, inheritance, current 
asset shares, age at marriage and media exposure, fall under what Kishor calls sources of 
empowerment. These typically represent the potential for but do not guarantee mother‟s 
empowerment. Other measures that are often used, for example the education gap 
between husband and wife, literacy gap, age gap and past incidence of violent treatment 
(beating) by husband, fall under settings for empowerment since these largely refer to the 
circumstances of the current and past life of the mother. Direct evidence of women‟s 
power includes such factors as control over expenditures and purchases, freedom of 
movement, attitudes towards violent treatment from husband and control over fertility 
choices. One or more of these indicators have been separately used to analyze the effects 
of specific aspects of mother‟s power.   
The emerging consensus regarding the effect of mother‟s empowerment appears 
to be that mother‟s control over resources and decision making process in the family 
enhances the welfare of children. While this generalization is largely based on studies 
conducted in developing countries, a few studies that used data from developed countries 
also arrived at similar conclusions. For example, Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) 
exploited a natural experiment generated by the replacement of a big part of child tax 
allowance by direct cash payment to the mother under the UK Child Benefit scheme of 
1977 and found that the transfer significantly increased the fraction of budget spent on 
clothing for women and their children.  Koenen, Lincoln and Appleton  (2006) also found 
women‟s power measured in terms of political participation, economic autonomy, 
employment, earnings, and reproductive rights at the state level in the United States to be 
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associated with better child-well-being  measured in terms of child birth weight, infant 
and teen mortality, high school dropout rate and teen birth rate.  
There is a relatively larger number of studies conducted on the effect of women‟s 
power on child well-being in developing countries mostly focusing on child nutrition and 
health as a measure of well-being. The most commonly used measures of women‟s power 
include non-labor-income, education, employment and asset ownership, often measured 
relative to the husband‟s power. Some direct indicators of control over family resources 
and decision-making processes as well as cultural and demographic variables that may 
influence mother‟s relative power (such as religion and age) have also been used. For 
example Thomas (1990) and Schultz (1990) found that non-labor income received by 
mothers is more likely to be spent on child health than income received by fathers. Smith 
and Haddad (2000) used the female-to-male life expectancy ratio as an indicator of 
women‟s status across 63 developing countries for the period from 1970–96 and found 
that greater women‟s status reduces the percentage of children who are underweight. 
Thomas (1994, 1997), Glewwe (1999), Desai and Alava (1998) all used relative 
education as a measure of mother‟s power and found a positive relationship between 
mother‟s empowerment and some measure of child health, although the relationship is 
not conclusive in the study by Desai and Alava after controlling for other relevant 
variables. Thomas (1997) used household and individual level data from Brazil and found 
women‟s income to have a significant and larger positive impact on child nutritional status 
than does similar income accruing to men.   
Some empirical studies have also shown that higher mother‟s bargaining power 
leads to more child schooling (e.g., Thomas 1990; Schultz 1990; Adato et al. 2003).  
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However, in a theoretical model Basu (2006) demonstrates conditions under which too 
much bargaining power for the mother relative to the father could result in a decline in 
school enrollment when children are needed for child labor as well. In support of Basu‟s 
model, Gitter and Barham (2008) used conditional cash transfer programs under a 
Nicaraguan social safety net program as a randomized experiment and found the ratio of 
mother‟s education to that of the father to have a positive effect on child schooling up to 
some level, but a negative effect in the case of too much power imbalance in favor of the 
mother. Using data from India, Lancaster, Maitra, and Ray (2006) provide similar 
empirical support for Basu‟s model. Therefore, the empirical evidence in support of the 
positive association between mother‟s empowerment and child schooling does not appear 
to be as strong as the evidence in support of its effect on child nutrition.  
Some of the empirical studies specifically examined whether increasing women‟s 
empowerment has a differential impact on health and schooling of boys and girls. For 
example, Thomas (1994) examined the effect of relative parental education and non-labor 
income on child height in the United States, Brazil and Ghana and found that increasing 
mother‟s power favors daughters over sons while father‟s power favors sons over 
daughters. Thomas (1990) also found evidence that mother‟s power favors the nutrition 
of daughters while father‟s power favors sons. Duflo (2003) examined the effect of the 
expansion of the benefits and coverage of the South African social pension program to 
the black population in the early 1990‟s and found positive and significant effects on 
girls‟(granddaughter‟s) weight-for-height when the recipient is a woman (grandmother), 
but little effect on boys. Neither girls‟ nor boys‟ well-being was significantly affected 
when the recipient was a man (grandfather).  Emerson and Souza (2007) find that in 
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Brazil mothers‟ education has a greater impact on education of daughters than sons‟ 
while the opposite is true for the father‟s education. One other study by Gibson (2008) 
examined the effect of absence of fathers on the survival and growth of boys and girls in 
one region of Ethiopia and found that girls benefit more than boys in terms of both 
indicators. However, there are a few contrasting studies, particularly for Africa, that find 
mother‟s power favoring sons and father‟s power favoring daughters (Haddad and 
Hoddinott 1994; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003).  The latter find that in Ethiopia, 
mother‟s assets at marriage decrease girls‟ chances of education while father‟s assets 
increase their chances.  
While the literature shows that there is some evidence supporting the claim that 
mother‟s power may have gender specific effects on the distribution of nutrition and 
schooling across children, the causes for such relationships are not well understood. For 
example if the mother‟s empowerment ends up favoring daughters over sons, is it 
because the mother provides preferential treatment to her daughters over her sons or just 
because the mother‟s power creates a family environment that daughters can exploit to 
their advantage (like learning from their educated mother) even if the mother did not 
intend to intentionally discriminate among her children? Do such observations persist in 
the situations where mothers prefer to have more sons than daughters? How does the 
gender composition of the children the mother actually has (vis-à-vis what she would 
prefer to have) influence her role in distributing education and nutrition across the 
children? These questions, while interesting and warranting answers, have not been 
explicitly investigated in the existing literature.  
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Studies that examined the effect of gender composition of siblings on education 
and health of a child have not explicitly addressed the possible role that could be played 
by the  differences in the mother‟s and father‟s preferences for gender mix of children in 
the subsequent distribution of quality across children. Neither did they address the role of 
the bargaining power of the mother or the father in influencing such distributions in the 
context of explicit preference for gender mix of children. For example Butcher and Case 
(1994) examined the effect of having sisters vs. brothers on women‟s educational 
attainment using three different data sets for the U.S (PSID, NLSY, and CPS) and found 
out that having sisters diminishes women‟s educational achievements. On the other hand, 
Conley (2000) finds that the number of opposite sex siblings hurt educational attainment 
of a given child. But they have not explicitly investigated how this could be related to 
parental preferences for gender mix of children and distribution of bargaining power 
within the family.    
A few studies that tried to investigate similar issues in developing countries 
(Morduch 2000; Garg and Morduch 1998; Paris and Willis 1993) also found some 
evidence that the gender mix of the siblings can influence the human capital outcomes of 
a child. However, unlike Butcher and Case (1994), which found a negative relationship 
between having sisters and educational attainment of women for the U.S, Garg and 
Morduch (1998) find positive correlation between number of sisters and nutritional health 
outcomes for both boys and girls in a sample from Ghana. Morduch (2000) also found 
some weak evidence that the number of sisters may influence the child‟s education in 
Tanzanian data but finds no evidence as such in the South African data.  
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Prior literature thus shows that the nature of the relationship between siblings‟ 
gender composition and human capital outcomes of children is so far inconclusive.  The 
relationship may be a weak one or may vary from country to country, perhaps depending 
on the cultural values that determine parents‟ attitude towards the gender distribution of 
children‟s human capital as well as the type of resource constraints that parents face. In 
addition, none of the studies conducted so far provides conclusive evidence as to the 
causal mechanism that drives the relationship. In particular, the role played by the 
explicit parental preference for gender mix of children on the distribution of human 
capital has not been investigated.  This study tries to expand the literature in this area by 
specifically analyzing the role played by the mother‟s preference for gender mix of her 
children and her bargaining power in the family in influencing the distribution of health 
and schooling investments across her children.  
 
Theoretical Background 
Becker‟s original model of fertility, which analyzed the tradeoff between quantity 
and quality of children, assumed a „unitary household‟ where husband and wife are 
treated as a single decision-maker with common preferences. Such a model does not 
accommodate the possible differences in preferences of the mother and father towards the 
quantity and quality of children and other aspects of fertility. Household models that 
allow for intra-household differences in preferences were developed by Becker (1991), 
McElroy and Horney (1981), McElroy (1990), and Chiappori (1988, 1992), among 
others. Household bargaining models as in McElroy and Horney (1981) define what are 
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called „outside options‟ or „fallback positions‟ for each partner and treat the household 
decision problem as a bargaining game leading to Nash Equilibrium outcomes. However, 
the equilibrium outcomes in such models largely depend on the definition of the outside 
options or „threat points‟ and hence may not provide predictions about the behavior of the 
partners that could easily be tested with the commonly available data (Strauss and 
Thomas, 1995). For example the bargaining model was criticized by Ulph (1988), as 
cited in Kanbur and Haddad (1994), for failing to predict choice behavior in the event of 
a breakdown in bargaining. On the other hand, the collective models of household 
behavior as in Chiappori (1988, 1992) explicitly assume that collective decisions by the 
partners will reflect Pareto efficiency in intra-household allocation, and thus could be 
more restrictive but provide more readily testable implications about the choices that the 
partners make without making any specific assumptions about individual preferences, 
except that they can be represented by a well-behaved utility function. As a result the 
latter approach is followed here to describe the household‟s decision problem involving 
the allocation of health and education investments among boys and girls where the 
mother and father may have different preferences.   
For a household consisting of a mother, a father, and n children (m daughters and 
k sons) a general utility function (U) may be defined as a weighted sum of the mother‟s 
and the father‟s separate utility functions where the weights reflect the bargaining power 
of the mother and the father as in Chiappori and Browning (1998) or Basu (2006).  
Letting θ23 Є [0,1] and (1-θ) represent the bargaining power of the mother and the father 
                                                          
23
 Typically  θ  will be a function of some choice variables in the model like hours worked and income as 
argued for example by Basu (2006) but for the theoretical exposition here θ is assumed to depend only on 
exogenous variables beyond the control of the household. For the empirical analysis, some self reported 
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respectively, the household‟s utility function defined over consumption of goods and 
leisure for every member, and health and education for the children can be stated as, 
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where c is total consumption by all the household members, l
m
, and γm   are mother‟s 
leisure and a vector of individual and household characteristics that may affect mother‟s 
utility, respectively;  l
f
 and γ
f
 are father‟s leisure and a vector of individual and household 
characteristics that may affect father‟s utility, respectively;  li
 
,hi and si are child i‟s 
leisure, health
24
 and time spent in schooling, respectively; n is the number of children, r is 
the ratio of girls to total children, and η is a vector of household characteristics that may 
affect household welfare. The number of children and gender ratio are assumed to be 
non-choice variables which are largely true in a poor country like Ethiopia where the 
means for birth control and selective abortion are beyond the reach of most of the 
families. If the current wage rates of the mother, father, and child are given by w
m
, w
f
, and 
wc respectively and everybody has total time endowment of 1, the full income budget 
constraint for this household can be stated as, 
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direct measures of mother’s empowerment and predetermined sources of mother’s power like education 
gap are used as indicators of bargaining power.  
24
 The treatment of child health as a variable fully controlled by parents is a bit simplistic. Parents’ actions 
will be part of the inputs into the health production function that generates child health which will also 
depend on the environment and child health endowments as in Thomas (1994) for example. For 
simplicity, however, the model assumes that parents can choose specific level of child health.    
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where, v
m
 and v
f 
are the non-labor incomes for the mother and father, respectively; ph and 
pe are the direct costs of health and education per child, respectively. The prices of 
consumption goods are normalized to 1. For simplicity, the direct costs of health and 
education are assumed to be the same for boys and girls. The wage rate is also assumed to 
be the same across boys and girls. Where the outside market for child labor does not 
exist, wc would be the implicit price for the time spent in child labor. The model stated 
here also assumes that children do not have direct influence on the decision making 
process in the household and they do not earn non-labor income.   
The household‟s problem is to maximize the total utility (welfare) function 
defined under (2.1) subject to the full income budget constraint stated under (2.2). 
Assuming that the utility functions of the mother and father are well-behaved (strongly 
concave, twice differentiable and increasing in  c, l
m
  l
f
 , li
 
,si, and hi
 
), that the non-
negativity constraint for consumption is non-binding, that the time constraint for both 
parents and child is non-binding and that investment by the parents in schooling and 
health of a child are independent
25
 decisions, we can maximize (2.1) subject to (2.2) to 
obtain the reduced form demand
26
 functions for child i‟s health and schooling as a 
function of predetermined variables as,    
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 The first essay in this dissertation specifically deals with the interdependence between health, schooling 
and child labor decisions by the parents. 
26
 Detailed solutions and characterizations of the demand functions that come out of the collective model 
of household behavior are presented in Chiappori (1988, 1990), Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Basu 
(2006) among others. 
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where λ is the multiplier for the full-time budget constraint stated under 2.2. The key 
variables of interest for this study are the proportion of girls among the total children (r), 
the mother‟s bargaining power in the family (θ) and the number of children (n). The 
separate effects of each of these variables on child health and education have been 
investigated by a number of other studies. In the absence of parental preferences for 
gender mix of children (r), intra-household resource allocation models predict a tradeoff 
between the number of children (n) and health and/or education that each child receives 
as demonstrated in Becker‟s model of fertility. This is based on the assumption that 
parents want approximately equal distribution of quality across their children and 
resource constraints that families face would imply that the larger the number of children 
the smaller the quality of each child will be. Therefore, families who want higher 
education and better health for each of their children will decide to have a small number 
of children and families who prefer to have large number of children will have to bear 
lower health and education for each child.  
When one or both parents have specific preferences for the gender mix of their 
children (r), however, new implications emerge that are not necessarily consistent with 
the predictions of the standard models of fertility and investment in child quality. First, it 
is possible that parents who fail to achieve the desired gender mix during the initial births 
may keep trying in the hope that the new trials produce the desired gender mix
27
. As a 
result, the prediction of the Becker model that parents limit the quantity of children so as 
to improve quality of each child may not hold; i.e., quantity may increase and quality 
may be compromised in the pursuit of the desired gender mix of children. Second, 
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 There is some empirical evidence that supports the claim that families with same-sex siblings tend to be 
larger (for example, Angrist and Evans 1998; Baez 2008). 
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parents may also attempt to compensate for the deficit in the quantity of children of the 
preferred gender by more heavily investing in their quality, henceforth called the 
compensating hypothesis. Therefore, the premise upon which the Becker‟s model is 
based, that parents want to equalize quality among their children, does not necessarily 
hold. The validity of this implication; i.e., whether parents try to compensate for the 
deficit in the quantity of children of the preferred gender by more heavily investing in 
their quality, has not been empirically examined. It will be interesting to look at whether 
the mother (who the literature says has a bigger role in child-well-being than the father) 
influences the distribution of investment in child quality in the direction of her gender 
preference when the actual gender mix of kids deviates from her preferred mix.  
Whether the compensating hypothesis holds or not in the case of child schooling 
will depend on why the mother has a preference for a child of one gender over another to 
begin with. For example, if the mother wants to have more girls just because she wants 
them to help her with family activities at home, it is likely that a girl born among boys 
will have less chance to be sent to school than one born among some boys and some girls. 
On the other hand, if the mother‟s preference for girls is a reflection of her wish to have 
daughters that are successful in their future life, then a girl born among boys is likely to 
have a better chance to go to school than one born among some boys and some girls and 
hence the compensating hypothesis will hold. Similar argument applies in the case of 
preference for boys.  
For the mother to be able to influence the distribution of child schooling and 
health one way or another, however, she must have some degree of control over the 
decision making process in the family. If the mother‟s preference for girls/boys is a 
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reflection of her wish to have daughters/sons that are successful in their future life, not 
just to help her in family labor activities, the mother‟s bargaining power will reinforce the 
distribution of both child health and schooling in the direction implied by the 
compensating hypothesis. It is the effect of this interaction between mother‟s gender 
preference (vis-à-vis actual gender mix of her kids) and bargaining power on the 
distribution of child health and education on which the empirical analysis in this essay 
focuses.  
Econometric Model 
The key task in this essay is to examine the effect of the disparity between the 
gender ratio preferred by the mother and the actual gender ratio of her living children on 
health and schooling of a child. The extent to which the mother can influence the 
distribution of education and health among her children based on her gender preferences, 
however, may depend on her bargaining power in the household. Therefore, the empirical 
models for child health and schooling include the interactions between the mother‟s 
gender ratio gap (actual ratio less desired ratio) and a measure of the mother‟s bargaining 
power (θ) as regressors.  
As previously discussed, there are several indicators of women‟s bargaining 
power in the family that have been used to analyze the effects of specific aspects of 
mother‟s power on child health and schooling. For the analysis here measures of mother‟s 
bargaining power are constructed from multiple indicators using factor analysis
28
. This 
approach is particularly appealing for the purpose at hand because there is a general 
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 A similar approach was followed by Kishor (2000), Jejeebhoy and Sather (2001), Smith et.al (2003), 
Varadharajan (2003), and Ahmed (2006), among others.  
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consensus in the literature that women‟s status in the family is a multidimensional 
concept that may not be effectively represented by one proxy as is often done in the 
economics literature in this area.  
Factor analysis helps us to condense a large number of variables measuring 
multiple dimensions of a given concept (like women‟s power) into a smaller number of 
non-overlapping measures that summarize the common variation in the original variables.  
For example, if we have j observable indicators of bargaining power x1,....xj, for n 
mothers,  the variability in these related indicators of mother‟s bargaining power can be 
expressed as a linear combination of q≤j unobservable factors and residuals as stated, for 
example, in Velicer and Jackson (1990), 
                                              eLfx                               (2.5) 
where, x is j n matrix of observable indicators of mother‟s bargaining power, f is q n 
matrix of factors, L is j q matrix of factor loadings representing the correlation 
coefficients between j indicators of bargaining power and q factors and  e is j n vector 
of errors that are uncorrelated with f and assumed to be independent of each other. The 
elements of the factor loadings matrix can be obtained through regression. The squared 
factor loading is the percent of variance in that indicator variable explained by the factor 
and the eigenvalue for a given factor measures the variation in all the variables which is 
accounted for by that factor.  
One problem with factor analysis is that there is no definite rule to determine the 
number of factors that sufficiently capture the variation in the original data. The most 
commonly used criteria in determining the optimal number of factors to be extracted are 
Kaiser-Guttman rule and the Cattell‟s scree test (Hayton, Allen and  Scarpello 2004). The 
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Kaiser-Guttman
29
 rule states that only those factors with eigenvalue greater than 1 should 
be retained.  The scree test involves an examination of a plot of the eigenvalues for 
breaks or discontinuities. The criterion for retention is to keep those factors with 
eigenvalue exceeding the point at which the sharp fall in the plot of the eigenvalues stops. 
In our application we examine both the magnitudes of the eigenvalues and their scree 
plots to determine the number of factors to retain. 
The indicators of mother‟s power that are used in the factor analysis to construct 
condensed measure(s) of empowerment are education or literacy gap between husband 
and wife, age gap, media exposure (frequency of listening to radio), presence of other 
wives for the same husband, and multiple self-reported indicators of freedom from 
violence from husband (the conditions under which the wife thinks beating by husband is 
justified). Information on some other commonly used measures like non-labor income 
and separate asset ownership are not available in the data used for analysis in this essay. 
Mother‟s employment status, which could be both a cause and an outcome of the 
mother‟s bargaining power, is not included in the indicators of bargaining power because 
of its apparent endogeneity
30
 in the child schooling and health equations.  
The measure(s) of mother‟s power so obtained is included in the empirical models 
for child health and education as a regressor along with its interactions with the gap 
between the desired and actual gender ratios of her living children. The desired gender 
ratio is defined as the ideal number of girls the mother would like to have divided by the 
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 The theoretical basis for this criterion is demonstrated in Guttman (1954). 
30
 For example, employment may provide a mother with higher bargaining power but may also leave her 
with limited time to spend on childcare, thus directly affecting the health of the child. Therefore, 
unobserved family characteristics that may be correlated with mother’s opportunities for employment 
may also be correlated with child’s health and schooling. 
97 
 
 
 
ideal number of boys and girls she would like to have. The actual gender ratio is defined 
as the ratio of total number of living girls for the mother to the total number of living 
children. By focusing on the gender ratios instead of absolute number of girls or boys, we 
are assuming that the mother tries to allocate the health and education investment across 
boys and girls at each point in time expecting the next child to be a girl or a boy with 
equal probability and hence anticipating the realized gender ratio at that point in time to 
remain the same, on average. That is, the mother thinks that whatever lopsidedness 
observed in the gender mix of her children thus far is an anomaly and that it need not 
repeat itself if she decides to have more children.  
The dependent variable in the demand for child health equation is the child‟s 
weight-for-height z-score that is commonly used as a short-term measure of the child‟s 
physical fitness.  The mother‟s influence on the child‟s weight-for-height is presumed to 
come mainly through her control over the distribution of food in the household although 
she may also influence other aspects of childcare at home and outside that may be 
reflected in his/her physical fitness. Schooling is represented by current enrollment status. 
Assuming that the parents‟ demand for child health and education are linear functions of 
family and child characteristics, the family‟s demand for child health or school 
enrollment (as a linear probability model
31
) could be stated as,  
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 The left hand side for a linear probability model for school enrollment is Pr(yij=1|.).  We avoided probit 
model for this dichotomous outcome variable because implementation techniques for interactive 
instruments are not yet available in such non-linear framework. However, linear approximations of such 
models provide consistent estimates of the average treatment effects (Angrist and Krueger 2001).  
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where, yij is weight-for-height or school enrollment for child i in family j, Sij is a child sex 
dummy that takes a value of 1 for girls, θj represents a measure of the bargaining power 
of the mother in family j, dj represents the female to total child ratio preferred by the 
mother in family j, rj represents the actual female to total child ratio in family j, Xij is a 
vector of observed child characteristics such as age and birth order,  Zj is a vector of 
observed household characteristics like household size and wealth status
32
, µj represents 
unobserved family characteristics and εij the error term that contains unobserved child 
characteristics and measurement error. We assume that μj and εij are both normally 
distributed with zero means and constant variances 2  and
2
 , respectively.  
The signs and magnitudes of δ3 vs. δ4 and δ5 vs. δ6 help us infer whether and how 
the deviation of the actual proportion of girls from the proportion desired by the mother 
along with her bargaining power influences health and education for boys and girls. δ3 
and δ4 represent the effect of the gender ratio gap on boys and girls, respectively and if 
the compensating hypothesis proposed in this essay is true δ3 should have a positive sign 
and δ4 should have a negative sign; i.e., the bigger the excess of actual proportion of girls 
over the desired proportion, the less will the mother invest in the quality of each girl and 
the more will she invest in the quality of each boy to compensate for the deficit in the 
quantity of boys. δ5 and δ6 represent the effect of the interaction between gender ratio gap 
and the mother‟s power on investment in the human capital of boys and girls, 
respectively. If the compensating hypothesis is true, therefore, δ5 has to be positive and δ6 
has to be negative but bigger in size relative to δ3 and δ4, respectively. On the other hand, 
if Becker‟s hypothesis that parents prefer equal distribution of quality across children is 
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 Controlling for family wealth status is important because fertility preferences and mother’s bargaining 
power could differ by wealth class and its omission may bias our estimates for the key coefficients.   
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correct, all these coefficients should be close to zero since gender preferences, satisfied or 
not, should not affect the distribution of human capital. 
As previously mentioned, there is a plausible reason why the signs of these 
coefficients in the schooling equation could even turn out to be the opposite of what is 
implied by the compensating hypothesis. For example, if the reason for mother‟s 
preference for more girls than boys is in order to help her with family activities at home, 
a girl born among boys may have less chance to be sent to school than a girl born among 
some boys and some girls. On the other hand, if the mother‟s preference for girls is a 
reflection of her wish to have daughters that are successful in their future life, then a girl 
born among boys is likely to have a better chance to attend a school than one born among 
some boys and some girls. Therefore, the empirical estimates of the coefficients will help 
us shed some light on the underlying cause of the mother‟s gender ratio preferences.   
 
Estimation Methodology 
There are two key issues that need be addressed in estimating the child health and 
schooling equations specified in the form of 2.6. First, our key variable of interest, 
mother‟s gender ratio gap, could be endogenous. While the actual gender composition of 
children (rj) can be largely assumed to be exogenous (because of lack of technology for 
selective abortion in less developed countries like Ethiopia), the mother‟s gender ratio 
preferences (dj) could arguably be correlated with the unobserved family characteristics 
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(µj). For example, the mother‟s preferences for gender mix
33
 of children (dj) could be 
influenced by the unobserved family characteristics in (µj) that may also influence her 
beliefs about the value of health and schooling for a girl vs. a boy. Therefore, valid 
instruments are needed to address the potential bias in the estimates that could arise 
because of the endogeneity.  Second, the interaction of this potentially endogenous 
variable with other covariates calls for a modified application of the instrumental 
variables method.  
We use two sources of identification for the mother‟s gender ratio gap.  The first 
source is the gender ratio of the mother‟s own siblings that may have influenced her 
perceptions about and hence preferences for the gender mix of children but are not 
directly correlated with the health and schooling outcomes of her children. Conceptually, 
the gender ratio of the mother‟s siblings could influence her tastes for gender mix of her 
own children in at least two different ways. One possibility is that the mother may have 
liked the gender mix of her own siblings and may just wish to replicate it. It is also 
possible that the mother may not have liked the gender mix of her own siblings and may 
wish to have a different gender mix for her own children. The two may tend to offset 
each other and the gender mix of the mother‟s siblings may not be a very strong 
instrument for the mother‟s gender ratio gap.  Therefore, we use the birth of living same-
sex twins to the mother as an additional source of identification for the mother‟s gender 
ratio gap. 
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 In the demographic and health surveys that are used for analysis in this essay the question about the 
desired gender mix of children was asked retroactively by asking the mother how many boys, girls or 
children of any sex would she like to have if she could go back to the time she did not have any 
children.    
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The birth of same-sex twins can be treated as a random shock that substantially 
alters the gap between the desired and actual gender ratios just as the birth of twins is 
often treated as an exogenous shock that substantially changes the family size in 
unexpected way. The birth of twins has been used as instrument to identify the effect of 
family size on human capital and other outcomes of family members (e.g., Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin 1980; Black, Devereux and Salvanes 2007).The rationale for using the birth 
of twins as instrument for family size is that it can substantially deviate the actual family 
size from the desired family size (Black, Devereux and Salvanes 2007). Analogous 
arguments can be made for the use of the birth of same sex twins as instrument for the 
gender ratio gap in the health and enrollment equations specified in the previous section. 
At a given point in time parents decide to have the next child expecting that it can be a 
boy or a girl with equal probability. When they end up getting two girls or two boys 
instead, it is a shock that may substantially cause the actual gender ratio to deviate from 
the desired gender ratio in unexpected way. Therefore, the presence of female pairs of 
twins and male pairs of twins is used as additional instruments for the gender ratio gap in 
the health and enrollment equations. 
To implement the instrumental variables estimation with an interactive endogenous 
regressor, we follow the approach formulated in Wooldridge (1997, 2003). The procedure 
involves generating instruments for the interactive terms and provides consistent 
estimators provided that the model satisfies the following conditions.  
(1) The treatment variable must be continuous. This holds in our model since the 
potentially endogenous variable, gender ratio gap (rj-dj), is a continuous variable.  
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(2) The conditional expectation of the outcome variable, y, must be linear in the 
treatment variable.  This also holds since y in equation 2.6 is specified to be linear 
in all of its covariates.   
(3) The instruments must fulfill the standard exclusion restrictions in equation 2.6. 
That is, the instruments influence child health and schooling only through their 
effect on the gender ratio gap. The instruments we have selected for the gender 
ratio gap appear to fulfill the exclusion restrictions since there is no apparent way 
through which they can directly influence the outcome variables as previously 
argued.   
Given these conditions, the Wooldridge‟s procedure essentially requires estimating a 
linear reduced form equation for the endogenous regressor and using the resulting fitted 
value and its interactions with the corresponding covariates in the model as new 
instruments. We estimate the child health and schooling models with this approach using 
cross-sectional data from siblings and twins that belong to married parents with at least 
two living children. We limit our sample to the currently married women with at least 2 
children since these are the families where we can observe differential bargaining power 
between husband and wife and differences in outcomes for children, if any. The models 
can be estimated by OLS to obtain unbiased estimates correcting the standard errors for 
family level clustering. However, the paired structure of the data from twins, and to some 
extent siblings, provides additional information that can be exploited to obtain more 
accurate estimates (Carlin et al. 2005; Conley, Strully, and Bennet 2006). To see that, we 
can rewrite the error components in equation 2.6 as, 
                                       
 
                                                   ijjij
                                                                (2.7)  
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The new composite error term, φij, has zero mean and variance, 22    . 
Apparently, φij is not independently distributed within twin-pairs or within siblings since 
they share the same family level heterogeneity, μj. The within-twin or within-siblings 
correlation is )/( 222     and the twins/siblings‟ random-effects GLS procedure that 
we use to estimate the models exploits this correlation to generate the required weights.  
The correlation between the errors is expected to be stronger for the twin-pairs since at 
least some
34
 of the twins may share the hereditary components of the unobserved 
endowments like ability that are part of εij.  In addition, the twins‟ data allow us to control 
for the potential confounding effects of the over-time changes in the unobserved family 
characteristics and preferences since twins, unlike the ordinary siblings, face such 
changes together.    
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The main empirical analysis in this essay is based on pooled cross-sectional data 
from two rounds of the Ethiopian demographic and health surveys (DHS)
35
 conducted in 
the years 2000 and 2005 by the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia.  Although the 
principal reason for pooling the two data sets is in order to obtain a reasonably large 
sample of twins, working with the pooled data should not be unreasonable for the 
purpose at hand since the key research question here does not closely relate to policy or 
other variables that could have changed between the two survey rounds. In any case, we 
try to generically control for the possible effects of the unobserved factors that might 
                                                          
34
 Both monozygotic and dizygotic twins are part of our sample but they are not identified in our data.  
35
 The data were provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development which is the Financial 
Sponsor of all the Demographic and Health Surveys. 
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have changed between the two rounds by including a dummy for the survey round in our 
econometric models. As a way of checking the validity of our results in other contexts we 
also try to replicate our main results using data from the demographic and health survey 
of India conducted in 2005/06 with a bigger sample size. 
The Ethiopian demographic and health survey of the year 2000 (DHS2000) was 
nationally representative survey of 14,072 households proportionately distributed across 
the 11 regions of the country. DHS2005 was a similar survey that covered 13,721 
households.  Both surveys consisted of three components: household questionnaire, 
women‟s questionnaire and men‟s questionnaire. The household questionnaire collected 
data on basic demographics and education for all individual members of the household, 
relationships among household members, and main assets owned by the household. The 
women‟s questionnaire was administered to all women of the reproductive age (15-49) in 
the sample households and asked reasonably detailed questions on fertility levels and 
preferences, child health and nutrition, as well as indicators of women‟s empowerment. 
The men‟s questionnaire addressed similar questions to a smaller number of men (2,607 
men vs. 15,367 women in 2000 and 6,033 men vs. 14,070 women in 2005) but did not 
include questions on fertility history, child nutrition and health. 
Most of the key variables of interest are available in both surveys. Data on 
educational attainment and attendance status are available for household members 
including the children. Child anthropometric data (weight and height) are available for 
under-5 children and the weight-for-height z-scores (waz) were calculated on the basis of 
the WHO standards. Information on the mother‟s preferences for the number and gender 
mix of children were collected by asking the mother how many children she would have 
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liked to have “if she could go back to the time she did not have any children and could 
choose exactly the number of children to have in her whole life” and how many of those 
she would like to be boys, girls or any sex. This information is used to calculate the 
mother‟s gender ratio preference as the ratio of total number of girls preferred to total 
number of children preferred. The actual gender ratio is calculated by dividing the total 
number of living girls to the mother by the total number of her children. The gender ratio 
gap is the difference between the preferred proportion of girls and the actual proportion 
of girls at the time of the survey assuming no gap (a zero gap) when the mother does not 
care about the gender mix of her children.   
To construct a measure(s) of women‟s bargaining power through factor analysis, 
we focus on the indicators that are available in both rounds. These include differences in 
schooling or literacy between husband and wife, age gap, religion, media exposure 
(frequency of listening to radio), presence of multiple wives (polygyny), and multiple 
self-reported indicators of independence and self-confidence of the mother in her 
relationship with her husband. All the indicators are scaled in an increasing order of 
importance for women‟s power so as to make the interpretation of the resulting factor(s) 
in our models easier.    
In addition to the key variables of interest (gender ratio gap, mother‟s bargaining 
power and gender of the child), we include controls for the child‟s age, household size 
and birthorder as well as the households‟ relative wealth profile in our models. 
Controlling for the child‟s birthorder is important because both the child‟s physical health 
and the parents‟ choice to send him/her to school or not could depend on how many 
children they have before or after him. Controlling for family wealth status is also 
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important because fertility preferences and mother‟s bargaining power could differ by 
wealth class and its omission may lead to biases in our estimates. The household‟s wealth 
quintiles (that are already available in the data) were constructed from the wealth indices 
that summarize the household‟s ownership of key assets like land and livestock. In the 
models for the child‟s physical health we also control for the mother‟s body mass index 
in order to account for some of the genetic variations in child‟s weight-for-height. The 
definitions of all the variables used in our econometric models including the instruments 
are presented in table 7 below. 
 Table 7. Descriptions of Variables Used in the Models 
Dependent Variables 
Child is attending school Dummy=1 if child is attending school 
Weight-for-Height Z-scores Z-scores for height standardized weight of the 
child 
Covariates  
Mother's Desired Female Ratio Desired number of girls/Desired Number of 
children 
Actual Female Ratio Actual number of girls/actual number of 
children 
Gender Ratio Gap Actual Female Ratio-Mother's Desired Female 
Ratio 
Mother's Bargaining Power A composite measure of mother's bargaining 
power from factor analysis 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female Gender Ratio Gap*Female 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining Power Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining Power 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining Power*Female Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining Power*Female 
Child is female Dummy=1 if child is female 
Age of Child Age of child in years 
Household Size Household size 
Child's Birth-Order Child's birth-order 
First Wealth Quintile Dummy=1 if household falls in the first wealth 
quintile 
Second Wealth Quintile Dummy=1 if household falls in the second 
wealth quintile 
Fourth Wealth Quintile Dummy=1 if household falls in the fourth 
wealth quintile 
Fifth Wealth Quintile Dummy=1 if household falls in the fifth wealth 
quintile 
Mother's Body Mass Index Mother's Body Mass Index 
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Survey Round is 2005 Dummy=1 if observation comes from the 2005 
round   
Instruments for Gender Ratio Gap 
 Gender Ratio of Mother's Siblings Number of mother's sisters/Number of 
mother's siblings 
Female Twin-Pair in the Family Dummy=1 if the mother has a living female 
pair of twins 
Male Twin-Pair in the Family Dummy=1 if the mother has a living male pair 
of twins 
Mixed-sex Twin-Pair in the Family (control 
group) 
Dummy=1 if the mother has a living mixed 
sex pair of twins 
Indicators of mother's bargaining power used in factor analysis 
Independence in Seeking External Relations Dummy=1 if mother thinks wife beating by 
husband is unjustified  for not telling him 
where she is going 
Independence in Child-care Decisions Dummy=1 if mother thinks wife beating by 
husband is unjustified  for failing in caring for 
children 
Self-confidence in Talking to Husband Dummy=1 if mother thinks wife beating by 
husband is unjustified  for arguing with him 
Independence in Sexual Decisions  Dummy=1 if mother thinks wife beating by 
husband is unjustified  for refusing to have sex 
with him 
Independence in Domestic Activities Dummy=1 if mother thinks wife beating by 
husband is unjustified  for burning food 
Husband has just 1 wife Dummy=1 if the mother is the only wife of her 
husband 
Mother Listens to Radio  =0 if not at all, =1 if less than once a week, =2 
if at least once a week, =3 if almost every day 
Mother is More Educated than Husband Dummy=1 if mother is more educated than  
husband 
Age-gap Mother's age-Husband's age 
Mother is Non-Muslim Dummy=1 if mother is non-Muslim 
 Source: The Demographic and Health Surveys. 
 
The focus of analysis in this essay is on the children belonging to the currently 
married women with at least 2 children since these are the families where we can observe 
differential bargaining power between husband and wife and differences in outcomes for 
children, if any. Our sample for schooling consists of the biological children of such 
parents who were 6-18 years old during the survey rounds while our models for child‟s 
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physical health are estimated using data from the under-5 year olds belonging to such 
families. The summary statistics computed from the combined data for the variables used 
in our models are presented in table 8 below. Table D1 in appendix D presents the 
descriptive statistics for the two rounds separately.   
We have a total of 23,819 children with complete data in our sample for schooling 
out of which 252 or 126 pairs are twins. On the other hand, our sample for the analysis of 
the child‟s physical health consists of 9,504 children with complete data out of which 148 
or 74 pairs are twins.  The total number of twin pairs belonging to married couples with 
at least two children is 268 (84 female pairs, 76 male pairs and 108 mixed sex pairs) 
including those with missing age and/or anthropometric data and those older than 18. 
While our regression results for twins are based on those who have complete data for the 
key variables, the gender of twin-pairs as an instrument for the gender ratio gap is based 
on all the living twin-pairs.  In our sample for schooling, about 0.9%, 1% and 1.4% of the 
children belonged to families with living female-twin pairs, male-twin pairs and mixed-
sex-twin pairs, respectively. On the other hand about 0.9%, 0.7% and 1.1% of the 
children in our sample for the child-health models belonged to families with living 
female-twin pairs, male-twin pairs and mixed-sex-twin pairs, respectively.  While this is 
a small sample of twins in absolute terms, it is generally comparable to the twins‟ 
samples used for the purpose of instrumenting for family size in some other studies. For 
example, the percentage of twins in the sample used by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) 
was 1.5%.  
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Table 8. Summary Statistics for the Variables Used in the Models 
  
School Attendance 
(N=23819) 
Weight-for-Height 
(N=9504) 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Child is attending school 0.369 0.483   
Weight-for-Height Z-scores   -1.719 1.294 
Percentage of wasted children    0.436 0.496 
Mother's Desired Female Ratio 0.470 0.150 0.471 0.162 
Actual Female Ratio 0.485 0.229 0.491 0.267 
Gender Ratio Gap 0.015 0.214 0.020 0.247 
Mother's Bargaining Power (de-meaned) 0.000 0.886 0.000 0.881 
Child is female 0.478 0.500 0.497 0.500 
Age of Child 10.204 3.213 2.129 1.409 
Household Size 7.239 2.005 6.424 1.998 
Child's Birth-Order 3.831 2.344 4.637 2.528 
First Wealth Quintile 0.201 0.401 0.177 0.381 
Second Wealth Quintile 0.170 0.376 0.172 0.378 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.189 0.391 0.200 0.400 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.237 0.425 0.235 0.424 
Mother's Body Mass Index   20.239 2.540 
Gender Ratio of Mother's Siblings 0.489 0.252 0.476 0.242 
Female Twin-Pair in the Family 0.009 0.093 0.009 0.096 
Male Twin-Pair in the Family 0.010 0.098 0.007 0.083 
Mixed Twin-Pair in the Family 0.014 0.116 0.011 0.105 
Independence in Seeking External Relations 0.368 0.482 0.384 0.486 
Independence in Child-care Decisions 0.335 0.472 0.334 0.472 
Self-confidence in Talking to Husband 0.388 0.487 0.364 0.481 
Independence in Sexual Decisions  0.467 0.499 0.451 0.498 
Independence in Domestic Activities 0.391 0.488 0.355 0.478 
Husband has just 1 wife 0.843 0.364 0.871 0.335 
Mother Listens to Radio 0.499 0.895 0.460 0.850 
Mother is More Educated than Husband 0.058 0.233 0.066 0.249 
Mother's age-Husband's age -9.036 6.784 -8.555 6.654 
Mother is Non-Muslim 0.592 0.491 0.609 0.488 
Survey Round is 2005 0.475 0.499 0.324 0.468 
Source: Combined Data from the Demographic and Health Surveys of Ethiopia Conducted in 
the Years 2000 and 2005.   
 
 
110 
 
 
 
The evidence in table 8 shows that only 37% of the children in the combined data from 
the two rounds were attending school at the time of the surveys. The attendance rates 
between the two survey rounds were not very far apart as shown in table D1 in appendix 
D (35% in 2000 vs.39% in 2005). The average height-for-age z-score of about -1.72 also 
shows a high prevalence of child wasting in Ethiopia. According to WHO standards
36
 a 
child with less than -2 weight-for-height z-score is considered to be wasted. According to 
this criterion, therefore, about 44% of the children were wasted. Although we observe 
some improvement in the percentage of children wasted in the 2005 round (46% in 2000 
vs. 39% in 2005) it is important to note that the number of children with anthropometric 
data in 2005 is less than half of that in 2000 and some of it could be statistical 
discrepancy as demonstrated by larger standard deviation in 2005. The relationships 
between the variations in child schooling and health outcomes and the proposed 
covariates are presented in the next section.  
 
Estimation Results 
 
Factor Analysis 
As previously stated we use factor analysis to construct an index (indices) of 
mother‟s bargaining power that focus on the common variation of selected indicators. 
The factor loadings and the corresponding eigenvalues of the correlation matrix between 
the 10 selected indicators are presented in table D2 and table D3 in appendix D, 
respectively. The scree plot of the eigenvalues for the 10 factors is presented as Fig 13 
                                                          
36
  The WHO child growth standards are available at 
http://www.who.int/childgrowth/standards/weight_for_height/en/index.html, accessed April, 2010. 
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below. The magnitudes of the eigenvalues reported in table D3 indicate that none of the 
factors except the first capture substantial common variation in the selected indicators. 
Only the first factor has an eigenvalue well in excess of 1 after which it drastically drops 
to 0.34 for the second factor and levels off as demonstrated in Fig 13 below. Therefore, 
both the Kaiser-Guttman rule and Cattell‟s scree test imply that only the first factor 
contains important information about the common variation in the selected indicators. We 
thus take factor1 as an indicative index of women‟s decision making power in the family 
and use it as a covariate in our child health and schooling models.  
 
 
All the 10 indicators of the mother‟s power are positively correlated in factor1 as 
demonstrated by their positive factor loadings reported in table D2.  This is in fact, by 
design since all the indicators were scaled in an increasing order of importance for 
women‟s power. Given the positive correlation between all the components of factor1, 
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Fig 13. Scree Plot of Eigenvalues after Factor Analysis
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therefore, we can interpret its increasing values as signifying increasing mother‟s power 
and the vice versa. This is so because those women who have larger values of the 
constituent indicators will also have larger values of the index, other things remaining the 
same.  
Although factor1 accounts only for about 22.1%
37
 of the total underlying variation 
in the indicators, it is capturing almost all of the common variation in the indicators since 
the other factors account for negligible fraction of the common variation in the variables. 
Whether the amount of variation in the original indicators we have captured in factor1 is 
adequate for our purpose or not mainly depends on how well the index performs in our 
models. Most of the results reported in the next section show that the index contains 
important information about women‟s power.  
It is also important to note that factor1 mostly captures the variation in the 5 self-
reported indicators of mother‟s independence and self-confidence in the relationship with 
her husband. The other indicators have relatively small but non-negligible common 
variation with the self-reported indicators of empowerment and hence are kept in the 
model. While it is possible to argue that the self-reported indicators are the direct 
measures of mother‟s empowerment whose influence on child health and schooling come 
through the latter, some of the other indicators like radio access and education gap could 
also have direct effects on child health and schooling. For example, a mother who listens 
to radio frequently may be better informed not only about her rights in the family and 
community (empowerment) but also about the benefits of child schooling and health. 
However, the part of the variation in radio access that is captured by our index is the part 
                                                          
37
 This is obtained by dividing the sum of the squared factor loadings by the number of variables which is 
the same as dividing the eigenvalue by the number of variables.  
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that is positively correlated with the self-reported direct indicators of empowerment. In 
other words, the role of access to radio will be captured in factor1 only when women who 
frequently listen to radio are also more independent and self-confident in their 
relationship with husbands. Therefore, it is less likely that our index of mother‟s 
bargaining power will be reflecting the direct effects of access to radio and the other 
indicators on child health and schooling.  
 
Results for Child Schooling  
In this section we present the estimation results for the models of schooling. As 
previously stated our main estimation procedure involves two stages. We first regress our 
potentially endogenous variable, the gender ratio gap, on the instruments and other 
covariates in our models using OLS. The fitted value from this first stage regression and 
its interactions with the corresponding covariates are then used as instruments for the 
gender ratio gap and its interactions. In the second stage, therefore, we are estimating an 
exactly identified equation since the number of generated instruments is exactly equal to 
the number of endogenous covariates including the interactive terms. One benefit of this 
approach is that we don‟t need to correct the standard errors in the second stage since we 
are using generated instruments instead of generated regressors as Wooldridge (2003) 
states.   
The first stage results for our models of child schooling are reported in table D4 in 
appendix D. The gender ratio of the mother‟s siblings as an instrument is positively 
correlated with the mother‟s gender ratio gap both in the siblings‟ and twins‟ data and it 
is statistically significant in the case of the siblings‟ data. The birth of female twins has 
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significant negative effect on the mother‟s gender ratio gap while the birth of male twins 
has the opposite effect. The instruments are jointly significant in both the siblings‟ and 
the twins‟ models as demonstrated by the F-test for their joint significance.   
We estimate the models both with OLS and random-effects GLS including their 
instrumental variables counterparts.  In most of the cases, the OLS and GLS estimates 
including their instrumental variables counterparts for our key variables of interest are 
similar in sign and close in magnitude but the GLS estimates generally have smaller 
standard errors than their OLS counterparts. However, the instrumental variables 
estimates for our key variables are often larger than their simple OLS and GLS 
counterparts perhaps implying that endogeneity of the gender ratio gap was indeed an 
issue that needed to be addressed. Therefore, our subsequent discussion mainly focuses 
on the instrumental variables GLS estimates.  
The first set of results we report as baseline estimates exclude the mother‟s 
bargaining power and its interaction with the gender ratio gap and just focus on the latter. 
These results are reported in tables D6 and D7 in appendix D for the siblings‟ and twins‟ 
data, respectively. The results from the siblings‟ data indicate that the mother‟s gender 
ratio gap has highly significant positive effect on the probability of school attendance for 
boys and marginally significant negative effect on the probability of school attendance 
for girls. This implies that the bigger the excess of actual proportion of girls over the 
mother‟s desired proportion, the smaller a girl‟s chance of attending school and the 
bigger a boy‟s chance of attending school will be. According to these results a girl born 
to a mother who desires to have 3 boys and 3 girls will have a bigger chance of attending 
school when she is born with 5 brothers than 2 sisters and 3 brothers. These results are 
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consistent with our compensating hypothesis and are replicated using similar
38
 but larger 
data from India as reported in table E4 in appendix E. However, we do not find similar 
results from the twins‟ data perhaps due to the relatively small sample of twins available 
in the data sets. Therefore, the support for our compensating hypothesis in our baseline 
estimates for schooling appears to be mixed at best.  
Table 9. Linear Probability Models for School Attendance-Results from Siblings‟ Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female -0.056*** -0.062*** -0.158*** -0.099*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.030) (0.020) 
Gender Ratio Gap 0.038* 0.058*** 1.055*** 0.992*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.286) (0.303) 
Mother's Bargaining Power 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.029** 0.026* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.015) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female -0.010 -0.040 -0.546 -0.745** 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.372) (0.375) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining Power -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.523** -0.545** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.231) (0.256) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining      
Power*Female 0.067** 0.066** 0.822** 0.872** 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.374) (0.360) 
Age of Child 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Child's Birth-order -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.146*** -0.142*** -0.147*** -0.142*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.045*** -0.042*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.206*** 0.207*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) 
Survey Round is 2005 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.151*** 0.149*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Constant -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.019 -0.030 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.036) (0.037) 
     
                                                          
38
 The only difference is that the set of instruments in the Indian case does not include the gender ratio of 
the mother’s siblings since such data were not gathered in the demographic and health survey of India in 
2005/06.  
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Observations 23819 23819 23819 23819 
Number of  Mother_id  9911  9911 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of children from age 6 to 18 in the combined data from the two rounds 
of DHS-Ethiopia. Only those children with married mother with at least two children are 
included. 
 
 
 
The main set of results we report for child schooling include the index of mother‟s 
bargaining power and its interaction with the gender ratio gap as additional covariates to 
the baseline equations. These results are presented in tables 9 and 10 for the siblings‟ and 
twins‟ data, respectively.  It is important to note that for the effects of the interactions 
between the mother‟s bargaining power and the gender ratio gap to be identified there 
must be differences in their gender preferences. Although we cannot verify this for the 
entire sample since data on fertility preferences were not collected for all the men, the 
small subsample of men for whom the data are available (2168 in 2000 and 4752 in 2005) 
appear to have substantially different gender preferences than women (see table D10 in 
appendix D). In the DHS2000, the preferred number of boys by the husband and wife 
differs in 77% of the cases while the preferred number of girls differs in 73% of the 
cases. In DHS2005, the corresponding figures are 76% and 72% for DHS2000 and 
DHS2005, respectively.  
The results from the siblings‟ data demonstrate that the index of the mother‟s 
bargaining power we constructed through the factor analysis has significant positive 
effect on the probability of child schooling which is generally consistent with the findings 
in the existing literature. However, it is important to note that the magnitude and sign of 
the coefficient of the mother‟s bargaining power that shows up along the third row in 
table 9 shows its effect that comes independent of its interaction with the mother‟s gender 
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ratio gap and hence may not tell the full story about the role of the mother‟s power. It is 
also important to note that the absolute magnitudes of the coefficients of the interactive 
terms are not very informative since they reflect the combined effect of multiple 
variables. Our focus is thus on the signs and statistical significances of the coefficients 
for boys and girls.   
Table 10. Linear Probability Models for School Attendance-Results from Twins‟ Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female 0.061 -0.019 -0.104 -0.104 
 (0.061) (0.051) (0.096) (0.096) 
Gender Ratio Gap -0.200 -0.087 0.408 0.408 
 (0.199) (0.198) (0.637) (0.637) 
Mother's Bargaining Power 0.034 0.041 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.048) (0.050) (0.057) (0.057) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female 0.216 0.089 0.899 0.899 
 (0.244) (0.193) (0.861) (0.861) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining 
Power 
 
-0.569* 
 
-0.421 
 
-1.287** 
 
-1.287*** 
 (0.335) (0.299) (0.497) (0.497) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining      
Power*Female 0.754* 0.620* 1.515** 1.515** 
 (0.399) (0.355) (0.754) (0.754) 
Age of Child 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
Household Size -0.015 -0.015 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
Child's Birth-Order -0.004 -0.022 0.003 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.144 -0.157 -0.121 -0.121 
 (0.123) (0.135) (0.109) (0.109) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.011 -0.047 -0.080 -0.080 
 (0.112) (0.120) (0.126) (0.126) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.071 0.072 0.056 0.056 
 (0.138) (0.151) (0.127) (0.127) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.257** 0.237* 0.261** 0.261*** 
 (0.108) (0.121) (0.101) (0.101) 
Survey Round is 2005 0.159** 0.136* 0.135* 0.135* 
 (0.078) (0.082) (0.073) (0.073) 
Constant -0.182 0.024 -0.246 -0.246 
 (0.180) (0.208) (0.214) (0.214) 
     
Observations 252 252 252 252 
Number of Mother_id  121  121 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of living twin-pairs from age 6 to 18 in the combined data from the 
two rounds of DHS-Ethiopia. Only those children with married mother with at least two children 
are included. 
 
 
In the results for both siblings and twins, the signs and statistical significances of 
the coefficients of the gender ratio gap for boys and girls are similar to those of the 
baseline line estimates although the statistical significance of our preferred IV-GLS 
estimate of the coefficient for girls has improved in the results for the siblings‟ data. On 
the other hand, the sign of the coefficient for the interaction between the gender ratio gap 
and the mother‟s bargaining power is negative and significant for boys and positive and 
significant for girls in both the siblings‟ and twins‟ results. These results39 are replicated 
using Indian data as reported in tables E8 and E9 in appendix E and imply that a girl born 
to an influential mother has a bigger chance of attending school when more than desired 
proportion of girls is born.  
These results apparently contradict our expectation that the mother‟s bargaining 
power will reinforce the effect of the gender ratio gap in the direction implied by the 
compensating hypothesis but make intuitive sense in the context of Basu‟s (2006) 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, too much mother‟s power could be unfavorable 
to a child‟s attendance of schooling in the contexts where the child is needed to help out 
with family activities. While Basu‟s hypothesis is not gender specific as formulated, if it 
is true, it is likely that a girl born to a powerful mother (who would like to keep some of 
the children for family labor activities) will be more demanded at home when she is the 
only girl among 5 boys than she is one among 3 boys and 3 girls. This is so because boys 
                                                          
39
 We obtain similar results when we use a dummy taking a value of 1 for the positive values of the index 
for the mother’s bargaining power and 0 otherwise in the place of the index itself.  
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and girls often have different roles in family labor activities and having siblings with 
similar gender could be an advantage for a child in terms of attending school since he/she 
can share the burden of those gender specialized activities with them. Therefore, when 
fewer than the mother's desired proportion of girls or boys are born, their chances of 
attending school could be diminished most likely because mothers use their power to 
retain them to help in household activities. This in itself implies that the mother‟s desire 
to have more girls/boys is not necessarily because she wants to have daughters/sons that 
are successful in their future life but rather because she wants them to help in specific 
family activities. The bottom line is thus, the mother‟s power is important in influencing 
the distribution of schooling among her children but could be unfavorable to boys‟ or 
girls‟ chances of schooling depending on their gender mix relative to her preferences. 
Although we do not want to stretch the policy implications of these results too far before 
they are confirmed in other contexts with different data sets and estimation techniques, 
they seem to indicate that women empowerment programs will have to be supplemented 
with other policies that mitigate their needs for child labor (like income support 
programs) in order to enhance child schooling. 
 
Results for Child’s Physical Health 
We estimate the equations for child‟s physical health, proxied by weight-for-
height z-scores, using similar procedures followed in our models for schooling. The first 
stage results for our models of child‟s health are reported in table D5 in appendix D. As 
in the case of our models for schooling the instruments are jointly significant in the first 
stage equations of the models for child health as demonstrated by the large values of the 
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F-stat in table D5. Once again we first estimate the models for child‟s health by ignoring 
the role of the mother‟s bargaining power. The results for these models are reported as 
baseline in tables D8 and D9 in appendix D for the siblings‟ and twins‟ data, respectively.   
The baseline results from the siblings‟ data presented in table D8 indicate that the 
mother‟s gender ratio gap has a positive effect on the weight-for-height of boys and 
negative effect on the weight-for-height of girls. The signs of the corresponding estimates 
from the twins‟ data presented in table D9 are consistent with the results from the 
siblings‟ data for girls but our preferred IV-GLS estimate for boys turns out to be 
negative in the results for twins. In the baseline results from Indian data reported in tables 
E6 and E7 in appendix E, the IV-GLS estimate of the coefficient of the mother‟s gender 
ratio gap is positive for boys and negative for girls both in the siblings‟ and twins data‟.  
Therefore, the balance of these results appears to indicate that there is some support to the 
compensating hypothesis that the birth of the less than desired proportion of children of 
either gender (particularly girls) may be augmented by favorable nutrition to the children 
of that gender. However, most of these coefficients are statistically insignificant and the 
results have to be cautiously interpreted.  
Table 11. Models for Child‟s Weight-for-Height Z-Scores -Results from Siblings‟ Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female -0.010 -0.006 0.301 0.154 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.389) (0.282) 
Gender Ratio Gap 0.021 0.045 1.544 1.428 
 (0.086) (0.084) (1.236) (1.232) 
Mother's Bargaining Power 0.041** 0.044** -0.068 -0.006 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.120) (0.104) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female -0.064 -0.100 -5.023* -3.780 
 (0.120) (0.118) (2.882) (2.506) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining 
Power 
 
-0.184* 
 
-0.161* 
 
-1.240 
 
-0.646 
 (0.096) (0.093) (1.320) (1.163) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining     
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Power*Female 0.219* 0.184 2.182 1.100 
 (0.132) (0.129) (2.259) (1.936) 
Age of Child -0.180*** -0.173*** -0.192*** -0.181*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Household Size 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.018 0.023* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) 
Child's Birth-Order -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.084*** -0.075*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.021) (0.018) 
First Wealth Quintile 0.021 0.029 0.006 0.016 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.049) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.041 -0.033 -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.048) (0.049) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.055 0.057 0.063 0.063 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.046) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.249*** 0.258*** 0.259*** 0.274*** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.044) (0.045) 
Mother's Body Mass Index 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Survey Round is 2005 0.280*** 0.277*** 0.248*** 0.258*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.039) (0.038) 
Constant -3.339*** -3.373*** -2.982*** -3.082*** 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.219) (0.219) 
     
Observations 9504 9504 9504 9504 
Number of Mother_id  6425  6425 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of children under age 5 in the combined data from the two rounds of 
DHS-Ethiopia. Only those children with married mother with at least two children are included. 
 
 
Our main models for the child‟s physical health expand the baseline line models 
by including the index for the mother‟s bargaining power and its interactions with the 
gender ratio gap as additional covariates. The results for these models are presented as 
tables 11 and 12 for the siblings‟ and twins‟ data, respectively. The signs of the 
coefficient of the gender ratio gap for boys and girls are consistent with the compensating 
hypothesis in these results as well, but we observe indications of the mother‟s bargaining 
power reinforcing the compensating hypothesis only in the twins‟ data. In the results for 
twins presented in table 12 below the effect of the interaction between the mother‟s 
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bargaining power and the gender ratio gap is positive for boys and negative for girls 
while it takes the opposite signs in the results from the siblings‟ data. However, none of 
these coefficients is statistically significant in the IV-GLS equations.  
Table 12. Models for Child‟s Weight-for-Height Z-Scores -Results from Twins‟ Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female -0.088 0.101 0.339 0.382 
 (0.221) (0.166) (0.401) (0.323) 
Gender Ratio Gap 1.790** 0.444 -0.078 0.145 
 (0.864) (0.695) (2.643) (3.391) 
Mother's Bargaining Power 0.154 0.156 0.317 0.353 
 (0.181) (0.172) (0.246) (0.305) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female -2.845** -0.864 -5.166 -6.390 
 (1.308) (1.115) (5.668) (8.018) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining 
Power 
 
1.437* 
 
1.387* 
 
4.324** 
 
4.193 
 (0.821) (0.772) (1.870) (2.560) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining 
Power*Female 
 
-0.788 
 
-0.220 
 
-5.892 
 
-7.568 
 (1.491) (1.517) (5.666) (7.329) 
Age of Child 0.209** 0.200** 0.275** 0.285* 
 (0.092) (0.090) (0.118) (0.151) 
Household Size 0.011 0.049 -0.004 -0.017 
 (0.101) (0.108) (0.076) (0.121) 
Child's Birth-Order -0.092* -0.116** -0.160* -0.144** 
 (0.052) (0.054) (0.089) (0.072) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.394 -0.532 -0.829 -0.617 
 (0.570) (0.570) (0.666) (1.057) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.673 -0.687 -0.866* -0.709 
 (0.447) (0.484) (0.449) (0.736) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 1.149** 0.923 0.876 1.085 
 (0.565) (0.576) (0.679) (1.091) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 1.023** 0.830* 0.737 0.951 
 (0.439) (0.450) (0.528) (0.898) 
Mother's Body Mass Index 0.060 0.083 0.062 0.036 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.090) (0.139) 
Survey Round is 2005 -0.013 0.051 -0.170 -0.225 
 (0.376) (0.381) (0.421) (0.587) 
Constant -3.554** -4.213*** -3.023 -2.633 
 (1.405) (1.397) (1.923) (2.921) 
     
Observations 148 148 148 148 
Number of Mother_id  73  73 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of living twin-pairs under age 5 in the combined data from the two 
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rounds of DHS-Ethiopia. Only those children with married mother with at least two children are 
included. 
 
 
 
In the results from Indian data reported in tables E10 and E11 in appendix E the 
signs of the coefficient of the interaction between gender ratio gap and the index for 
mother‟s power are consistent with the compensating hypothesis in the IV-GLS equations 
but the estimates are statistically insignificant for both boys and girls. Based on these 
results, therefore, there is little evidence in support of the claim that the mother‟s power 
may be used to reinforce the effect of the gender ratio gap in the direction implied by the 
compensating hypothesis when it comes to child‟s nutrition health. Perhaps the mother 
doesn‟t want to discriminate between her children in terms of something as basic as food 
no matter how the realized gender mix deviates from what she would have liked.  
 
Conclusion 
In this essay we try to empirically investigate how the gap between mother‟s 
preferred and actual gender mix of children influences the distribution of schooling and 
nutrition health across boys and girls. Specifically, we try to examine whether the 
quantity deficit in the children of the preferred gender is compensated by their favorable 
treatment in terms of investment in schooling and nutrition (that we call compensating 
hypothesis) and to what extent the mother uses her bargaining power in the family to 
influence this process. We mainly use data from siblings and twins in two rounds of the 
demographic and health surveys of Ethiopia, although we replicate the results using data 
from a similar but larger data from India.  
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An index of mother‟s power in the family is constructed from multiple indicators 
using factor analysis and the potential endogeneity of the gap between the mother‟s 
preferred and actual gender mix of children is instrumented for by the gender mix of the 
mother‟s own siblings as well as the birth of female and male pairs of twins to the 
mother. Our models for child schooling and nutritional health (measured in terms of 
child‟s weight-for-height) are estimated using both OLS and random-effects GLS. Our 
preferred results are those based on the random effects GLS method that exploits the 
paired structure of the siblings‟ and twins‟ data to produce more accurate estimates than 
OLS.  
We found no conclusive evidence that the mother tries to compensate the deficit 
in the quantity of children of her preferred gender by more favorably investing in their 
schooling and nutrition although there are qualitative indications in some of our results 
that this could be the case. While our expectation was that higher mother‟s power will 
reinforce the effect of mother‟s gender ratio gap on the distribution of child schooling and 
nutritional health in the direction implied by the compensating hypothesis, we rather find 
it working in the opposite direction in the case of child schooling and having no 
substantive role in the case of child nutritional health. In other words, our results for 
schooling imply that a girl born to an influential mother has a bigger chance of attending 
school when more than desired proportion of girls is born than not.  
Our results for schooling, though unanticipated, make some intuitive sense in the 
context of Basu‟s (2006) hypothesis about the role of mother‟s power in child labor and 
schooling. According to this hypothesis, too much mother‟s power could be unfavorable 
to a child‟s attendance of schooling in the contexts where the child is needed to help out 
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with family activities. While Basu‟s hypothesis is not gender specific as formulated, it is 
likely that a girl born to a powerful mother (who would like to keep some of the children 
for family labor activities) will be more demanded at home when she is the only girl 
among 5 boys than she is one among 3 boys and 3 girls. This is so because boys and girls 
often have different roles in family labor activities and having siblings with similar 
gender could be an advantage for a child in terms of attending school since he/she can 
share the burden of those gender specialized activities with them.  
Therefore,  when fewer than the mother's desired proportion of girls or boys are 
born, their chances of attending school could be diminished because the mother uses her 
power to retain them to help in household activities. This in itself implies that the 
mother‟s desire to have more girls/boys is not necessarily because she wants to have 
daughters/sons that are successful in their future life but rather because she wants them to 
help in specific family activities. The bottom line is thus, the mother‟s power is important 
in influencing the distribution of schooling among her children but could be unfavorable 
to boys‟ or girls‟ chances of schooling depending on their gender mix relative to her 
preferences. Although we do not want to stretch the policy implications of these results 
too far before they are confirmed in other contexts with different data sets and estimation 
techniques, they seem to indicate that women empowerment programs will have to be 
supplemented with other policies that mitigate the need for child labor (e.g., income 
support programs) in order to enhance child schooling.   
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ESSAY III: TEENAGE SOCIALIZING BEHAVIOR AND SCHOOLING 
OUTCOMES FOR AMERICAN YOUTH 
 
Introduction 
Recent empirical studies have shown that there is some decline in the „actual‟ 
high school graduation rates and some „slow-down‟ in the college enrollment rates in the 
U.S. While the official estimates based on „status completion‟ show high school 
graduation rates as high as 88% and somewhat rising (Heckman and Lafontaine 2010), 
various studies have used alternative methods and data sources to come up with much 
lower and slightly declining graduation rates over the last three decades. For example, 
Miano and Haney (2004) report national high school graduation rates ranging between 
66% and 80% for the period from 1973 to 2001, slightly declining particularly after early 
1990s. Heckman and LaFontaine (2010) focused on earning formal high school diploma 
(i.e., not including those with a general educational development certificate, GED) as an 
appropriate measure of high school graduation and compared alternative data sets to 
conclude that the graduation rates based on the latter are much lower than the officially 
reported rates and have in fact declined over the recent years
40
. There is also substantial 
variation in the high school graduation rates by race and gender, men generally falling 
behind and the outcomes being worse for blacks and Latinos. They associate the observed 
recent slow-down in college enrollment and the rising female-male college attendance 
ratio to this declining high school graduation rate that disproportionately affects men.  
                                                          
40
 The distinction between high school graduation with the standard diploma and just GED is important 
because there is now a substantial literature, cited in Heckman and Lafontaine (2010), indicating that the 
GED provides far lower returns than the standard high school diploma. 
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A number of empirical studies in the past tried to investigate the socio-economic 
factors that influence schooling outcomes in general and high school graduation rates in 
particular. The mainstream economics literature in this area largely focused on factors 
unrelated to the choices that the child him/herself makes. These include family income 
and financial constraints, family background, and demographic and school characteristics 
as possible determinants of child education. Other studies have examined the influence of 
child endowments and environmental factors that are largely beyond the control of the 
family and the child. However, the differences in school outcomes across individuals 
could not be fully explained by factors beyond the control the individual himself/herself. 
As a result recent studies in labor economics have expanded the literature on the 
determinants of child schooling outcomes by examining the effects of some choices that 
children themselves make such as involvement in crime, drug use, alcohol consumption, 
teenage pregnancy and child birth. These behaviors have been subject to empirical and 
theoretical research in other social science disciplines like sociology and psychology for a 
long time, but it is relatively recently that rigorous methodologies of economics have 
been applied to identify causal relationships between these variables and schooling 
outcomes.  
What appears to be largely missing from the economics literature on the 
relationship between the choices made by the child and schooling outcomes is the direct 
effect of participation in sexual and dating activities. Despite the fact that Becker (1980) 
developed a broad theoretical model that could be applied to almost any rational choice 
that a person makes, the empirical researchers in economics appear to so far be reluctant 
to expand the literature on the determinants of child schooling in this direction. I could 
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find no empirical study that examines the influence of the frequency and intensity of 
teenage dating on schooling outcomes. There are a few studies, particularly in sociology 
and psychology that tried to examine the effect of early involvement in sex on schooling 
(see the next section). However, these studies are based on simple correlations and fail to 
recognize the possible endogeneity of the teenagers‟ decisions to engage in sexual 
activities in the models for educational outcomes. Hence, their estimates might not 
represent causal effects. There are two recent publications (Sabia 2007a, 2007b) that try 
to address the issue of endogeneity of teenage sex in school outcome equations, but the 
author uses a narrowly defined sex variable (loss of virginity) and the results are 
inconclusive . The purpose of this essay is, therefore, to examine the effect of teenage 
involvement in dating and sexual activities on schooling outcomes, using a broader set of 
measures that capture the intensity of the teenager‟s participation in these activities. In 
addition, an attempt is be made to use a new set of instruments and control variables from 
a different data set (NLSY97) to address the problem of endogeneity. 
 
Literature 
The bulk of economics literature on the determinants of school attainment in the 
past emphasized the effect of family income and financial constraints on schooling 
outcomes. For example, Cameron and Heckman (1998) examined the determinants of 
grade by grade schooling attainment for cohorts of American males born between 1908 
and 1964 and found a strong correlation between family income and transitions from one 
level of schooling to the next starting from elementary school to graduate school. Similar 
findings were reported by a number of other studies like Mayer (1997), Levy and Duncan 
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(2000) and Cameron and Heckman (2001). This may seem to indicate that expanding 
access to credit would enhance educational attainment by the needy. However, a number 
of other studies found no evidence that borrowing constraints play a major role in 
explaining the educational attainment gap between children from high and low income 
families. For instance, in a model where schooling choices and returns to schooling are 
jointly determined, Cameron and Taber (2004) analyzed the impact of borrowing 
constraints on the years of schooling attained by the sample of American youth in the 
1979 NLSY cohort and found no evidence that borrowing constraints play a role. Similar 
findings were reported by Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Carneiro and Cameron (2002). 
The latter argue that access to credit may play only a minor and short-term role while the 
educational gap between the children from the high and low income family backgrounds 
is mostly explained in terms of the long-term family effects. Clearly, much more than 
family income and financial constraints must be involved in explaining differences in 
educational attainments. 
Another area of focus for empirical research on educational attainment of children 
has been on the effect of parents‟ education. Parental education to some extent is related 
to the effect of income and wealth but even beyond income there could be some 
„hereditary‟ and „environmental‟ effects (Keane and Wolpin 2001) given that children 
born from better educated parents may put higher value on educational achievement and 
learn from their parents‟ success. While the conventional wisdom (with some empirical 
support) is that mother‟s education is much more important than father‟s education 
(Haveman and Wolfe 1995), there are some recent studies that cast some doubt on this 
perception. Using data from twins, Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) have found that 
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mother‟s education has little effect on the child‟s education if the unobserved abilities 
(like the hereditary elements) are held constant. Similarly, Plug (2004) used evidence 
from adopted children and finds “no treatment effect for the mother‟s schooling, 
conditional on the husband‟s schooling” (p.366) and suggested that the effect of parent‟s 
schooling on children‟s education could largely be hereditary reinforced by “positive 
assortative  mating”. These findings indicate that the usual argument about the value or 
quality of more educated mother‟s time being more productive in producing child‟s 
human capital does not survive the control for endowment or genetic effects. However, 
these studies were based on data from samples drawn from atypical populations (Farré, 
Klein, and Vella 2009) and further studies may be needed to confirm their findings.  
Other family background variables, whose effects on educational attainments 
have been widely investigated by various studies summarized in Haveman and Wolfe 
(1995), include parents‟ labor force status and occupation, wealth, race, age, marital 
status, number of siblings, birth order, ethnicity, language, and urban/rural residence. The 
effects of some government assistance programs (like AFDC or TANF), neighborhood 
characteristics, school types and amenities have also been tested (see Haveman and 
Wolfe 1995). Other studies have focused on differences in endowments (e.g., ability) to 
explain differences in child school achievements. While some studies (e.g., Behrman, 
Rosenzweig and Taubman 1994) find endowment differences could matter in schooling 
attainments, others (e.g., Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994) found “no evidence that 
unobserved ability is positively related to the schooling level completed” (p.1157). 
Therefore, factors unrelated to the choices that the child makes explain some but not all 
of the variation in educational achievements among children.  
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As such, it should not come as big surprise that the economics literature on the 
determinants of school attainment has lately expanded to incorporate variables that are 
directly related to the choices that the child himself/herself makes like involvement in 
crime, drug use, alcohol consumption and smoking. These may affect educational 
achievements not only because of their effect on cognitive and physical health through 
addiction, but also because of their potential effect on social status. For example, 
Register, Williams and Grimes (2001) try to analyze the effect of drug use on the number 
of years of schooling completed and find strong negative correlation. Chatterji (2006) 
finds similar results after accounting for endogeneity of drug use. DiSimone and Wolaver 
(2005) find alcohol consumption to have important negative effect on educational 
attainment for risk averse students after accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. There 
are some sociological studies like Jenkins (1995) that try to estimate the effect of 
delinquent behavior on school outcomes. The reverse effect of education on such 
outcomes has also been investigated by some studies (e.g., Kenkel 1991).  Of course, any 
serious investigation of the effects of such variables has to address the apparent 
simultaneity between these and the schooling outcomes but many studies, including some 
recent ones like Register, Williams and Grimes (2001), fail to do so. 
One issue related to the child‟s choice whose effect on educational attainment has 
long attracted attention is teenage pregnancy and child bearing. There exists a 
voluminous empirical literature on this issue including but not limited to Bronars and 
Grogger (1994), Geronimus and Korenman, 1992), Hoffman, Foster, and Furstenberg 
(1993),  Ahn (1994), Klepinger ,Lundberg, and Plotnick (1999), Hofferth, Lori, and  
Frank (2001) and  Hotz, McElroy, and  Sanders (2005). The overwhelming evidence is 
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that teenage pregnancy and childbearing have a strong negative effect on educational 
attainment although the effects are smaller once unobserved heterogeneity is accounted 
for. However, there could be other social, psychological and physiological reasons why 
teenage engagement in dating and sexual activities could affect schooling outcomes even 
when it does not result in pregnancy and childbearing. For example involvement in such 
activities may lead to reduced focus on long-term objectives, changing priorities in time 
use, and changing attitudes towards academic achievement (Billy et al., 1988). These 
reasons may be particularly relevant when there are multiple sex and dating partners and 
an increasing intensity of engagement in such activities. 
There are a few studies, particularly in sociology and psychology, that tried to 
examine the effect of early involvement in sex on schooling outcomes (e.g., Mott and 
Marsiglo 1985; Billy et al. 1988; Schvaneveldt et al. 2001; Rector and Johnson 2005). 
The findings are mixed but these studies are based on simple correlations failing to 
recognize the possible endogeneity of the teenagers‟ decisions to engage in sexual 
activities in the models for academic achievement and hence their estimates may not 
represent causal effects. For example, it might be the case that those who opt to spend a 
lot of time in dating and sex are those who are less capable and hence have limited 
prospects of doing well at school.  
In the economics literature, two recent studies by Sabia (2007a, 2007b) recognize 
the potential endogeneity of teenage sexual activities in the models for school 
achievement and tried to correct for the potential bias. Using data from National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, the author attempted to control for possible 
unobserved heterogeneity using fixed effects and instrumental variables estimation 
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techniques. He concludes that losing virginity by teenagers has negligible or no effect on 
school attachment and achievement in the form of GPA once controlling for the 
endogeneity. However, his results might not be conclusive given the narrow definition of 
involvement in sexual activity and school achievement he adopted.  
The detailed data on teenage sexual activity available in the NLSY97 data set 
makes it possible to test the effect of not only the loss of virginity as in Sabia (2007a, 
2007b) but also the effect of the intensity of sexual activity in the form of number of 
times the teenager had sex over a period, number of sex partners and the age at which the 
teenager had sex for the first time. The data set also contains information on the age of 
first-dating with a boy friend or girl-friend, frequency of dating and number of people 
dated. Therefore, this essay tries to estimate the effect of each of these on the schooling 
outcome variables controlling for teenage pregnancy and child birth, cohabitation and 
early marriage, whose effects in turn may be confounded by the failure to account for the 
effects of sex and dating.  
 
Theoretical Background 
In Becker‟s (1991) single-person family utility maximization model, a child‟s 
(teenager‟s) decision problem involving schooling, dating, sex and other sources of 
satisfaction can be modeled treating schooling as one of the z-goods for the child. Since 
the focus of this essay is on the role of the choices made by the child himself/herself, the 
parental preferences and resources are assumed to be part of the environmental variables 
for the child. Ignoring sex for the time being, suppose the teenager generates utility 
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directly from schooling(S), dating (D), and (Z)-all other sources of welfare including 
leisure, sleeping, etc. 
   U=U(S, D, Z)        (3.1) 
 
The child is both producer and consumer of S, D and Z and the production of each 
of these requires material inputs purchased in the market (x) as well as time inputs (t) 
from the child. For example material inputs of schooling will include books and material 
inputs of dating will include drinks. In other words, the production functions for S, D, and 
Z will look like, 
   S=fs(xs, ts; A)         (3.2) 
   D=fd(xd, td; A)        (3.3) 
   Z=fz(xz, tz; A)        (3.4) 
 
where A represents factors like the child‟s ability, motivation, psychological health, plus 
environmental variables such as parental preferences and resources that the child cannot 
directly control. Substituting (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) into (3.1) the utility function of the 
child becomes, 
)];,(),;,(),;,([ AtxfAtxfAtxfUU zzzdddsss    (3.5) 
 
Suppose pi
x
 represents the market price of the x inputs where i=s,d,z and w 
represents the opportunity cost of time for the teenager; i.e., w is the wage rate he/she 
could earn if he/she were to work (or whatever the valuation placed on activities 
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foregone). Also suppose the teenager spends a total time of tw working. Then the total 
time constraint is,   
   ts+td+tz+tw=t         (3.6) 
 
and the full income budget constraint  for the child will be, 
    
 Fvttttwtttwxpxpxp zdszdsz
x
zd
x
ds
x
s  )()(    (3.7) 
 
Here, v is the non-labor income of the child including the direct transfers from the 
parents that the child can decide upon how to spend. Maximizing (5) subject to (7) with 
respect to xi and ti gives us the optimal amount of purchased and time inputs into each of 
the commodities as a function of the predetermined variables as, 
   ),,,,,(* AFwpppxx xz
x
d
x
sii  ,   where i=s, d, z   (3.8) 
    ),,,,,(* AFwppptt xz
x
d
x
sii  ,    where i=s, d, z   (3.9) 
 
Substituting (3.8) and (3.9) into (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) gives us S, D and Z as a 
function of the material input prices, the full income (F) and the endowment and 
environmental variables (A). However, we can use the input prices to calculate the costs 
of producing the commodities that directly enter the child‟s utility function (S,D and Z) 
that represent their shadow prices(π) as, 
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w
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                 (3.11) 
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                 (3.12) 
Then, the full income budget constraint can be written in terms of the shadow 
commodity prices as, 
 
   FZDS zds                (3.13) 
  
Taking the other commodities (Z) as the base category, we can obtain the demand 
functions
41
 for S and D as functions of shadow prices, the full income and the 
environmental and endowment variables as, 
             ),,,(* AFSS zs                 (3.14) 
             ),,,(* AFSD zd                 (3.15) 
       
A demand function similar to (3.15) can also be derived for involvement in sexual 
activities by a child following the same procedures. Clearly, the equations for schooling 
and dating are highly interdependent not only because of the way the shadow prices are 
defined but also because of the presence of common endowment and environmental 
variables in both equations. Since time allocations have to add up to a fixed time 
endowment as per equation (3.6) and since dating and schooling may compete for the 
                                                          
41
 The detailed characterizations of the demand functions in the z-goods context are available in Becker 
(1991). 
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same material inputs (x), their shadow prices are interdependent. The nature of the 
interdependence may depend on whether dating and schooling are substitutes or 
complements to each other. For example, if dating involves studying together and sharing 
school materials with your dating-mate, then dating and schooling could be considered 
complements to each other and increased allocation of time and resources for one could 
increase production of the other as well. However, if the purpose of dating is something 
unrelated to schooling including romance and hanging out together, then dating could 
lead to less time, attention and motivation for studying and may result in diminished 
schooling outcome. In addition, dating may affect one‟s mood, degree of happiness or 
motivation (based, for example, on one‟s partner‟s attitude toward schooling) that can 
either improve (complement) or worsen (substitute) school outcomes. Therefore, the 
effect of dating on schooling outcomes is theoretically ambiguous. Depending on whether 
the complementarity or substitution effect is stronger, we may observe negative, positive 
or no empirical correlation between indicators of dating and schooling outcomes. Similar 
arguments can be made for involvement in sexual activities. The effects of the substitutes 
and complements for dating and sex such as cohabitation, marriage, pregnancy and 
having children come into play through their shadow prices (πz).  
 
Methodology 
The focus of analysis in this essay is on how high school completion is affected 
by involvement in dating and sex as a teenager.  To define an empirical model for high 
school completion, suppose si* represents the indirect utility for child i obtained by 
substituting the optimal amounts of schooling and other activities into the child‟s utility 
138 
 
 
 
function described in the previous section. The indirect utility is unobserved to the 
researcher but whether the child graduates from high school or not is observed and 
assumed to depend on whether or not this maximized utility takes at least a minimum 
threshold value. The indirect utility depends on the shadow prices of schooling and other 
activities that represent opportunity costs, anticipated returns to schooling, the full 
income as well as child endowment and environmental variables. Suppose si* is linearly 
related to these factors such that,   
                                                
iii eXs  
*                            (3.16) 
 
where, Xi represents a vector of observable variables like shadow prices of schooling, 
shadow prices of dating or sex and their substitutes and complements, child‟s full income 
including transfers from parents, and other parental resources. Unobservable endowments 
and environmental variables like motivation and ability fall into the error term ei that is 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. Now, let si represent 
high school completion status of individual i that takes a value of 1 if the maximized 
utility *
is  is positive and zero otherwise i.e., 
                                   









 0s if  1 
0 s if 0
i
i
is                (3.17) 
The distribution of si conditional on Xi can then be modeled as probit or can be 
approximated by a linear probability model. If observations on all the components of Xi 
including the shadow prices of dating or sex and their substitutes and complements were 
available and exogenous, we could regress the dichotomous outcome for high school 
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completion (si) on these covariates and try to infer the effects of dating or sex variables 
on the basis of the estimates for their component variables. While theoretically the 
shadow prices could be calculated from the observed input prices as described in the 
previous section, in practice this is impossible because observations on the inputs and 
their prices are unavailable. Alternatively, therefore, we treat the observed dating and sex 
variables as direct covariates in the equations for schooling, but recognize that they are 
endogenous.   
One of the possible reasons for the endogeneity is that both school outcomes and 
the decision to engage in dating and sexual activities may be influenced by common 
unobserved individual and family characteristics. For example, it might be the case that 
those who choose to spend a lot of time in dating and sex are those who are less capable 
and hence have limited prospects of doing well at school. If this is the case the simple 
OLS estimates will tend to overestimate the causal effects of the teenage dating and sex 
on schooling. Another source of bias in the OLS estimates could be the under-reporting 
of engagement in sexual/dating activities by the teenagers.  The under-reporting may lead 
to understatement of the effects of teenage dating and sex on schooling outcomes. The 
various sources of bias may thus tend to offset each other.  
The specific variables that are used to represent involvement in sexual activity are 
age at which the teenager had sex for the first time, number of sex partners over ages 15 
to 17
42
 and number of times the teenager had sex over the same period. Similarly, 
                                                          
42
 The selection of this age range is essentially dictated by the fact that the oldest members of the sample 
were age 16 during the first round and hence age 15, 16 and 17 are the teenage years for which 
information on these variables is available for everybody in the sample (data for age 15 is available for the 
oldest respondents because questions relating to these variables were asked for the last year). 
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engagement in dating activities are represented by age at first date with a girlfriend or 
boy friend, number of dating partners and frequency of dating over ages 15 to 17.  The 
effect of each of these variables on high school completion is cumulative in nature since a 
diminished performance in earlier grades, say because of too many sex/dating partners, 
will make it less likely that the student will complete high school. 
Each of the indicators of involvement in sex/dating are treated as endogenous 
covariates (one at a time) in the schooling equations.  Controls for teenager‟s choices or 
their outcomes that could be substitutes or complements to sex and/or dating like 
cohabitation, marriage, and teenage child birth are included in the models since sex and 
dating variables could simply be capturing the effects of these variables. In addition, an 
indicator for above or below mean family income is included as a proxy for the 
availability of parental resources. We also include parental education, race and residence 
at age 17 as additional controls.  
The fact that the sex or dating variables are endogenous in the models for 
schooling means that identification of their causal effect requires the existence of 
variables that influence the taste for sex or dating but do not directly affect schooling.  
The data from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) 
that are used for analysis in this essay contain information on the frequency of church 
visits by parents, and percent of peers who go to church regularly that may influence the 
teenager‟s inclination towards engaging in sexual activities43 but do not seem to have 
apparent direct effect on schooling outcomes. Therefore, indicators of parental and peers‟ 
                                                          
43
 See Evans, Oates and Schwab (1992) for peer group effects and L’Engle, Christine, and Brownet al. 
(2006) and Brewster  (1998) for the effect of religion on teenage sex. 
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religiosity are used as instruments for teenage sex and dating variables, in an attempt to 
estimate their causal effects on schooling outcomes.  
Although all the endogenous dating and sex variables used here take discrete 
(integer) values and hence the continuity and normality assumptions required for 
consistent estimates through application of instrumental variables probit
44
 to such cases 
may not strictly hold, linear approximations of such models provide consistent estimates 
of the average treatment effects (Angrist and Krueger 2001). Therefore, our main results 
are based on linear probability models for high school completion and college enrollment 
although for our key models we also report the marginal effects from probit estimates in 
the appendix. For our main models we test the instruments for exogeneity using Sargan's 
(1958) and Basmann's (1960) chi-squared tests for over-identification.  
It is worth noting that most of the control variables included in the models like 
cohabitation, marital status, and child bearing might also be endogenous. As a result the 
estimated coefficients of such variables may not necessarily represent their causal effect 
on the school outcome variables. Our principal interest, however, is not in estimating and 
interpreting the causal effects of these variables since that has been done elsewhere, but 
rather to control for the potential omitted variable bias in the estimated coefficients of 
dating and sex variables that may arise as a result of their correlation with these control 
variables. As such, the properly estimated coefficients of the variables of interest are 
expected to be valid even when some of the other regressors in the models are 
                                                          
44
 In the instrumental variables Probit model, the errors in the first and second stage equations are 
assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution. This means that the endogenous regressor has to have 
features of a normal random variable. Discrete variables do not strictly fulfill this requirement due to lack 
of continuity (for details see Wooldridge, 2002:472-478).  
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endogenous. The control variables are sequentially introduced into the models so that we 
can see how much of the observed relationship between the specific sex or dating 
experience indicator and the school outcome variable was due to other observable 
variables that are correlated with sex or dating.  
Finally, we estimate models for college enrollment to see if involvement in dating 
and sexual activities as a teenager has any lasting effect beyond high school completion. 
The covariates and estimation procedures for the college enrollment models are similar to 
those in the models for high school completion, but the college enrollment outcome is 
made conditional on high school completion.  For both high school completion and 
college enrollment, we also estimate and report   separate models for boys and girls to see 
if the effects of teenage dating and sex vary by gender. The models for girls include 
teenage pregnancy as an additional control variable since teenage pregnancy could have 
lasting psychological or physiological effects even if it doesn‟t lead to child bearing. The 
definition and summary statistics for all the variables used in the models are presented in 
the next section.  
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Analysis in this essay is based on data from the 1997 cohort of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). The original sample for this cohort consisted 
of 8984 young men and women aged 12 to 16 on December 31, 1996. The data from the 
first 11 rounds of the survey are publicly available and contain detailed information on 
the individual and family characteristics as well as processes and outcomes for the youth.  
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The key outcome variables we are interested in are whether the youth have completed 
high-school at or before age 19 and subsequently enrolled in college at or before age 20.  
The weighted summary statistics for these and other variables used in the models are 
presented in table 13 below. The summary statistics disaggregated by gender and race are 
presented in tables F1 and F2 in appendix F, respectively. Our estimation sample consists 
of 6026 youth with complete data for all the variables of interest out of which 3054 are 
girls and the balance are boys.  
As briefly stated in the introductory section, there is no consensus as to how to 
measure high school graduation rate.  Status completion rates that include the recipients 
of the GED and certificates of attendance often show a much higher graduation rate than 
the rates that count only those who have received formal high school diploma. This is 
true in our sample as well 88.7% of the youth having completed high school while only 
81.8% have formal high school diplomas. The high school completion rate obtained for 
this sample of youth is very close to the estimated completion rate of 88% issued by the 
National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES). For our econometric analysis we 
focus on the high school completion that includes GED recipients instead of only 
graduates with diploma since the GED is “generally accepted as the equivalent of a high 
school diploma for college admissions” (Heckman and LaFontaine 2010). 
The summary statistics for boys and girls presented in table F1 in appendix F 
show that both the high school completion rate and high school graduation rate (with a 
diploma) are higher for women than men, the gap being slightly bigger in the latter case 
with 83.8% of the girls having a high school diploma compared to 79.7% of boys. There 
is also substantial racial disparity in both the high school completion rate and graduation-
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with-diploma rate as presented in table F2.  While the outcomes are essentially identical 
for blacks and Latinos, the completion rate is about 9 percentage points higher for the 
whites and the graduation rate is about 10 percentage points higher. The gender and racial 
disparities observed in these data are consistent with the general pattern in the U.S. (and 
other developed countries) that girls on average do better in terms of high school and 
undergraduate educational outcomes and minorities on average do worse.  
Table 13. Description and Weighted Summary Statistics for the Variables Used in the  
                 Econometric Models  
Variable Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Schooling Outcome  
   High School Completion Dummy=1 if completed high school at/before age 19 0.887 0.317 
High School Diploma Dummy=1 if graduated with high school diploma 0.818 0.386 
College Enrollment Dummy=1 if enrolled in college at or before age 20 0.542 0.498 
Enrollment | HS Completion Dummy=1 if enrolled in college at or before age 20 
  
 
given high school completion  0.609 0.488 
Teenage Sex Indicators 
   Had Sex Under 15 Dummy=1 if had sex under 15 0.181 0.385 
Had Sex Under 18 Dummy=1 if had sex under 18 0.513 0.500 
Sex Partners Total Number of sex Partners from age 15 to 17 4.420 9.528 
Age at 1st sex Age at first sex 16.09 2.101 
Total Sex Total Number of times had sex from age 15 to 17 134.5 298.9 
Teenage dating indicators 
  Had Date Under 15 Dummy=1 if had date under 15 0.599 0.490 
Had Date Under 18 Dummy=1if had date under 18 0.936 0.245 
Dating Partners Total Number of dating Partners from age 15 to 17 13.64 21.00 
Age at 1st Date Age at first date 14.04 1.954 
Total Dates Total Number of times had dates from age 15 to 17 25.93 87.94 
Controls for Family Background and demographics 
  Male Dummy=1 if male  0.496 0.500 
Black Dummy=1 if race is black 0.156 0.363 
Hispanic Dummy=1 if race is Hispanic 0.059 0.236 
White (excluded) Dummy=1 if race is white 0.723 0.448 
Dad college educated Dummy=1 if dad is college educated 0.529 0.499 
Mom college educated Dummy=1 if mom is college educated 0.511 0.500 
Above mean income Dummy=1 if family earns above mean income 0.464 0.499 
Rural at age 17 Dummy=1 if rural resident at age 17 0.281 0.449 
Control for teenage marriage and cohabitation 
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Married under 18 Dummy=1 if married under age 18 0.159 0.366 
Cohabited under 18 Dummy=1 if cohabited under age 18 0.290 0.454 
Controls for teenage pregnancy and child bearing 
  Pregnant under 18 (girls) Dummy=1 if ever pregnant under age 18 0.216 0.411 
Had kids under 18 Dummy=1 if had kids under age 18 0.133 0.339 
Instruments 
   Parental church visit1 Dummy=1 if parent visited church once or less per 
  
 
month in 1997 0.505 0.500 
Parental church visit2 Dummy=1 if parent visited church twice per month in 
  
 
1997 0.121 0.326 
Parental church visit3 Dummy=1 if parent visited church once a week in 
  
 
1997 0.264 0.441 
Parental church visit4 Dummy=1 if parent visited church several times a 
  
 
week in 1997 0.108 0.310 
Parental church visit5 Dummy=1 if parent visited church every day in 1997 0.003 0.054 
Peer church visit Dummy=1 if more than 50% of peers visited church in 
  
 
1997 0.260 0.439 
Source: Various rounds of NLSY97. 
  Note: N=6026, Number of Girls=3054. About 5.7 of the sample are from other races. In the regression 
equations these are included in the excluded category (whites). 
 
In terms of college attendance, the summary statistics in table 13 show that about 
54.2% of the youth were enrolled in college at or before age 20. The college enrollment 
rate for high school completers (including those with the GED) is about 7 percentage 
points higher than the total sample which is in line with Heckman and Lafontaine‟s 
(2010) argument that low high school graduation is one of the reasons for the observed 
slowdown in college attendance over much of the last decade. Once again girls in these 
data do much better in terms of college attendance with the conditional college 
enrollment rate of 65.7% compared to 55.8% for boys as shown in table F1. The 
enrollment rate for non-Hispanic whites is about 10 percentage points higher than that of 
blacks and about 7 percentage points higher than that of Hispanics. The overall 
enrollment rate of about 61% for the high school completers in our data is close to the 
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enrollment rates in the CPS data for the late 1990‟s and the early years of the last decade 
as demonstrated in fig 14 below. 
 
 
Table 13 also presents summary statistics for sexual and dating experience of the 
respondents as teenagers. The evidence shows that about 51.3% of the respondents have 
reported to have had sex under age 18 including 18.1% who have already begun sex 
under 15. A bigger percentage of boys appears to have started sex under 15 than girls 
although the proportion is roughly the same for boys and girls for the under 18 sexual 
experience. Boys appear to be more sexually active on average than girls in terms of 
number of sex partners but girls seem to have higher average frequency of sex over ages 
15 to 17 than boys although the standard errors are quite large in both cases. The fact that 
boys appear to start sex earlier than girls is somewhat surprising given that girls mature 
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earlier than boys and men generally date younger girls. It is possible that girls are more 
shy or secretive about revealing their early sexual experience or boys could be defining 
sex and dating more loosely than girls.     
Among the racial groups, blacks on average seem to start sex earlier, 64% 
reporting to have had sex under 18 and 32% under 15 whereas the corresponding figures 
for Hispanics and whites are 56 (20) and 50 (15), respectively. Blacks have the largest 
number of sex partners on average but reported to have had sex the smallest number of 
times on average over ages 15 to 17 while whites had the opposite experience.  
The teenage dating experience follows a similar general pattern to that of teenage 
sex experience in terms of gender disparity in the number of dating partners and starting 
age. According to the evidence presented in table F1, girls on average start dating later 
than boys and keep much smaller number of dating partners.  About 66.6% of boys and 
53.3% of girls reported to have started dating under age 15 while 93.7% of boys and 
93.5% of girls already started dating under age 18 with an average of 11 partners for girls 
and 17 partners for boys over ages 15 to 17. Boys also have slightly higher average 
frequency of dating than girls. Unlike the case with teenage sex where a larger fraction of 
blacks start sex under 15, a relatively larger fraction of whites (followed by Hispanics) 
appear to start dating under 15 and keep it slightly more intense than blacks in terms of  
number of dating partners and frequency of dating.  
It is important to note that the mean age at first sex/date reported in the tables is 
less informative given that it is top-coded at 18; i.e., everybody who reported to have had 
first sex/date at age 18 or later or didn‟t yet have sex/date during the latest round are all 
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recorded at 18. We chose to top-code age at first sex/date at 18 since our interest is to 
examine the effect of sex/dating as a teenager on schooling outcomes. In the regression 
equations, age at first sex/date is expected to capture the effect of waiting at least up to 
age 18 and still account for the effect of the variation in the sex/dating–start age as a 
teenager (unlike the under 18 sex/dating dummy that doesn‟t capture this variation).  
The summary tables also contain descriptive statistics for the control variables 
including teenage marriage, cohabitation, pregnancy and child birth. We observe a much 
higher prevalence of teenage marriage and cohabitation among girls which is not 
surprising given their much quicker biological maturity than boys. There is also a much 
higher prevalence of teenage child birth among girls than boys with 20.1% of girls having 
a kid under age 18 compared to just 6.4% of boys. In terms of racial disparities, we 
observe a higher rate of teenage pregnancy and child birth among black girls than whites 
and Hispanics, and higher prevalence of teenage marriage or cohabitation among Latinos.  
The effects of these and the multiple indicators of teenage sex and dating on high school 
completion and college enrollment are discussed in the next section. 
 
Estimation Results 
As stated in the methodology section, the equations for high-school completion
45
 
are estimated treating the indicators of teenage sex and dating as endogenous regressors. 
Each of the multiple indicators of teenage involvement in sex and dating activities enters 
the regression equations separately since they mostly contain overlapping information 
and we do not have sufficient instruments to identify their effects all at once. The controls 
                                                          
45
 The qualitative aspects of the results remain the same when we use high school graduation with a 
formal diploma instead of the status completion as the dependent variables but the magnitudes of the 
estimates are mostly larger in the case of high school diploma. 
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for teenage pregnancy and child bearing as well as marriage and cohabitation are 
sequentially introduced into the equations so that we can see how much of the observed 
relationship between the specific sex or dating variable and the schooling outcome 
variable was due to other observable variables that are correlated with sex or dating. 
Due to the discrete nature of our key variables of interest we prefer to focus on the 
linear probability models for high school completion that provide consistent estimates 
even when the first stage is mis-specified. Robust standard errors are used to correct for 
the inefficiency arising from heteroskedastic errors in the linear probability models. The 
marginal effects from probit models corresponding to our key linear probability estimates 
are also reported in appendix F.  The instruments are tested for over-identification using 
Sargan and Basmann‟s chi-squared test and the first stage results for our main models are 
reported in appendix F.  
While the summary statistics reported in the previous section were weighted using 
the sampling weights, the regression results reported and discussed in this section are 
unweighted.  Using sample weights in the regressions is generally recommended when 
the interest is in obtaining the estimates representative of the entire population. Weighted 
estimators, however, tend to be more variable than the unweighted estimators as 
demonstrated for example in Korn and Graubard (1995). Hence, sample weights were not 
used in the regressions reported here as also suggested in the guidelines for the use of 
sampling weights in NLSY97
46
. As such, the estimates reported in this section may not 
                                                          
46
 See the guidelines at http://www.nlsinfo.org/nlsy97/nlsdocs/nlsy97/use97data/weights.html, accessed 
July, 2010. 
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strictly represent the characteristics of the entire U.S. population since variable 
probabilities of selection into the sample were used for various groups.  
Teenage Sex and High Completion 
The linear probability estimates of the effects of multiple indicators of teenage 
involvement in sexual activities are presented in table 14 below. The complete results for 
the models summarized in table 14 are reported in tables F6-F8 in appendix F and the 
first stage results for the 2SLS models are reported in tables F3 to F5 in the same 
appendix. The first stage results show that the instruments are both individually and 
jointly significant in the equations for all the three indicators of teenage sex. The results 
show that parental and peer religiosity is an important constraint to involvement in sexual 
activities by teenagers. Frequency of parental and peer church visits have negative effects 
on the number of sex partners and frequency of teenage sex but positive effect on age at 
first sex. In addition, the Sargan and Basmann chi-squared test for over-identification 
does not reject exogeneity of these instruments in the models for high school completion. 
Therefore, instruments capturing parental and peer religiosity appear to be valid for 
teenage sex variables in the models for high school completion.  
The estimates for the effects of the number of teenage sex partners on high school 
completion are reported along the first row of table 14. While the coefficient of the 
number of teenage sex partners is negative in sign and highly significant in all of the OLS 
and 2SLS estimates, its magnitude is more than 15 times bigger in the case of 2SLS. 
Controlling for teenage marriage and cohabitation only slightly increases the magnitude 
of the 2SLS estimate while controlling for teenage child bearing slightly reduces its 
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magnitude. Our 2SLS estimate from the model where all controls are included indicates 
that increasing ones sex partner between ages 15 to 17 by 1 reduces the probability of 
completing high school by 4.6% on average. The corresponding marginal effect at the 
mean from a probit model has similar sign and statistical significance but slightly smaller 
magnitude (3.7%) as presented in table F17 in appendix F. Therefore, maintaining large 
number of sex partners as a teenager appears to have non-negligible negative effect on 
the probability of graduating from high school even after controlling for teenage marriage 
and child birth. 
Table 14. Teenage Sex and High School Completion by  Age 19-                
Estimates from Linear Probability Models 
 OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex partners -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.046*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
Age at 1
st
 sex 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.095*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
Total sex /100 -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.113*** -0.120*** -0.115*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Notes: Each of the teenage sex indicators separately entered into the regression equations.                 
 
 
It appears that there is also some benefit to delaying initiation of sex as 
demonstrated by a highly significant positive coefficient for age at first sex as shown 
along the second row of table 14 above. As it is the case with the number of sex partners, 
the 2SLS estimate of the coefficient of age at first sex is much bigger than the OLS 
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estimate and shows little change when controls for teenage marriage, cohabitation and 
child birth are included. After including all the control variables, our estimate shows that 
delaying initiation of sex by an additional year increases the probability of high school 
completion by 9.5%. The corresponding marginal effect at the mean from a probit model 
has similar positive sign and statistical significance but slightly bigger magnitude 
(11.4%) as shown in table F17 in appendix F.  
Another indicator of teenage sex whose effects we analyzed is the number of 
times the teenager had sex from age 15 to 17. Since the frequencies are somewhat large 
for some of the youth and the absolute magnitudes of the effects of single sexual 
encounters are small, we rescaled the observed values of this variable dividing them by 
100 for convenience in presenting the results. As shown along the third row of table 14 
above, the frequency of teenage sex also has highly significant negative effect on high 
school completion with little changes in the coefficient when we control for teenage 
marriage and child bearing. Our preferred estimate obtained after controlling for these 
variables shows that having sex 100 times as teenager may reduce the probability of 
completing high school by 11.5% with almost identical (11.3%) marginal effect at the 
mean from a probit model.   
In tables 15 and 16 below we present estimates for boys and girls
47
 separately to 
see if there are gender differences in the effects of teenage involvement in sexual 
activities. In models for girls we include teenage pregnancy as an additional control 
                                                          
47
 An attempt was also made to see if results vary by racial groups by separately estimating the models for 
blacks, Hispanics and whites. For whites (n=3480) the results are both qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar to those we obtained for the total sample. For blacks (n=1578) and Hispanics (n=622), the signs of 
the estimated coefficients are largely similar to those we obtained for the total sample, but the 
magnitudes mostly differ and the estimates are mostly statistically insignificant except age at first sex for 
blacks. The same pattern is observed in the results for teenage dating by the racial groups.  
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variable.  According to these results, the number of teenage sex partners has bigger effect 
on high school completion of girls than boys while age at first sex and frequency of 
teenage sex have bigger effect on the outcome for boys. Focusing on the model in which 
we control for all the relevant variables of interest, increasing the number of teenage sex 
partners by 1 reduces the probability of high school completion for girls by 5% compared 
to 3.5% for boys. On the other hand, delaying age at first sex by an additional year 
increases the probability of high school completion for girls by 6.2% compared to 10.3% 
for boys. Similarly, the effect of the frequency of teenage sex on the probability of high 
school completion is more than twice higher for boys than girls.  
Table 15. Teenage Sex and High School Completion for Girls by Age 19-                
Estimates from Linear Probability Models 
 OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex partners -0.004** -0.002 -0.000 -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.050** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) 
Age at 1
st
 sex 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.013*** 0.083*** 0.080*** 0.062*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.019) (0.022) 
Total sex /100 -0.009*** -0.005** -0.001 -0.092*** -0.089*** -0.071** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.022) (0.028) (0.031) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 3054 3054 3054 3054 3054 3054 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Notes: Each of the teenage sex indicators separately entered into the regression equations. 
 
 
 
  It is also important to note that controlling for teenage pregnancy and child birth 
in the equations for girls substantially reduces the magnitudes of the coefficients of each 
of the teenage sex indicators as shown along the last column of table 15. On the other 
hand, controlling for teenage child birth for boys leaves the coefficients of the teenage 
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sex indicators unchanged as shown in the last column of table 16. This implies that some 
of the effects of teenage sex for girls come through the resulting pregnancy and child-
bearing while for boys the effects are essentially unrelated to teenage child birth.   
 Table 16. Teenage Sex and High School Completion for Boys by Age 19-  
                             Estimates from Linear Probability Models 
 OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex partners -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.034*** -0.035** -0.035** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Age at 1
st
 sex 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) 
Total sex /100 -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.133*** -0.149*** -0.150*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.036) (0.046) (0.046) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2972 2972 2972 2972 2972 2972 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 Notes: Each of the teenage sex indicators separately entered into the regression equations.                    
 
According to these results, therefore, not only the age at which the teenager starts 
having sex and the number of sex partners but also the frequency with which he/she is 
engaged in sexual activities could significantly influence educational outcomes. It doesn‟t 
seem that the measures of teenage sex we have analyzed are simply capturing the effects 
of the consequences of sex like child birth or related variables like teenage marriage since 
we mostly observe little changes in the coefficients when we control for these variables.  
In addition, there are some differences in the effects of teenage sex variables on the 
outcomes for boys and girls. While the underlying physiological, psychological or other 
reasons for gender differences in the effects of teenage sex on educational outcomes will 
need further investigation that is beyond the scope of this essay, it appears that the 
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differences are non-trivial and survive our controls for teenage pregnancy that could 
potentially explain some of the differences.   
However, the substantial differences between the OLS and the 2SLS estimates 
raise some questions as to whether the absolute magnitudes of the estimated coefficients 
are realistic. One possible reason for the attenuation of the OLS estimates could be that 
the downward bias in the estimates because of the under-reporting of teenage sex could 
be strongly offsetting the upward bias because of the other sources of endogeneity bias 
such as unobserved ability and motivation. Another possibility is that the complementary 
(positive) and substitution (negative) effects of teenage sex on schooling might be 
canceling out each other. On the other hand, the instruments based on parental and peer 
religiosity could only be identifying the negative effects of teenage sex. For example, if 
religious parents impose more discipline even in matters unrelated to sex, the religiosity 
instruments might be attributing the effects of these other elements of personal discipline 
on schooling to teenage sex. It could also be the case that children who belong to highly 
religious parents derive little positive stimulus from engaging in sexual activities perhaps 
because of what they have been taught about the evilness of premarital sex. In addition, 
the religiosity instruments may not be correcting for the reporting error bias in the 
estimates. Until all these issues are addressed in a future study perhaps using more 
detailed data for example on attitudes towards premarital sex and personal discipline, the 
results reported in this essay should be interpreted with caution.   
Teenage Dating and High School Completion  
  We estimate the effects of alternative indicators of teenage involvement in dating 
activities on high school completion using the same procedure we followed in the case of 
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teenage sex. Summaries of the OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effects of teenage dating 
are presented in table 17 below. The complete results out of which these summaries were 
extracted are reported in tables F9-F11 in appendix F. The marginal effects from probit 
models corresponding to these estimates are also reported in table F17 in the same 
appendix.  
  According to the first stage results for the 2SLS models reported in tables F3-F5 
in appendix F, our instruments appear to be generally valid for age at first date both in 
terms of explanatory power and exogeneity as demonstrated by the statistics for joint and 
individual significance as well as the test for over-identification. The instruments are both 
individually and jointly significant in all of the first stage equations for age at first date.  
In addition the Sargan and Basmann chi-squared test for over-identification does not 
reject exogeneity of the instruments at 1% or 5% in all of the first stage equations for age 
at first date. On the other hand, the instruments turned out to be weak or invalid in some 
of the first stage equations for the teenage dating partners and frequency of dating. In 
models involving the number of dating partners, we do not reject exogeneity of the 
instruments but they are not jointly significant at conventional levels for the results 
reported in the last two columns of table17. The instruments are jointly significant in all 
of the first stage results for the frequency of teenage dating but we reject their exogeneity 
in all the cases.  Therefore, the 2SLS results in this subsection are strictly valid only for 
age at first date and the rest of the results should be treated only as suggestive.   
Table 17. Teenage Dating and High School Completion by Age 19-  
                 Estimates from Linear Probability Models 
 OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dating Partners -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.045** -0.043** -0.040** 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) 
Age at 1
st
 date 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.121*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) 
Total Dates/10 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.048** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
  Notes: Each of the teenage dating indicators separately entered into the regression equations. 
                      
 
 
  The effects of age at first date on the probability of high school completion 
reported in table 17 essentially mimic the corresponding estimates for age at first sex in 
terms of sign and statistical significance but the estimates for age at first date are 
somewhat larger in magnitude. In the model in which all the controls are included, 
delaying age at first date by an additional year increases the probability of high school 
completion by about 12% compared to 9.5% for age at first sex. The bigger effect of age 
at first date could be reflecting the fact that teenage dating on average starts much earlier 
than teenage sex (see table 13) and involves more partners and perhaps more time 
investment  (or distraction from studies).  
  The estimates of the effects of the number of dating partners are somewhat 
smaller in magnitude and less significant than the corresponding estimates for the number 
of sex partners but the magnitudes of the 2SLS estimates of the former are not very 
reliable because of the poor explanatory power of the instruments in the first stage 
equations for the number of dating partners.  The effect of the frequency of teenage 
dating appears to be unrelated to the frequency of teenage sex since the former is 
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consistently positive while the latter is consistently negative both in the OLS and 2SLS 
results. If we were to believe our estimates for the effects of the frequency of teenage 
dating, the positive signs would imply that the purpose of dating is not limited to 
romantic activities but may rather work as a complement
48
 to studying and hence may 
enhance schooling outcomes. In other words, the results may indicate that the positive 
effects of the complementary role outweigh the negative effects that arise because of the 
associated involvement in sexual activities and the required time investment. However, 
too much cannot be made of out of the 2SLS results for the frequency of teenage dating 
since the rejection of exogeneity of the instruments indicates that the models involving 
this variable may be mis-specified.  
Table 18. Teenage Dating and High School Completion for Girls by Age 19-  
                 Estimates from Linear Probability Models 
 OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dating Partners 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.019* -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) 
Age at 1
st
 date 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.007** 0.110*** 0.097*** 0.068* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.030) (0.038) (0.037) 
Total Dates/10 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.062* 0.052* 0.036 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.030) (0.024) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 3054 3054 3054 3054 3054 3054 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
  Notes: Each of the teenage dating indicators separately entered into the regression equations. 
                                                          
48
 One possibility is that more attractive teens are likely to date more, all else the same, and “beauty” 
tends to be associated with a lot of positive outcomes in the labor market (e.g., Hamermesh and Biddle 
1994; Fletcher, 2009) and probably schooling, if for no other reason than that employers (teachers) may 
reward attractive workers (students) better. However, there is so far little research that directly 
associates beauty and schooling outcomes. Mocan and Tekin (2009) find positive association between 
attractiveness and vocabulary test scores but not much is known about how beauty affects schooling 
outcomes in general.   
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  As in the case of teenage sex, we try to look at whether the effects of teenage 
dating vary by gender by separately estimating the models for boys and girls.  The 
summarized results for girls and boys are presented in tables 18 and 19, respectively.  As 
in the case of age at first sex, age at first date has a larger effect on school outcomes for 
boys than girls. In the models where all the controls are included, delaying the initiation 
of teenage dating by a year increases the probability of high school graduation for boys 
by 14.4% compared to 6.8% for girls. In addition, we observe substantial reduction in the 
coefficient of age at first date for girls when we include controls for teenage pregnancy 
and child bearing while inclusion of teenage child birth leaves the coefficient nearly 
unchanged in the models for boys. This pattern in the estimates for the coefficient of age 
at first date is essentially similar to what we found in the case of age at first sex indicating 
that the two variables are mostly capturing the same information. While there are also 
non-negligible gender differences in the estimates for the coefficients of the number of 
teenage dating partners and frequency of dating, these results are not very informative 
due to the questionable validity of the instruments.    
Table 19. Teenage Dating and High School Completion for Boys by Age 19-   
                 Estimates from Linear Probability Models 
 OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dating Partners -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.040* -0.041 -0.041 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) 
Age at 1
st
 date 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.151*** 0.145*** 0.144*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) 
Total Dates/10 0.001** 0.001* 0.001 0.040** 0.038** 0.039** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation       
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& Marriage No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2972 2972 2972 2972 2972 2972 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
  Notes: Each of the teenage dating indicators separately entered into the regression equations.                     
 
In general, although our finding about the importance of the age at which the 
teenager starts dating is informative, our results for teenage dating are mostly weaker 
than those we found for teenage sex. This is so because our instruments did not perform 
as well in explaining teenage dating behavior as they did in explaining teenage sex. 
Perhaps the constraints the religious values of parents and peers impose on the teenagers 
are less important in influencing their dating behavior in general than their involvement 
in sexual activities.   
Teenage Dating, Sex and College Enrollment  
While the main purpose of this essay was to examine the extent to which the 
failure to finish high school can be explained as a cumulative effect of teenage 
involvement in dating and sexual activities, we also tried to estimate models for college 
enrollment to see if involvement in dating and sexual activities as a teenager has any 
lasting effect beyond high-school completion. The covariates and estimation procedures 
for the college enrollment models are similar to those in the models for high school 
completion, but the college enrollment outcome is made conditional on high school 
completion.  As previously stated GED recipients are included in the estimation sample 
as high school completers since GED is generally accepted for college admissions.  
The summarized results for the effects of teenage sex and dating on college 
enrollment at or before age 20 are presented in table 20 below. The first stage results 
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corresponding to the 2SLS estimates are reported in tables F12-F14 in appendix A. 
Although the explanatory power of the instruments is acceptable for all the indicators of 
teenage sex and dating as demonstrated by the joint significance of the instruments in the 
first stage results, their exogeneity is questionable in most of the models we tried for 
college enrollment. While we do not reject exogeneity of the instruments for the number 
of teenage sex partners and frequency of teenage dating on the basis of the Sargan and 
Basmann test for over-identification, we reject it at 5% or less for the other indictors of 
teenage sex and dating. This implies that our models for college enrollment are probably 
mis-specified, and the 2SLS results in this section should mostly be taken as suggestive at 
best.   
Table 20. Linear Probability Models for College Enrollment at or Before Age  
                 20 Conditional on High School Completion  
 OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex partners -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.063*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) 
Age at 1
st
 sex 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.152*** 0.148*** 0.141*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.027) (0.028) 
Total sex /100 -0.016*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.190*** -0.180*** -0.168*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.037) (0.046) (0.047) 
Dating Partners -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001 -0.029** -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
Age at 1
st
 date 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.167*** 0.145*** 0.131*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.037) (0.041) (0.041) 
Total Dates/10 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.098*** 0.086*** 0.081*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 5208 5208 5208 5208 5208 5208 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Notes: Each of the sex and dating experience indicators were separately entered into the 
regression equations.  
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While we do not want to make too much out of these results because of the 
questionable validity of the instruments, the fact that we obtain intuitively plausible signs 
with high level of statistical significance for all the coefficients of interest may be taken 
as indicative of the possible lasting effects of the teenage sex and dating on schooling 
outcomes. For example, the number of sex partners during the teenage years, for which 
we find the instruments to be valid, appears to have a large and highly significant 
negative effect on college enrollment-conditional on high school completion. In fact, the 
negative effect of the number of teenage sex partners on college enrollment is larger in 
magnitude than its effect on high school completion. The signs of the estimated 
coefficients for the frequency of teenage sex are also negative while the estimates for the 
coefficients of age at first sex are positive. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients 
for both variables are larger in magnitude than the comparable estimates for high school 
completion. Although we could not directly verify the extent to which this is related to 
the effects of teenage sex on high school grades since data on the latter (collected only in 
1999) are largely missing, it is possible that at least some of the observed effects could be 
through lower high school GPA.   
Unlike the estimated coefficients for the number of teenage sex partners, the 
2SLS estimates for the coefficients of the number of teenage dating partners are not only 
very small in magnitude but also statistically insignificant once the controls for teenage 
marriage, cohabitation and child birth are included. On the other hand, age at first date 
and frequency of teenage dating both have highly significant positive coefficients in the 
models for college enrollment just like their estimated coefficients in the models for high 
school completion. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for these two indicators 
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are larger in the models for college enrollment than in their counterparts in the models for 
high school completion. However, the validity of the 2SLS estimates for the coefficients 
of number of dating partners and age at first date is questionable because of the rejection 
of exogeneity for the instruments in our models for college enrollment.  
The gender differences we observe in the estimated coefficients of the indicators 
of teenage sex and dating in the models for college enrollment (reported in tables F15 and 
F16 in appendix F for girls and boys, respectively) are similar to the gender disparities we 
found in the estimated coefficients of these variables in the models for high school 
completion. For example, the estimated coefficient of the number of teenage sex partners 
is much larger for girls than boys, whereas age at first sex and frequency of teenage sex 
have larger coefficients in the models for boys than girls. Therefore, it appears that the 
same underlying reasons that drive the gender disparity in the effects of teenage sex and 
dating on high school completion explain the gender differences in the effects of these 
variables on college enrollment.  
In general, while the veracity of some of our estimates could be questionable 
because of poor performance of our instruments in some of the models, the overall 
pattern of the results suggests that the choice teenagers make as to when to start dating 
and/or sex, how many dating/ sex partners to maintain, and how frequently to engage in 
sexual/dating activities could have significant effects not only on high school completion, 
but also the subsequent enrollment in a college. We observe only small changes in the 
estimated effects of the indicators of teenage sex and dating when we control for teenage 
pregnancy and child birth implying that the former are not just capturing the effects of the 
latter. The fact that parental and peer religiosity appears to constrain the teenagers‟ 
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involvement in sex and dating (the effect being stronger on teenage sex) and the fact that 
the latter influence schooling outcomes implies that religious morality could be one way 
to influence schooling outcomes by imposing more discipline on the teenagers in terms of 
their involvement in sexual and dating activities. This poses an important policy dilemma 
(including some Constitutional issues) regarding the extent to which religious morality 
ought to be promoted in order to improve schooling outcomes. But it is important to note 
that such an outcome could be achieved through non-religious forms of parental 
discipline as long as these disciplinary measures succeed in convincing the teenager to 
delay the initiation of sex/dating, limit the number of sex/dating partners and frequency 
of sex/dating.  
Conclusion 
This essay uses data from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of 
the Youth (NLSY97) to examine the extent to which high school completion (and to a 
limited extent   college enrollment) are influenced by the choice teenagers make as to 
when to start dating and/or sex, how many dating and/or sex partners to maintain, and 
how frequently to engage in sexual and/or dating activities. We use indicators of parental 
and peer religiosity as instruments to address endogeneity of the teenager‟s involvement 
in sex and dating activities.   
Our results indicate that the age at first sex, the number of sex partners and the 
frequency with which he/she is engaged in sexual activities as a teenager could 
significantly influence whether the child completes high school or not. For example, our 
preferred 2SLS estimates indicate that increasing ones sex partners between ages 15 to 17 
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by 1 reduces the probability of completing high school by as much as 4.6% on average 
while delaying initiation of sex by an additional year increases the probability of high 
school completion by 9.5%. It doesn‟t seem that these indicators of teenage sex are 
simply capturing the effects of the consequences of sex such as child birth or related 
variables like teenage marriage since we typically observe small changes in the 
coefficients when we control for these variables.  However, we find some differences in 
the effects of teenage sex variables on the outcomes for boys and girls. While the 
underlying physiological, psychological or other reasons for gender differences in the 
effects of teenage sex on educational outcomes will need further investigation that is 
beyond the scope of this essay, it appears that the differences are non-trivial and survive 
our controls for teenage pregnancy that could potentially explain some of the differences. 
In the models for high school completion, our identifying instruments did not 
perform as well for teenage dating as they did for teenage sex. Perhaps the constraints the 
religious values of parents and peers impose on the teenagers are less important in 
influencing their dating behavior in general than their involvement in sexual activities. 
However, we find the instruments to be valid for age at first date that appears to mimic 
age at first sex in terms of sign and statistical significance of its estimated effect except 
that age at first date has a somewhat bigger effect on high school completion. In the 
model in which all the controls are included, we find that delaying age at first date by an 
additional year increases the probability of high school completion by about 12% 
compared to 9.5% for age at first sex. The bigger effect of age at first date could be 
reflecting the fact that teenage dating on average starts much earlier than teenage sex and 
involves more partners and perhaps more time investment. 
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Although most of our results for college enrollment are weaker than those for 
high school completion because of questionable validity of the instruments in most of our 
models for the former, the overall pattern of our estimates suggests that teenage sex and 
dating could have significant effects not only on high school completion, but also the 
subsequent enrollment in a college. The fact that parental and peer religiosity appears to 
constrain the teenagers‟ involvement in sex and dating (the effect being stronger on 
teenage sex) and the fact that the latter influence schooling outcomes implies that 
religious morality could be one (but not the only) way to influence schooling outcomes 
by imposing more discipline on the teenagers in terms of delaying initiation of sex and 
dating, limiting sex/dating partners and frequency of sex/dating. This poses an important 
policy dilemma (including some Constitutional issues) regarding the extent to which 
religious morality ought to be promoted in order to improve schooling outcomes.  
 
 
  
167 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Additional Results for Essay 1 
 
Table A1. Average Marginal Effects of Child's height-for-age z-scores on the Choice probabilities   
                   of Various Child Activities  (Older Cohort) 
    p(stud=1, p(stud=1, p(stud=0, p(stud=0, 
  Model p(stud=1|x) work=0|x) work=1|x) work=1|x) work=0|x) p(work=1|x) 
Biprobit - 0.001 0.037*** -0.032*** -0.006** - 
  
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) 
 Biprobit two-stage - 0.001 0.062 -0.052 -0.011 - 
  
(0.036) (0.049) (0.065) (0.017) 
 Mlogit - -0.005 0.043*** -0.035*** -0.002 - 
  
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) 
 Mlogit two-stage - 0.026 0.044 -0.044 -0.026 - 
  
(0.044) (0.064) (0.064) (0.020) 
 Mlogit (Main act.) 0.036*** - - -0.030***   -0.007* - 
 
(0.007) 
  
(0.008) (0.004) 
 Mlogit two-stage (Main 
act.) 0.080 - - -0.064 -0.017 - 
 
(0.050) 
  
(0.051) (0.018) 
 Probit 0.036*** - - - - 0.008 
 
(0.007) 
    
(0.007) 
Probit, two-stage 0.079* - - - - 0.011 
 
(0.047) 
    
(0.045) 
Panel probit 0.034*** - - - - - 
 
(0.007) 
     Panel prob. two- stage 0.055 - - - - - 
 
(0.049) 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes:  Table 4 in the main text and , tables A7, A8, and A9  in this appendix respectively present coefficient 
estimates for bivariate probit, multinomial logit, multinomial logit (Main activity), and Probit results from which 
these  partial effects were obtained. The partial effects reported in this table are the averages of partial effects 
calculated at each value of the child‟s height-for-age z- scores and the standard errors were calculated by the 
delta method.  All models included controls for community fixed effects, child age and sex, land and livestock 
owned, household size and number of siblings, education of father and mother, distance to primary school,  age 
of mother and father, and sex of household head. 
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Table A2. Marginal effects (at the minimum value) of Child's height-for-age z-scores on the Choice  
                 Probabilities of Various Child Activities  (Older Cohort) 
    p(stud=1, p(stud=1, p(stud=0, p(stud=0, 
  Model p(stud=1|x) work=0|x) work=1|x) work=1|x) work=0|x) p(work=1|x) 
Biprobit 0.031*** 0.003 0.028*** -0.022*** -0.009 0.005 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
Biprobit two-stage 0.037*** 0.010 0.027* -0.013 -0.023 0.014 
 
(0.003) (0.018) (0.016) (0.072) (0.071) (0.072) 
Mlogit - -0.000 0.023*** -0.023*** -0.000 - 
  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
 Mlogit two-stage - 0.000 0.023*** -0.023*** -0.000 - 
  
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) 
 Mlogit (Main act.) 0.025*** - - -0.020***   -0.005 - 
 
(0.002) 
  
(0.005) (0.005) 
 Mlogit two-stage(Main 
act.) 0.024** - - 0.003 -0.027 - 
 
(0.011) 
  
(0.077) (0.078) 
 Probit 0.026*** - - - - 0.010 
 
(0.003) 
    
(0.010) 
Probit, two-stage 0.025* - - - - 0.015 
 
(0.013) 
    
(0.079) 
Panel probit 0.018*** - - - - - 
 
(0.002) 
     Panel prob. two- stage 0.015 - - - - - 
 
(0.013) 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  Table 4 in the main text and  tables A7, A8, and A9  in this appendix respectively present coefficient 
estimates for bivariate probit, multinomial logit, multinomial logit (Main activity), and Probit results from 
which these  partial effects were obtained. The partial effects reported in this table were calculated at the 
sample minimum value of the child‟s height-for-age z-scores fixing other regressors at their mean values and 
the standard errors were calculated by the delta method.  All models included controls for community fixed 
effects, child age and sex, land and livestock owned, household size and number of siblings, education of 
father and mother, distance to primary school,  age of mother and father, and sex of household head. 
 
 
 
Table A3. Marginal Effects (at maximum value) of Child's Height-for-age z-scores on the Choice  
                 probabilities of  Various Child Activities  (Older  Cohort) 
  
 
p(stud=1, p(stud=1, p(stud=0, p(stud=0, 
 Model p(stud=1|x) work=0|x) work=1|x) work=1|x) work=0|x) p(work=1|x) 
Biprobit 0.047*** -0.003 0.051*** -0.047*** -0.000 0.004 
 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.000) (0.004) 
Biprobit two-stage 0.067*** -0.006 0.073*** -0.068** -0.000 0.006 
 
(0.029) (0.010) (0.026) (0.029) (0.000) (0.009) 
Mlogit - -0.000*** 0.070*** -0.070*** -0.000** - 
  
(0.000) (0.012) (0.012) (0.000) 
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Mlogit two-stage - 0.003 0.070 -0.073 -0.000 - 
  
(0.018) (0.081) (0.073) (0.000) 
 Mlogit (main act.) 0.053*** - - -0.051*** -0.002*** - 
 
(0.010) 
  
(0.010) (0.000) 
 Mlogit two-stage 
(main  
act.) 0.067** - - -0.065** -0.001 - 
 
(0.030) 
  
(0.030) (0.001) 
 Probit 0.050*** - - - - 0.005** 
 
(0.010) 
    
(0.002) 
Probit, two-stage 0.074*** - - - - 0.005 
 
(0.017) 
    
(0.006) 
Panel probit 0.063** - - - - - 
 
(0.015) 
     Panel probit-two stage 0.091*** - - - - - 
 
(0.030) 
     ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  Table 4 in the main text and tables A7, A8, and A9 in this appendix respectively present coefficient 
estimates for bivariate probit, multinomial logit, multinomial logit (Main activity), Probit and Panel Probit 
results from which these  partial effects were obtained. The partial effects reported in this table were calculated 
at the sample maximum value of the child‟s height-for-age z-scores fixing other regressors at their mean values 
and the standard errors were calculated by the delta method.  All models included controls for community fixed 
effects, child age and sex, land and livestock owned, household size and number of siblings, education of father 
and mother, distance to primary school,  age of mother and father, and sex of household head. 
 
 Table A4. Average Marginal Effects of Child's height-for-age z-scores on the Choice probabilities  
                  of various Child Activities  (Younger Cohort) 
  
 
p(stud=1, p(stud=1, p(stud=0, p(stud=0, 
 Model p(stud=1|x) work=0|x) work=1|x) work=1|x) work=0|x) p(work=1|x) 
Biprobit - 0.005 0.021*** -0.017*** -0.009*** - 
  
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) 
 Biprobit two-stage - -0.004 0.080*** -0.034 -0.041*** - 
  
(0.019) (0.022) (0.027) (0.014) 
 Mlogit - 0.010*** 0.016*** -0.013*** -0.014*** - 
  
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) 
 Mlogit two-stage - 0.026 0.047* -0.007 -0.066*** - 
  
(0.024) (0.028) (0.031) (0.018) 
 Mlogit (main act.) 0.026*** - - -0.013*** -0.013*** - 
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.005) (0.003) 
 Mlogit two-stage (main 
act.) 0.073** - - -0.007 -0.066*** - 
 
(0.029) 
  
(0.031) (0.018) 
 Probit 0.026*** - - - - 0.007 
 
(0.005) 
    
(0.015) 
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Probit, two-stage 0.073** - - - - 0.043 
 
(0.029) 
    
(0.029) 
Panel probit 0.029*** - - - - 0.002 
 
(0.005) 
    
(0.004) 
Panel probit-two stage 0.082** - - - - 0.040 
 
(0.032) 
    
(0.027) 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  Table 4 in the main text and , tables A7, A8, and A9 in this appendix respectively present coefficient 
estimates for bivariate probit, multinomial logit, multinomial logit (Main activity), Probit results from which 
these  partial effects were obtained. The partial effects reported in this table are the averages of partial effects 
calculated at each value of the child‟s height-for-age z- scores and the standard errors were calculated by the 
delta method.  All models included controls for community fixed effects, child age and sex, land and livestock 
owned, household size and number of siblings, education of father and mother, distance to primary school,  age 
of mother and father, and sex of household head. 
 
 
 
Table A5. Marginal effects (at the minimum value) of Child's height-for-age z-scores on the Choice  
                 Probabilities of Various Child Activities  (Younger Cohort)  
  
 
p(stud=1, p(stud=1, p(stud=0, p(stud=0, 
 Model p(stud=1|x) work=0|x) work=1|x) work=1|x) work=0|x) p(work=1|x) 
Biprobit 0.031*** 0.007** 0.024*** -0.020*** -0.011*** 0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Biprobit two-stage 0.043** 0.029*** 0.013 0.051 -0.094** 0.065* 
 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.045) (0.046) (0.039) 
Mlogit - 0.010*** 0.022*** -0.018*** -0.014** - 
  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
 Mlogit two-stage - 0.011 0.024 0.110* -0.145 - 
  
(0.012) (0.023) (0.066) (0.089) 
 Mlogit (main act.) 0.033*** - - -0.021*** -0.012** - 
 
(0.005) 
  
(0.006) (0.005) 
 Mlogit two-stage (main 
act.) 0.038 - - 0.110* -0.147* - 
 
(0.033) 
  
(0.064) (0.089) 
 Probit 0.031*** - - - - 0.002 
 
(0.005) 
    
(0.005) 
Probit, two-stage 0.043*** - - - - 0.061 
 
(0.010) 
    
(0.040) 
Panel probit 0.036*** - - - - 0.002 
 
(0.005) 
    
(0.005) 
Panel probit-two stage 0.035* - - - - 0.057 
 
(0.020) 
    
(0.038) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  Table 4 in the main text and , tables A7, A8, and A9 in this appendix respectively present coefficient 
estimates for bivariate probit, multinomial logit, multinomial logit (Main activity), and Probit results from which 
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these  partial effects were obtained. The partial effects reported in this table were calculated at the sample 
minimum value of the child‟s height-for-age z-scores fixing other regressors at their mean values and the 
standard errors were calculated by the delta method.  All models included controls for community fixed effects, 
child age and sex, land and livestock owned, household size and number of siblings, education of father and 
mother, distance to primary school,   age of  mother and father, and sex of household head. 
 
 
 
Table A6. Marginal Effects (at maximum value) of Child's Height-for-age z-scores on the Choice  
                probabilities of  Various Child Activities  (Younger Cohort)  
  
 
p(stud=1, p(stud=1, p(stud=0, p(stud=0, 
 Model p(stud=1|x) work=0|x) work=1|x) work=1|x) work=0|x) p(work=1|x) 
Biprobit 0.025*** -0.002 0.026*** -0.023*** -0.002*** 0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) 
Biprobit two-stage 0.006 -0.004 0.010 -0.006 -0.000 0.004 
 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.000) (0.007) 
Mlogit - 0.010 0.012* -0.022*** -0.001*** - 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.000) 
 Mlogit two-stage - 0.004 0.011 -0.015 -0.000 - 
  
(0.054) (0.055) (0.013) (0.000) 
 Mlogit (main act.) 0.021*** - - -0.021*** -0.001*** - 
 
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.000) 
 Mlogit two-stage (main 
act.) 0.013 - - -0.013 -0.000 - 
 
(0.012) 
  
(0.012) (0.000) 
 Probit 0.025*** - - - - 0.002 
 
(0.002) 
    
(0.004) 
Probit, two-stage 0.007 - - - - 0.005 
 
(0.012) 
    
(0.008) 
Panel probit 0.026*** - - - - 0.002 
 
(0.001) 
    
(0.004) 
Panel probit-two stage 0.002 - - - - 0.006 
 
(0.006) 
    
(0.008) 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  Table 4 in the main text and , tables A7, A8, and A9 in this appendix respectively present coefficient 
estimates for bivariate probit, multinomial logit, multinomial logit (Main activity), and Probit  results from 
which these  partial effects were obtained. The partial effects reported in this table were calculated at the sample 
maximum value of the child‟s height-for-age z-scores fixing other regressors at their mean values and the 
standard errors were calculated by the delta method.  All models included controls for community fixed effects, 
child age and sex, land and livestock owned, household size and number of siblings, education of father and 
mother, distance to primary school,  age of mother and father, and sex of household head. 
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Table A7. Multinomial Logit Estimates for Child Activities   
 Older Cohort Younger Cohort 
 I II III IV V VI 
  
Mlogit 
2-Stage 
Mlogit 
 
Mlogit 
2-Stage 
Mlogit 
 
RE Mlogit 
2-Stage RE 
Mlogit 
Student       
Child's Height-for-age  -0.019 0.379 0.138*** 0.296 0.151*** 0.285 
 (0.096) (0.637) (0.038) (0.240) (0.041) (0.257) 
Sex 0.395* 0.469* 0.438*** 0.477*** 0.480*** 0.518*** 
 (0.232) (0.259) (0.149) (0.158) (0.161) (0.173) 
Age -0.088 -0.044 0.223*** 0.227*** 0.168*** 0.162*** 
 (0.074) (0.103) (0.044) (0.044) (0.036) (0.037) 
Agri. Land Area Owned -0.019 -0.027 -0.157* -0.159* -0.164* -0.165* 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.091) (0.091) (0.093) (0.093) 
Livestock Units Owned 0.005 0.006 0.033 0.034 0.032 0.034 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Father's Education 1.135* 0.992 0.825*** 0.777*** 0.900*** 0.858*** 
 (0.600) (0.690) (0.213) (0.222) (0.234) (0.246) 
Mother's Education 0.026 0.050 0.489 0.542 0.541 0.595* 
 (1.139) (1.148) (0.324) (0.334) (0.347) (0.362) 
Distance to Primary School 0.031 0.030 -0.064 -0.063 0.009 -0.062 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.041) 
Household Size -0.006 0.001 -0.057 -0.061 -0.028 -0.025 
 (0.079) (0.081) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.041) 
Number of Siblings 0.068 0.055 0.123** 0.129** 0.099* 0.103* 
 (0.076) (0.080) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054) 
Age of Father 0.005 0.003 -0.012 -0.013 -0.015 -0.016 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Age of Mother 0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Sex of Household Head -0.382 -0.394 0.111 0.117 0.147 0.119 
 (0.426) (0.428) (0.231) (0.230) (0.248) (0.246) 
Year=2004   -0.723*** -0.738***     
   (0.261) (0.261)     
Resid. from Height-for-age eqn.  -0.408  -0.162   -0.136 
  (0.644)  (0.245)   (0.262) 
Constant -1.909 -1.152 -3.409*** -2.969*** -3.287*** -2.652*** 
 (1.814) (2.206) (0.639) (0.937) (0.822) (1.009) 
Student and Working       
Child's Height-for-age z-scores 0.287*** 0.299 0.123*** 0.300* 0.140*** 0.291 
 (0.063) (0.440) (0.034) (0.180) (0.037) (0.203) 
Sex 0.675*** 0.677*** 0.483*** 0.528*** 0.539*** 0.585*** 
 (0.163) (0.176) (0.124) (0.132) (0.139) (0.148) 
Age 0.121** 0.123* 0.253*** 0.256*** 0.366*** 0.357*** 
 (0.049) (0.065) (0.036) (0.036) (0.028) (0.029) 
Agri. Land Area Owned -0.013 -0.013 0.033 0.032 0.018 0.021 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.053) (0.054) 
Livestock Units Owned 0.019 0.019 0.035** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
Father's Educ.-at Least Primary 1.400*** 1.395*** 0.689*** 0.633*** 0.823*** 0.775*** 
 (0.332) (0.369) (0.220) (0.222) (0.245) (0.251) 
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Mother's Educ.-at Least Primary 0.007 0.009 0.806*** 0.865*** 0.881*** 0.952*** 
 (0.909) (0.912) (0.277) (0.278) (0.304) (0.309) 
Distance to Primary School 0.074 0.074 -0.079** -0.079** 0.021 -0.117*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.040) 
Household Size 0.039 0.040 -0.041 -0.046 -0.081** -0.078** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) 
Number of Siblings -0.000 -0.001 0.058 0.064 0.089* 0.094** 
 (0.043) (0.047) (0.041) (0.041) (0.047) (0.047) 
Age of Father -0.013 -0.013 -0.010 -0.011 -0.013 -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Age of Mother 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Sex of Household Head 0.140 0.140 0.258 0.266 0.319 0.278 
 (0.253) (0.254) (0.177) (0.177) (0.202) (0.200) 
Year==2004   0.579*** 0.566***     
   (0.204) (0.204)     
Residuals from 1
st
 stage.  -0.012  -0.181   -0.154 
  (0.450)  (0.180)   (0.203) 
Constant -3.499*** -3.482** -3.662*** -3.155*** -4.787*** -3.862*** 
 (1.122) (1.519) (0.535) (0.753) 0.688 (0.835) 
       
Neither Student nor Working       
Child's Height-for-age  -0.071 -1.512 -0.161*** -0.905*** -0.164*** -0.960*** 
 (0.254) (1.249) (0.045) (0.280) (0.050) (0.294) 
Sex 1.583*** 1.335** -0.004 -0.185 0.049 -0.147 
 (0.554) (0.551) (0.178) (0.180) (0.194) (0.197) 
Age 0.036 -0.086 -0.794*** -0.810*** -0.696*** -0.704*** 
 (0.157) (0.171) (0.065) (0.067) (0.060) (0.061) 
Agri. Land Area Owned 0.086 0.118 -0.188** -0.178* -0.177* -0.177* 
 (0.108) (0.110) (0.096) (0.095) (0.105) (0.103) 
Livestock Units Owned -0.115* -0.116* -0.055* -0.064** -0.052 -0.058* 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) 
Father's Education -33.721*** -34.250*** 0.239 0.492* 0.321 0.583* 
 (0.623) (0.710) (0.273) (0.281) (0.291) (0.302) 
Mother's Education -32.934*** -34.189*** -0.471 -0.713 -0.402 -0.670 
 (0.829) (0.858) (0.500) (0.507) (0.522) (0.530) 
Distance to Primary School 0.066 0.062 0.001 0.010 -0.045 -0.054 
 (0.127) (0.123) (0.061) (0.062) (0.052) (0.064) 
Household Size 0.207** 0.178** -0.005 0.016 -0.025 -0.001 
 (0.100) (0.087) (0.040) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) 
Number of Siblings -0.049 0.004 0.058 0.031 0.083 0.054 
 (0.111) (0.114) (0.061) (0.062) (0.068) (0.068) 
Age of Father -0.019 -0.013 -0.017 -0.014 -0.017 -0.014 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Age of Mother -0.007 0.023 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.007 
 (0.045) (0.052) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
Sex of Household Head -0.808 -0.747 -0.059 -0.044 -0.056 -0.040 
 (0.595) (0.567) (0.258) (0.257) (0.279) (0.277) 
Year=2004   1.205*** 1.299***     
   (0.398) (0.408)     
Residuals from the 1
st
 stage  1.481  0.762***   0.812*** 
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  (1.297)  (0.287)   (0.299) 
Constant -4.576 -7.878* 5.296*** 3.149*** 5.214*** 2.464** 
 (3.186) (4.373) (0.740) (1.027) (0.921) (1.129) 
St. dev of individual random 
effects
a
 
    
-0.492* 0.528** 
     (0.281) (0.266) 
St. dev of family random effects     0.810*** 0.827*** 
 
 
    
(0.128) (0.129) 
Number of individuals     1263 1263 
Number of families     781 781 
Observations 1116 1116 2241 2241 2241 2241 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
Notes: Dummies representing exposure to a big drought in 1984 at 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years are used 
as identifying instruments for child‟s height-for-age in equation (II) . Dummies for substantial 
rain deficit and rain surplus at 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years are used as instruments in IV and VI. Mother‟s 
height and father‟s height were also included in all first stage equations to control for genetic 
variations in height. Site dummies were included in all equations to control for community fixed 
effects. The excluded child activity in all equations was „work only‟.                                                                                                                                                   
a
 When the estimated parameter is negative its absolute value is interpreted as the standard 
deviation (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles,  2004). 
 
Table A8. Multinomial Logit Estimates for Main Child Activities  
 Older Cohort Younger Cohort 
 Pooled Panel Panel Pooled Panel Panel 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
 
 
2-Stage RE 2-Stage  2-Stage RE 2-Stage 
 
Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit 
RE 
Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit Mlogit 
RE 
Mlogit 
Student                 
Child's Height-for 
-age   
 
0.210*** 
 
0.463 0.206*** 0.321 
 
0.128*** 
 
0.300* 0.144*** 0.293 
 (0.045) (0.303) (0.058) (0.345) (0.032) (0.166) (0.036) (0.188) 
Sex 0.778*** 0.839*** 1.094*** 1.121*** 0.466*** 0.509*** 0.517*** 0.557*** 
 (0.122) (0.141) (0.174 (0.193) (0.115) (0.122) (0.130) (0.138) 
Age 0.106*** 0.130*** 0.166*** 0.178*** 0.245*** 0.249*** 0.303*** 0.305*** 
 (0.034) (0.045) (0.044) (0.057) (0.034) (0.034) (0.026) (0.026) 
Agri. Land Area  
Owned 
 
0.013 
 
0.012 0.032 0.032 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.010 -0.018 -0.019 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.061) (0.061) (0.038) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043) 
Livestock Units  
Owned 
 
0.009 
 
0.009 0.014 0.014 
 
0.035*** 
 
0.036*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
Father's Education 1.592*** 1.502*** 2.110*** 2.070*** 0.740*** 0.686*** 0.845*** 0.802*** 
 (0.281) (0.298) (0.405) (0.418) (0.192) (0.194) (0.217) (0.222) 
Mother's Education 0.112 0.119 0.036 0.040 0.705*** 0.763*** 0.776*** 0.828*** 
 (0.709) (0.703) (0.887) (0.885) (0.250) (0.252) (0.280) (0.283) 
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Distance to Primary 
School 
 
0.066* 
 
0.065 0.100* 0.099* 
 
-0.051* 
 
-0.051* 0.018 0.018 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.052) (0.052) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) 
Household Size 0.017 0.025 0.009 0.013 -0.049* -0.054* -.062** -.066** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.046) (0.046) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) 
Number of Siblings 0.019 0.005 0.051 0.045 0.078** 0.084** 0.087** 0.093** 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.051) (0.053) (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.042) 
Age of Father -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age of Mother 0.006 -0.000 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Sex of Household  
Head 
 
0.058 
 
0.062 -0.039 -0.037 
 
0.221 
 
0.228 0.266 0.273 
 (0.181) (0.181) (0.247) (0.247) (0.164) (0.163) (0.188) (0.188) 
Year=1995 0.486*** 0.511*** 
  
    
 (0.098) (0.102) 
  
    
Year=2004   
  
0.178 0.164   
   
  
(0.181) (0.180)   
Residuals from 1
st
  
stage 
  
-0.258   -0.116 
  
-0.176   -0.153 
  (0.306)   (0.345)  (0.166)   (0.188) 
Constant -3.53*** -3.00*** -4.81*** -4.57*** -2.92*** -2.43*** -3.64*** -3.21*** 
 (0.796) (1.021) (1.079) (1.331) (0.485) (0.690) (0.626) (0.857) 
Neither Student nor Working 
Child's Height-for 
-age  
 
-0.115 
 
-0.313 -0.107 -0.149 
 
-.162*** 
 
-.902*** -.166*** -.938*** 
 (0.093) (0.470) (0.108) (0.502) (0.045) (0.280) (0.050) (0.283) 
Sex 0.441** 0.393* 0.664*** 0.653** -0.004 -0.183 0.046 -0.142 
 (0.219) (0.234) (0.252) (0.269) (0.178) (0.180) (0.193) (0.197) 
Age -.296*** -.318*** -.379*** -.385*** -.793*** -.809*** -.688*** -.692*** 
 (0.067) (0.081) (0.088) (0.102) (0.065) (0.067) (0.060) (0.060) 
Agri. Land Area  
Owned 
 
0.069 
 
0.070 0.027 0.027 
 
-0.178* 
 
-0.168* -0.160 -0.149 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.105) (0.105) (0.095) (0.094) (0.103) (0.102) 
Livestock Units  
Owned 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.028 -0.036 -0.036 
 
-0.055* 
 
-.063** -0.051 -0.058* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) 
Father's Education -0.109 -0.046 0.384 0.395 0.231 0.482* 0.301 0.562* 
 (0.449) (0.467) (0.523) (0.546) (0.273) (0.280) (0.291) (0.299) 
Mother's Education -0.831 -0.805 -1.431 -1.413 -0.459 -0.700 -0.387 -0.637 
 (0.819) (0.823) (1.077) (1.078) (0.500) (0.507) (0.522) (0.530) 
Distance to Primary 
School 
 
0.178* 
 
0.181* 0.203** 0.203** 
 
0.003 
 
0.012 -0.045 -0.038 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.103) (0.103) (0.061) (0.062) (0.051) (0.050) 
Household Size 0.122** 0.115** 0.159** 0.157** -0.005 0.015 -0.027 -0.008 
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 (0.052) (0.054) (0.064) (0.067) (0.040) (0.042) (0.044) (0.045) 
Number of Siblings -0.106* -0.094 -0.127* -0.124* 0.055 0.029 0.080 0.054 
 (0.055) (0.061) (0.068) (0.074) (0.061) (0.062) (0.068) (0.068) 
Age of Father -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.017 -0.014 -0.016 -0.013 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Age of Mother -0.010 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.007 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
Sex of Household  
Head 
 
-.976*** 
 
-.980*** -.957*** -.957*** 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.037 -0.048 -0.032 
 (0.285) (0.286) (0.326) (0.326) (0.257) (0.256) (0.277) (0.275) 
Year=1995 -1.40*** -1.41*** 
  
    
 (0.291) (0.291) 
  
    
Year=2004   
  
1.223*** 1.315***   
   
  
(0.398) (0.408)   
Residuals from 1
st
  
stage. 
 0.204 
  0.044 
 0.758*** 
  0.790*** 
  (0.463)   (0.492)  (0.286)   (0.290) 
Constant -0.064 -0.501 -0.474 -0.557 5.274*** 3.138*** 5.131*** 2.762** 
  (1.793) (2.066) (2.008) (2.190) (0.740) (1.024) (0.914) (1.169) 
St. dev of ind.  
Rand. effects 
  
1.220*** 1.222***   0.472* 0.491* 
 
  
(0.211) (0.211)   (0.287) (0.279) 
St. dev of family 
 rand. effects 
  
1.137*** 1.134***   0.801*** 0.802*** 
  
  
(0.162) (0.163)   (0.127) (0.128) 
No. of Individuals 
  
1358 1358   1263 1263 
No. of families 
  
840 840   781 781 
Observations 2348 2348 2348 2348 2241 2241 2241 2241 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Notes: Dummies representing exposure to a big drought in 1984 at 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years are used 
as identifying instruments for child‟s height-for-age in equation II and IV. Dummies for 
substantial rain deficit and rain surplus at 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years are used as instruments in VI and 
VIII. Mother‟s height and father‟s height were also included in all first stage equations to control 
for genetic variation in heights. Site dummies were included in all equations to control for 
community fixed effects. The excluded child activity in all equations was „work‟. 
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Table A9. Probit Models for Child Schooling 
 Pooled Panel Panel Pooled Panel Panel 
 I II III IV V VI VII VII 
 
 
2-Stage RE  2-Stage 
 
2-Stage RE  2-Stage 
 
Probit Probit Probit 
RE 
Probit Probit Probit Probit 
RE 
Probit 
Child's Height-for- 
age  
 
0.125*** 
 
0.276* 
 
0.159*** 
 
0.253 
 
0.085*** 
 
0.242** 
 
0.105*** 
 
0.299** 
 (0.025) (0.166) (0.035) (0.228) (0.018) (0.097) (0.020) (0.120) 
Sex 0.441*** 0.477*** 0.664*** 0.686*** 0.276*** 0.314*** 0.339*** 0.385*** 
 (0.068) (0.078) (0.107) (0.120) (0.066) (0.070) (0.080) (0.085) 
Age 0.072*** 0.087*** 0.152*** 0.161*** 0.201*** 0.204*** 0.251*** 0.252*** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.030) (0.038) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Agri. Land Area  
Owned 
 
0.003 
 
0.002 
 
0.027 
 
0.027 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.033) (0.024) (0.024) (0.035) (0.035) 
Livestock Units  
Owned 
 
0.007 
 
0.006 
 
0.009 
 
0.009 
 
0.022*** 
 
0.023*** 
 
0.028*** 
 
0.029*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Father's Education 0.951*** 0.898*** 1.453*** 1.420*** 0.415*** 0.366*** 0.500*** 0.440*** 
 (0.154) (0.163) (0.213) (0.227) (0.106) (0.108) (0.122) (0.126) 
Mother's Education 0.055 0.059 0.008 0.011 0.443*** 0.495*** 0.524*** 0.587*** 
 (0.376) (0.374) (0.388) (0.388) (0.144) (0.145) (0.195) (0.199) 
Distance to Primary  
School 
 
0.034 
 
0.033 
 
0.042 
 
0.041 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.034 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.032) (0.032) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) 
Household Size 0.007 0.012 -0.006 -0.003 -0.025 -0.030* -0.029 -0.033* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.027) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
Number of Siblings 0.014 0.005 0.041 0.036 0.048** 0.053** 0.057** 0.063** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.028) (0.030) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.026) 
Age of Father -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age of Mother 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Sex of Household  
Head 
 
0.070 
 
0.073 
 
0.040 
 
0.043 
 
0.124 
 
0.129 
 
0.133 
 
0.138 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.145) (0.145) (0.095) (0.094) (0.103) (0.103) 
Year=1995 0.331*** 0.345***       
 (0.056) (0.058)       
Year=2004     0.031 0.018   
     (0.105) (0.105)   
Residuals from 1
st
  
stage. 
  
-0.154 
  
-0.096 
  
-0.161* 
  
-0.199* 
  (0.168)  (0.230)  (0.097)  (0.121) 
Constant -2.23*** -1.91*** -3.61*** -3.41*** -2.46*** -2.00*** -3.03*** -2.45*** 
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  (0.456) (0.577) (0.698) (0.842) (0.270) (0.393) (0.316) (0.462) 
lnsig2u 
 
 0.224 0.223   -0.69*** -0.70*** 
  
  
(0.190) (0.190) 
  
(0.264) (0.265) 
No. of Individuals 
  
1358 1358 
  
1263 1263 
Observations 2348 2348 2348 2348 2241 2241 2241 2241 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Notes: Dummies representing exposure to a big drought in 1984 at 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years are used 
as identifying instruments for child‟s height-for-age in (II) &(IV) . Dummies for substantial rain 
deficit and rain surplus at 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 years are used as instruments in (VI)&(VIII). Mother‟s 
height and father‟s height were also included in all first stage equations to control for genetic 
variations in height. Site dummies were included in all the equations to control for community 
fixed effects. 
 
Table A10 Semi-Nonparametric Bivariate Estimates for Child Schooling and Work 
 Older Cohort Younger Cohort 
 
Variables  
I 
SNP 
II 
2-Stage SNP 
III 
SNP 
IV 
2-Stage SNP 
Stud     
     
Child's Height-for-age z-scores 0.169*** 0.334 0.097*** 0.304*** 
 (0.042) (0.222) (0.022) (0.100) 
Sex 0.468*** 0.499*** 0.353*** 0.410*** 
 (0.105) (0.113) (0.089) (0.103) 
Age 0.046 0.066 0.223*** 0.230*** 
 (0.029) (0.043) (0.028) (0.027) 
Total Agricultural Land Area Owned -0.031 -0.035 0.010 0.009 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.034) (0.034) 
Total Tropical Livestock Units Owned 0.012 0.013 0.027*** 0.028*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
Father's Education-at Least Primary 1.129*** 1.076*** 0.484*** 0.428*** 
 (0.229) (0.237) (0.131) (0.133) 
Mother's Education-at Least Primary -0.045 -0.016 0.494** 0.562*** 
 (0.517) (0.514) (0.198) (0.193) 
Distance to the Nearest Primary School 0.031 0.036 -0.071*** -0.069*** 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022) 
Household Size 0.034 0.038 -0.030 -0.035 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.023) 
Number of Siblings 0.001 -0.005 0.053* 0.061** 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029) 
Age of Father -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age of Mother 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Sex of Household Head -0.032 -0.028 0.125 0.135 
 (0.168) (0.167) (0.129) (0.129) 
year04   0.164 0.139 
   (0.189) (0.197) 
Child's Height-for-age z-scores     
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Resid. from Height-for-age eqn.  -0.168  -0.212** 
  (0.227)  (0.099) 
work     
     
Child's Height-for-age z-scores 0.032 -0.369 0.030 0.149 
 (0.046) (0.269) (0.022) (0.093) 
Sex -0.321** -0.390*** -0.072 -0.050 
 (0.135) (0.144) (0.087) (0.090) 
Age 0.131*** 0.061 0.250*** 0.248*** 
 (0.033) (0.051) (0.029) (0.033) 
Total Agricultural Land Area Owned 0.008 0.021 0.105** 0.105** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) 
Total Tropical Livestock Units Owned 0.007 0.006 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013) 
Father's Education-at Least Primary -0.204 -0.104 -0.193 -0.237* 
 (0.287) (0.312) (0.125) (0.126) 
Mother's Education-at Least Primary 0.489 0.437 0.181 0.210 
 (0.511) (0.518) (0.204) (0.208) 
Distance to the Nearest Primary School 0.065** 0.042 0.071** 0.068** 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) 
Household Size -0.021 -0.036 0.016 0.012 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.023) (0.023) 
Number of Siblings -0.009 0.008 -0.041 -0.037 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.030) (0.030) 
Age of Father 0.001 0.002 0.011** 0.010* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age of Mother 0.009 0.014 0.004 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
Sex of Household Head 0.417** 0.387** 0.106 0.097 
 (0.189) (0.190) (0.135) (0.138) 
year04   -0.091 -0.086 
   (0.210) (0.221) 
g_1_1  -0.685*** -0.684*** -0.066 -0.057 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.074) (0.088) 
g_2_1  0.058** 0.053** 0.270*** 0.268*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.042) (0.042) 
g_1_2    -0.225*** -0.225*** 
   (0.023) (0.024) 
g_2_2    -0.070*** -0.069*** 
   (0.017) (0.014) 
Standard Deviation (s)  1.281 1.281 1.301 1.300 
Standard Deviation (w) 1.279 1.279 1.342 1.340 
Variance (s) 1.642 1.640 1.692 1.690 
Variance(w) 1.636 1.635 1.801 1.796 
Skewness(s) -0.072 -0.066 -0.397 -0.395 
Skewness(w) -0.005 -0.005 0.331 0.329 
Kurtosis(s) 2.550 2.551 3.127 3.124 
Kurtosis(w) 2.527 2.531 3.055 3.053 
rho -0.557 -0.559 -0.484 -0.482 
Observations 1116 1116 2241 2241 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The bivariate binary-choice models were estimated through the semi-nonparametric 
estimators of Gallant and Nychka (1987). The unknown density of the latent regression errors is 
approximated by a Hermite polynomial expansion of order 2 for and 1 for the schooling and work 
equations for the older cohort and order 2 in both equations for the younger cohort. Convergence 
was hard to obtain with higher order polynomials because of the non-concavity of the log 
pseudolikelihood function. 
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Appendix B. Robustness to Missing Rainfall Data 
 
Table B1. Missing Monthly Rainfall Records for the 8 Critical Years in the Analysis of the  
                  Younger Cohort 
  Year 
Site 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Adado 3 0 0 5 0 3 0 0 
Adele Keke 0 0 0 0 1 12 12 12 
Aze Deboa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Debre berhan 2 0 0 1 0 3 1 1 
Dinki 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Doma'a 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Gara Godo 4 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 
Geblen 12 12 12 12 5 0 0 0 
Haresaw 8 12 12 12 4 0 0 3 
Imdibir 0 0 0 0 1 0 12 4 
Koro degaga 0 0 0 4 4 2 0 0 
Shumsha 0 5 12 12 6 1 0 1 
Sirbana Gudeti 0 0 1 4 0 0 1 0 
Tirufe Kecheme 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Yetmen 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Table B2. Availability of Rainfall Data During the Main Rainy Season 
  Year 
Site 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Adado A A A A A A A A 
Adele Keke A A A A A NA NA NA 
Aze Deboa A A A A A A A A 
Debre berhan A A A A A A A A 
Dinki A A A A A A A A 
Doma'a A A A A A A A A 
Gara Godo A A A A A A A A 
Geblen NA NA NA NA A A A A 
Haresaw NA NA NA NA A A A A 
Imdibir A A A A A A NA A 
Koro degaga A A A A A A A A 
Shumsha A A NA NA A A A A 
Sirbana Gudeti A A A A A A A A 
Tirufe Kecheme A A A A A A A A 
Yetmen A A A A A A A A 
Notes: A stands for "data available" and NA stands for "data not available". 
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Table B3. Two-Stage Bivariate Probit Results-Successively Adjusting the Estimation  Sample for the 
Major Missing Rainfall Records 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
     
Student     
     
Child's Height-for-age z-scores 0.251*** 0.259*** 0.233** 0.226** 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.101) (0.105) 
Sex 0.324*** 0.326*** 0.315*** 0.314*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.072) (0.072) 
Age 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.200*** 0.210*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) 
Total Agricultural Land Area Owned -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
Total Tropical Livestock Units Owned 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Father's Education-at Least Primary 0.349*** 0.362*** 0.377*** 0.370*** 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.109) (0.114) 
Mother's Education-at Least Primary 0.472*** 0.489*** 0.494*** 0.502*** 
 (0.143) (0.144) (0.148) (0.153) 
Distance to the Nearest Primary School -0.027* -0.031** -0.027* -0.026 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Household Size -0.030* -0.027* -0.030* -0.028 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Number of Siblings 0.052** 0.054** 0.056** 0.061*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Age of Father -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age of Mother 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Sex of Household Head 0.113 0.079 0.077 0.079 
 (0.094) (0.096) (0.099) (0.105) 
Resid. from Height-for-age eqn. -0.169* -0.175* -0.150 -0.141 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.100) (0.105) 
Year=2004 0.043 0.065 0.069 0.045 
 (0.105) (0.111) (0.112) (0.115) 
Constant -1.892*** -1.965*** -2.059*** -2.229*** 
 (0.390) (0.389) (0.407) (0.416) 
Work     
     
Child's Height-for-age z-scores 0.162 0.176* 0.189* 0.174 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.106) (0.115) 
Sex -0.035 -0.068 -0.098 -0.119* 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.068) (0.069) 
Age 0.141*** 0.148*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) 
Total Agricultural Land Area Owned 0.081** 0.080** 0.076** 0.073** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Total Tropical Livestock Units Owned 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
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 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Father's Education-at Least Primary -0.200** -0.190* -0.177* -0.193* 
 (0.095) (0.097) (0.099) (0.101) 
Mother's Education-at Least Primary 0.140 0.144 0.140 0.128 
 (0.148) (0.150) (0.153) (0.158) 
Distance to the Nearest Primary School 0.041** 0.041** 0.045** 0.045** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Household Size 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.009 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Number of Siblings -0.030 -0.031 -0.030 -0.036 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Age of Father 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age of Mother 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Sex of Household Head 0.025 0.087 0.077 0.103 
 (0.099) (0.103) (0.107) (0.112) 
Resid. from Height-for-age eqn. -0.152 -0.169 -0.188* -0.170 
 (0.105) (0.104) (0.108) (0.117) 
Year=2004 0.080 0.015 0.080 0.097 
 (0.109) (0.114) (0.118) (0.120) 
Constant -0.467 -0.355 -0.349 -0.388 
 (0.389) (0.400) (0.408) (0.422) 
Athrho -0.521*** -0.518*** -0.510*** -0.522*** 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.057) 
Observations 2241 2145 2053 1958 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Site dummies were included in all equations to control for community fixed effects. 
Equation (I) was estimated using the entire sample. Equation (II) includes in the estimation 
sample only those who had at least 6 months of non-missing monthly rainfall records including 
the main rainy (agricultural) season during at least 1 of their critical years of development.  The 5 
and 6 year olds from Geblen and Haresaw and 1 year olds from Adele Keke did not fulfill these 
criteria and were excluded from the estimation sample for (II). Equation (III) includes in the 
estimation sample only those who had at least 6 months of non-missing monthly rainfall records 
including the main rainy (agricultural) season during at least 2 of their critical years of 
development.  The 4, 5 and 6 year olds from Geblen and Haresaw, 1 and 2 year olds from Adele 
Keke and 4 year olds from Shumsha did not fulfill these criteria and were excluded from the 
estimation sample for (III). Equation (IV) includes in the estimation sample only those who had at 
least 6 months of non-missing monthly rainfall records including the main rainy (agricultural) 
season for all of the 3 critical years of development.  The 3, 4, 5 and 6 year olds from Geblen and 
Haresaw, 1, 2 and 3 year olds from Adele Keke, 3 and 4 year olds from Shumsha, and 1 and 2 
year olds from Imdibir did not fulfill these criteria and were excluded from the estimation sample 
for (IV). 
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Table B4. First-Stage Results for the Younger Cohort-Successively Adjusting the Estimation 
Sample for the Major Missing Rainfall Records  
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
     
Substantial rainfall deficit at 1st year 0.047 0.021 0.052 0.059 
 (0.223) (0.226) (0.233) (0.244) 
Substantial rainfall deficit at 2nd year -0.401** -0.396** -0.379** -0.371** 
 (0.179) (0.179) (0.181) (0.178) 
Substantial rainfall deficit at 3rd year -0.243 -0.240 -0.212 -0.246 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.180) (0.181) 
Substantial rainfall surplus at 1st year -0.030 -0.088 -0.067 -0.046 
 (0.178) (0.196) (0.197) (0.198) 
Substantial rainfall surplus at 2nd year -0.227 -0.247 -0.224 -0.179 
 (0.180) (0.181) (0.182) (0.186) 
Substantial rainfall surplus at 3rd year -0.094 -0.090 -0.041 -0.147 
 (0.251) (0.251) (0.261) (0.273) 
Height of Mother 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Height of Father 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Sex -0.223*** -0.207*** -0.199 -0.176 
 (0.119) (0.121) (0.124) (0.128) 
Age -0.020 -0.035 -0.050 -0.054 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
Household Size 0.016 0.025 0.021 0.015 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Number of Siblings -0.034 -0.038 -0.032 -0.029 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) 
Sex of Household Head -0.102 -0.125 -0.173 -0.207 
 (0.157) (0.164) (0.170) (0.178) 
Father's Education-at Least Primary 0.200 0.180 0.225 0.199 
 (0.188) (0.191) (0.193) (0.194) 
Mother's Education-at Least Primary -0.343 -0.326 -0.399 -0.404 
 (0.260) (0.263) (0.253) (0.259) 
Age of Father 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age of Mother 0.009 0.012 0.016 0.018 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Total Agricultural Land Area Owned 0.003 -0.000 0.002 -0.005 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Total Tropical Livestock Units Owned -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Year=2004 0.108 0.189 0.236 0.231 
 (0.167) (0.175) (0.177) (0.180) 
Constant -11.453*** -12.668*** -12.541*** -12.362*** 
 (1.901) (1.943) (2.014) (2.087) 
     
Observations 2241 2145 2053 1958 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Site dummies were included in all equations to control for community fixed effects. 
Equations (I), (II), (III) and (IV) are first-stage results for equations (I), (II), (III) and (IV) in table 
B3, respectively.  
 
Table B5. Marginal effects (at mean value) of Child's Height-for-age z-scores on the Choice 
Probabilities of Various Child Activities  from the Two-Stage Bivariate Probit Results in Table B2 
  
 
p(stud=1, p(stud=1, p(stud=0, p(stud=0, 
 Model p(stud=1|x) work=0|x) work=1|x) work=1|x) work=0|x) p(work=1|x) 
 (I) 0.100*** -0.013 0.113*** -0.064* -0.036*** 0.048 
 
(0.038) (0.023) (0.032) (0.035) (0.012) (0.031) 
(II) 0.103*** -0.014 0.117*** -0.065* -0.038*** 0.052* 
 
(0.038) (0.023) (0.032) (0.035) (0.011) (0.030) 
(III) 0.093*** -0.018 0.111*** -0.055 -0.038*** 0.056* 
 
(0.040) (0.023) (0.034) (0.037) (0.013) (0.031) 
(IV) 0.090** -0.016 0.106*** -0.055 -0.036*** 0.051 
 
(0.042) (0.025) (0.036) (0.038) (0.013) (0.034) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The partial effects reported in this table were calculated at the mean value of the child‟s height-for-age 
z- scores and other regressors and the standard errors were calculated by the delta method.  Rows (I),  (II), 
(III) and (IV) come from the results reported under equations (I), (II), (III) and (IV) in table B3, respectively.  
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Appendix C. The GLLAMM Model for Multinomial Logit 
GLLAMM stands for Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models that includes a wide 
class of models elaborated in detail in Rabe-Hesketh and Skondrel (2008) and Rabe-
Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles, (2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2003). The GLLAMM models 
allow the unobserved heterogeneities at multiple levels of observation to be accounted for 
like a child and family levels in our case. They also recognize the nested structure of the 
observations as in our level-1 units of observation or children being nested or clustered 
under our level-2 units of observation that are families or households. In a panel data 
setting level 1 units are occasions or panel waves, level 2 units are children and level 3 
units are families or households.  
The multinomial logit model in this framework consists of three parts: the linear 
predictor, assumptions about the distribution of the latent variables for unobserved 
heterogeneities, and multinomial logit link. Assuming that the indirect utility under 
equation 1.21 in the main text is linear in its arguments, the linear predictor for a three 
level random intercept model for child i and household f at measurement occasion or 
panel wave w may be stated as, 
fif
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                   (C1) 
where j = 0,1,2,3 denotes categories of child activity choices, xiw is a vector of child 
specific covariates that remain the same across alternatives but vary across children and 
over time, zfw is a vector of family specific covariates that vary over time ,  xi are time 
invariant child specific characteristics, zf  are time invariant family specific 
characteristics, αi are child specific time invariant unobserved heterogeneities, ηf  are time 
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invariant family specific unobserved characteristics, and β(j) , δ(j), γ(j), and λ(j) are 
parameters.  We do not have category specific covariates in our model. 
Conditional on the random effects, the child activity choice, yifw , is assumed to have a 
multinomial logit distribution,  
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where, we have assumed all the random intercepts and the coefficients for the base 
category to be equal to zero for identification.  
The random intercepts are assumed to be independently normally distributed. 
);,0(),...,( '31'   Niidiii             (C3) 
).,0(),...,( '31'   Niidffi             (C4) 
Since the choice probabilities stated under 1.C2 are conditional on the time-invariant 
unobserved child and family level heterogeneities, estimation of the model requires 
integrating over the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneities. Thus, the likelihood 
for the multinomial logit with child and family level random intercepts has the following 
form, 
  
 
dfdfzxzxjyPL
j
N
n w
fifiiwiwifw )()(),,,,,|()(
3
1 1
2
1
  
  
             (C5) 
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where, both f(η) and g(α) are standard normal densities and hence the random effects 
have a bivariate normal density and ω is a vector of parameters, 
),,,...,,,...,,,...,,,...,( )3()1()3()1()3()1()3()1('   . 
Since the integrands in the likelihood function in C5 do not have closed from solutions, 
numerical approximations are needed to maximize it.  The gllamm program in stata has 
the option of approximating the integrals by either Gauss-Hermite quadrature or adaptive 
quadrature. Adaptive quadrature is a method that extends Gauss Hermite quadrature by 
exploiting the posterior density of the unobserved heterogeneities which is approximately 
multivariate normal for large cluster sizes (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles, 2004c).  
The results reported under the last two columns of Table A7 and Table A8 were 
estimated using adaptive quadrature. This is implemented in stata by suitably arranging 
the data, defining level identifiers and feeding them to the GLLAMM program. To ensure 
the program recognizes the correct hierarchy of observations the identifiers are stated 
sequentially by starting with the lowest level.  
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Appendix D.  Additional Summary Statistics and Results for Essay 2 from 
Ethiopian Data 
Table D1. Summary Statistics for the Variables Used in the Models 
  School Attendance  Weight-for-Height  
 
DHS2000 
(N=12502) 
DHS2005 
(N=11317) 
DHS2000 
(N=6427) 
DHS2005 
(N=3077) 
Variables  M 
Std. 
Dev. M 
Std. 
Dev M 
Std. 
Dev. M 
Std. 
Dev 
Child is attending school 0.35 0.48 0.39 0.49     
Weight-for-Height Z-scores 
    
-1.81 1.24 -1.53 1.37 
Percentage of wasted children 
    
0.46 0.50 0.39 0.49 
Mother's Desired Female Ratio 0.47 0.16 0.47 0.14 0.47 0.17 0.47 0.15 
Actual Female Ratio 0.49 0.23 0.48 0.23 0.49 0.27 0.49 0.26 
Gender Ratio Gap 0.02 0.21 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.23 
Mother's Bargaining Power  0.00 0.89 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.90 
Child is female 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 
Age of Child 10.89 3.58 9.45 2.55 2.11 1.41 2.16 1.41 
Household Size 7.31 2.07 7.16 1.93 6.40 2.02 6.47 1.96 
Child's Birth-Order 3.90 2.35 3.75 2.34 4.64 2.55 4.62 2.49 
First Wealth Quintile 0.12 0.33 0.29 0.45 0.13 0.34 0.27 0.44 
Second Wealth Quintile 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.39 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.39 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.27 0.44 0.20 0.40 0.26 0.44 0.18 0.38 
Mother's Body Mass Index 
    
20.17 2.50 20.38 2.61 
Gender Ratio of Mother's Siblings 0.50 0.25 0.47 0.26 0.48 0.24 0.47 0.25 
Female Twin-Pair in the Family 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.07 
Male Twin-Pair in the Family 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.07 
Mixed Twin-Pair in the Family 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.12 
Independence in Seeking External 
Relations 0.41 0.49 0.32 0.47 0.40 0.49 0.34 0.47 
Independence in Child-care Decisions 0.35 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 
Self-confidence in Talking to Husband 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48 
Independence in Sexual Decisions  0.45 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Independence in Domestic Activities 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.39 0.49 
Husband has more than 1 wife 0.84 0.37 0.85 0.36 0.87 0.33 0.87 0.34 
Mother Listens to Radio 0.46 0.87 0.55 0.92 0.43 0.82 0.53 0.90 
Mother is More Educated than Husband 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 
Mother's age-Husband's age -9.27 6.90 -8.78 6.65 -8.69 6.56 -8.27 6.84 
Mother is Non-Muslim 0.60 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.60 0.49 
Source: The Demographic and Health Surveys of Ethiopia Conducted in the Years 2000 and 2005.   
Notes: M stands for mean.  
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Table D2. Factor Loadings (pattern matrix) and Unique Variances 
Variable 
 
Factor1 
 
Factor2 
 
Factor3 
 
Factor4 
 
Factor5 
 
Uniqueness 
Independence in Seeking Ext. 
Relations 
 
0.666 
 
-0.042 
 
0.024 
 
0.121 
 
0.007 
 
0.540 
Independence in Child-care 
Decisions 
 
0.690 
 
-0.101 
 
0.059 
 
0.089 
 
0.013 
 
0.502 
Self-confidence in Talking to 
Husband 
 
0.689 
 
-0.050 
 
0.006 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.003 
 
0.523 
Independence in Sexual 
Decisions  
 
0.590 
 
0.091 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.101 
 
-0.025 
 
0.632 
Independence in Domestic 
Activities 
 
0.638 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.127 
 
0.001 
 
0.573 
Mother Listens to Radio 0.202 0.263 -0.172 -0.005 0.010 0.861 
Mother is More Educated than 
Husband 
 
0.082 
 
0.172 
 
-0.228 
 
0.032 
 
0.013 
 
0.911 
Mother is Non-Muslim 0.070 0.283 0.048 0.102 -0.028 0.901 
Mother's age-Husband's age 0.051 0.206 0.147 -0.066 0.030 0.928 
Husband has Just 1 Wife 0.049 0.297 0.158 -0.011 0.003 0.884 
Observations= 40,178. 
 
Table D3. Factor Analysis/Eigen Values 
Factor Eigen value Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 2.207 1.872 1.090 1.090 
Factor2 0.335 0.199 0.166 1.256 
Factor3 0.136 0.071 0.067 1.323 
Factor4 0.065 0.062 0.032 1.355 
Factor5 0.003 0.100 0.001 1.356 
Factor6 -0.097 0.018 -0.048 1.308 
Factor7 -0.115 0.017 -0.057 1.251 
Factor8 -0.132 0.034 -0.065 1.186 
Factor9 -0.166 0.046 -0.082 1.104 
Factor10 -0.211 . -0.104 1.000 
Notes: Some of the eigenvalues are negative and hence the cumulative proportion is 
greater than 1 because in principal factor analysis that was followed here, the sample 
covariance matrix is not guaranteed to be positive semidefinte as opposed to the principal 
component analysis (Rencher, 1995).  
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Table D4. First Stage Results for the Models of Schooling- OLS Regression of Gender Ratio Gap 
on Instruments and Other Covariates   
 For Baseline Results For Main Results 
        VARIABLES Siblings Twins Siblings Twins 
Gender Ratio of Mother's Siblings 0.037*** 0.075 0.037*** 0.070 
 (0.008) (0.077) (0.008) (0.077) 
Female Twin-Pair in the Family 0.087*** 0.157*** 0.087*** 0.164*** 
 (0.023) (0.042) (0.023) (0.043) 
Male Twin-Pair in the Family -0.102*** -0.141*** -0.102*** -0.137*** 
 (0.024) (0.043) (0.024) (0.042) 
Child is female 0.147*** 0.025 0.147*** 0.025 
 (0.003) (0.016) (0.003) (0.016) 
Mother's Bargaining Power   0.000 -0.020 
   (0.002) (0.019) 
Age of Child -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006) 
Household Size -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) 
Child's Birth-order -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) 
First Wealth Quintile 0.007 -0.013 0.007 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.073) (0.006) (0.072) 
Second Wealth Quintile 0.010 0.040 0.010 0.039 
 (0.007) (0.078) (0.007) (0.079) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile -0.001 -0.017 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.084) (0.007) (0.085) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile -0.000 -0.023 -0.000 -0.012 
 (0.006) (0.071) (0.006) (0.071) 
Survey Round is 2005 -0.006 0.023 -0.006 0.024 
 (0.004) (0.040) (0.004) (0.039) 
Constant -0.064*** -0.047 -0.064*** -0.050 
 (0.011) (0.147) (0.011) (0.145) 
F-stat for joint sig. of instruments 15.93*** 11.61*** 15.93*** 11.37*** 
 (p=0.00) (p=0.00) (p=0.00) (p=0.00) 
Observations 23819 252 23819 252 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table D5. First Stage Results Weight-For-Height Models- OLS Regression of Gender Ratio Gap 
on Instruments and Other Covariates   
 For Baseline Results For Main Results 
        VARIABLES Siblings Twins Siblings Twins 
Gender Ratio of Mother's Siblings 0.018 0.094 0.018 0.091 
 (0.012) (0.112) (0.012) (0.112) 
Female Twin-Pair in the Family 0.054* 0.144*** 0.053* 0.145*** 
 (0.032) (0.050) (0.032) (0.050) 
Male Twin-Pair in the Family -0.083** -0.117* -0.084** -0.116* 
 (0.035) (0.067) (0.035) (0.068) 
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Child is female 0.209*** -0.000 0.209*** -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Mother's Bargaining Power   -0.005 -0.012 
   (0.003) (0.027) 
Age of Child 0.000 -0.014 0.000 -0.013 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) (0.018) 
Household Size -0.001 -0.010 -0.001 -0.011 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.011) 
Child's Birth-order 0.001 -0.011* 0.001 -0.010 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) 
First Wealth Quintile 0.010 -0.176** 0.009 -0.178** 
 (0.009) (0.070) (0.009) (0.071) 
Second Wealth Quintile 0.006 -0.053 0.006 -0.052 
 (0.009) (0.070) (0.009) (0.070) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile -0.005 -0.141 -0.005 -0.139 
 (0.009) (0.099) (0.009) (0.100) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile -0.013 -0.177*** -0.012 -0.166** 
 (0.009) (0.063) (0.009) (0.066) 
Mother's Body Mass Index 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.009 
 (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.013) 
Survey Round is 2005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.045) (0.006) (0.053) 
Constant -0.110*** 0.041 -0.112*** 0.035 
 (0.024) (0.288) (0.024) (0.287) 
F-stat for joint sig. of instruments 3.66** 6.71*** 3.65** 6.56*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Observations 9504 148 9504 148 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
             
Table D6. Linear Probability Models for School Attendance-Baseline Results from Siblings‟ 
Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female -0.057*** -0.062*** -0.168*** -0.105*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.030) (0.019) 
Gender Ratio Gap 0.029 0.051** 1.053*** 0.977*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.282) (0.300) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female 0.000 -0.033 -0.451 -0.621* 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.356) (0.352) 
Age of Child 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.004* -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Child's Birth-order -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.146*** -0.142*** -0.150*** -0.145*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.048*** -0.044*** 
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 (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.233*** 0.238*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) 
Survey Round is 2005 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.151*** 0.149*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Constant -0.097*** -0.097*** -0.020 -0.035 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.036) (0.037) 
     
Observations 23819 23819 23819 23819 
Number of  Mother_id  9911  9911 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of children from age 6 to 18 in the combined data from the two rounds 
of DHS-Ethiopia. Only those children with married mother with at least two children are 
included. 
 
Table D7. Linear Probability Models for School Attendance-Baseline Results from Twins‟ 
Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female 0.047 -0.023 -0.109 -0.129 
 (0.062) (0.051) (0.094) (0.094) 
Gender Ratio Gap -0.250 -0.060 -0.128 0.010 
 (0.205) (0.186) (0.515) (0.518) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female 0.285 -0.013 1.482* 1.354* 
 (0.251) (0.146) (0.753) (0.756) 
Age of Child 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
Household Size -0.023 -0.024 -0.017 -0.020 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
Child's Birth-Order -0.009 -0.025* -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.128 -0.136 -0.103 -0.110 
 (0.125) (0.136) (0.105) (0.106) 
Second Wealth Quintile 0.012 -0.028 0.007 -0.004 
 (0.114) (0.123) (0.113) (0.114) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.168 0.166 0.193* 0.222** 
 (0.142) (0.154) (0.107) (0.108) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.313*** 0.295** 0.354*** 0.348*** 
 (0.109) (0.120) (0.089) (0.089) 
Survey Round is 2005 0.164** 0.140* 0.154** 0.158** 
 (0.081) (0.085) (0.070) (0.071) 
Constant -0.124 0.077 -0.188 -0.144 
 (0.182) (0.206) (0.212) (0.213) 
     
Observations 252 252 252 252 
Number of Mother_id  121  121 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of living twin-pairs from age 6 to 18 in the combined data from the 
two rounds of DHS-Ethiopia. Only those children with married mother with at least two children 
are included. 
 
 
Table D8. Models for Child‟s Weight-for-Height Z-Scores –Baseline Results from Siblings‟ 
Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female -0.011 -0.006 0.360 0.167 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.393) (0.285) 
Gender Ratio Gap 0.014 0.039 1.582 1.402 
 (0.087) (0.085) (1.172) (1.158) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female -0.059 -0.097 -5.641* -3.921 
 (0.120) (0.118) (3.014) (2.586) 
Age of Child -0.180*** -0.172*** -0.191*** -0.180*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) 
Household Size 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.016 0.023 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) 
Child's Birth-Order -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.089*** -0.077*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.019) 
First Wealth Quintile 0.019 0.028 0.002 0.016 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.049) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.044 -0.036 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.050) (0.050) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.053 0.055 0.059 0.060 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.046) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.262*** 0.272*** 0.274*** 0.290*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.046) 
Mother's Body Mass Index 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Survey Round is 2005 0.283*** 0.280*** 0.246*** 0.260*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.038) 
Constant -3.370*** -3.404*** -3.025*** -3.127*** 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.215) (0.213) 
     
Observations 9504 9504 9504 9504 
Number of Mother_id  6425  6425 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of children under age 5 in the combined data from the two rounds of 
DHS-Ethiopia. Only those children with married mother with at least two children are included. 
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Table D9. Models for Child‟s Weight-for-Height Z-Scores –Baseline Results from Twins‟ Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female -0.105 0.089 0.206 0.194 
 (0.215) (0.167) (0.319) (0.167) 
Gender Ratio Gap 1.880** 0.447 0.828 -0.164 
 (0.823) (0.710) (2.128) (2.347) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female -2.982** -0.968 -4.523* -3.014 
 (1.215) (1.063) (2.348) (2.883) 
Age of Child 0.199** 0.199** 0.186** 0.185* 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.072) (0.098) 
Household Size 0.013 0.054 -0.009 0.015 
 (0.098) (0.104) (0.064) (0.096) 
Child's Birth-Order -0.079 -0.104* -0.119** -0.133** 
 (0.049) (0.054) (0.051) (0.056) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.238 -0.315 -0.585 -0.626 
 (0.539) (0.542) (0.469) (0.611) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.517 -0.477 -0.689* -0.637 
 (0.411) (0.457) (0.358) (0.493) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 1.336** 1.159** 1.155*** 1.081* 
 (0.541) (0.547) (0.439) (0.580) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 1.238*** 1.096*** 0.929** 0.845* 
 (0.402) (0.414) (0.402) (0.512) 
Mother's Body Mass Index 0.042 0.060 0.040 0.050 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.047) (0.066) 
Survey Round is 2005 0.067 0.123 -0.011 0.013 
 (0.347) (0.360) (0.259) (0.367) 
Constant -3.414** -4.088*** -2.796** -3.131* 
 (1.330) (1.378) (1.164) (1.634) 
     
Observations 148 148 148 148 
Number of Mother_id  73  73 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of living twin-pairs under age 5 in the combined data from the two 
rounds of DHS-Ethiopia. Only those children with married mother with at least two children are 
included. 
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Table D10: Gender Preferences by Husband and Wife 
  Percent of Cases  
 
2000 (Obs=2168) 2005 (Obs=4752) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Wife Prefers More Boys than Husband 33.90 47.35 32.49 46.84 
Wife Prefers Less Boys than Husband 43.17 49.54 43.77 49.62 
Husband and Wife Prefer Same Number of Boys 22.92 42.04 23.74 42.55 
Wife Prefers More Girls than Husband 41.10 49.21 37.50 48.42 
Wife Prefers Less Girls than Husband 32.29 46.77 34.62 47.58 
Husband and Wife Prefer Same Number of Girls 26.61 44.20 27.88 44.85 
Wife Prefers More Children than Husband 38.51 48.67 38.09 48.57 
Wife Prefers Less Children than Husband 40.08 49.02 43.06 49.52 
Husband and Wife Prefer Same Number of Children 21.40 41.02 18.86 39.12 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys of Ethiopia 
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Appendix E.  Results for Essay 2 from Indian Demographic and Health Survey of 
2005/06 
Table E1. Summary Statistics for the Variables Used in the Models-Indian Data 
  
School Attendance 
(N=91899) 
Weight-for-Height 
(N=9504) 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Child is attending school 0.75 0.43   
Weight-for-Height Z-scores 
  
-1.83 1.19 
Mother's Desired Female Ratio 0.44 0.17 0.44 0.17 
Actual Female Ratio 0.48 0.26 0.51 0.29 
Gender Ratio Gap 0.04 0.25 0.06 0.28 
Mother's Bargaining Power (de-meaned) 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.87 
Child is female 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Age of Child 11.63 3.62 2.30 1.37 
Household Size 6.15 2.07 5.79 1.88 
Child's Birth-Order 2.84 1.75 3.40 1.94 
First Wealth Quintile 0.16 0.37 0.24 0.43 
Second Wealth Quintile 0.18 0.39 0.21 0.41 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.22 0.41 0.13 0.34 
Mother's Body Mass Index 
  
20.24 3.39 
Gender Ratio of Mother's Siblings 
    Female Twin-Pair in the Family 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 
Male Twin-Pair in the Family 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 
Mixed Twin-Pair in the Family 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 
Independence in Seeking External Relations 0.63 0.48 0.66 0.47 
Independence in Child-care Decisions 0.56 0.50 0.58 0.49 
Self-confidence in Talking to Husband 0.61 0.49 0.65 0.48 
Independence in Sexual Decisions  0.77 0.42 0.82 0.38 
Independence in Domestic Activities 0.74 0.44 0.77 0.42 
Husband has just 1 wife 0.98 0.14 0.98 0.15 
Mother Listens to Radio 0.98 1.19 0.79 1.11 
Mother is More Educated than Husband 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.37 
Mother's age-Husband's age -6.07 5.87 -6.01 6.17 
Mother is Non-Muslim 0.98 0.14 0.99 0.10 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys of India Conducted in 2005/06.   
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Table E2. First Stage Results for the Models of Schooling- OLS Regression of Gender Ratio Gap 
on Instruments and Other Covariates- Indian Data  
 For Baseline Results For Main Results 
        VARIABLES Siblings Twins Siblings Twins 
Female Twin-Pair in the Family 0.092*** 0.140*** 0.092*** 0.137*** 
 (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.021) 
Male Twin-Pair in the Family -0.099*** -0.163*** -0.098*** -0.157*** 
 (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) 
Child is female 0.202*** 0.015** 0.201*** 0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) 
Mother's Bargaining Power   -0.007*** -0.005 
   (0.001) (0.009) 
Age of Child -0.000 -0.003 -0.000* -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
Household Size 0.006*** 0.006 0.006*** 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Child's Birth-order 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
First Wealth Quintile 0.018*** 0.054* 0.019*** 0.054* 
 (0.004) (0.029) (0.004) (0.029) 
Second Wealth Quintile 0.010*** 0.020 0.010*** 0.011 
 (0.004) (0.027) (0.004) (0.027) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile -0.010*** -0.000 -0.009** 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.023) (0.003) (0.024) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile -0.018*** 0.023 -0.015*** 0.026 
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Fig E1. Scree Plot of Eigenvalues after Factor-Indian Data
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 (0.003) (0.026) (0.004) (0.026) 
Constant -0.121*** -0.031 -0.118*** -0.030 
 (0.005) (0.042) (0.005) (0.043) 
Observations 91899 1377 91899 1377 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            
Table E3. First Stage Results for Weight-for-Height Models- OLS Regression of Gender Ratio 
Gap on Instruments and Other Covariates- Indian Data  
 For Baseline Results For Main Results 
        VARIABLES Siblings Twins Siblings Twins 
Female Twin-Pair in the Family 0.101*** 0.164*** 0.104*** 0.182*** 
 (0.023) (0.044) (0.023) (0.049) 
Male Twin-Pair in the Family -0.109*** -0.210*** -0.101*** -0.164*** 
 (0.019) (0.044) (0.020) (0.053) 
Child is female 0.256*** 0.012 0.256*** 0.031** 
 (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.013) 
Mother's Bargaining Power   0.000 0.004 
   (0.002) (0.024) 
Age of Child -0.004*** 0.005 -0.004*** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.013) 
Household Size 0.007*** 0.012 0.007*** 0.011 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) 
Child's Birth-order 0.006*** -0.007 0.006*** -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) 
First Wealth Quintile 0.019*** 0.070 0.019*** 0.067 
 (0.006) (0.058) (0.006) (0.057) 
Second Wealth Quintile 0.018*** 0.034 0.018*** 0.049 
 (0.006) (0.057) (0.006) (0.059) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.000 -0.027 0.000 -0.024 
 (0.006) (0.054) (0.006) (0.054) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile -0.015** -0.075 -0.015* -0.071 
 (0.007) (0.056) (0.007) (0.055) 
Mother's Body Mass Index -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) 
Constant -0.104*** 0.075 -0.104*** 0.066 
 (0.015) (0.130) (0.015) (0.126) 
Observations 20975 317 20975 317 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E4. Linear Probability Models for School Attendance-Baseline Results from Siblings‟ Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.021 -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.028) (0.024) 
Gender Ratio Gap 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.474*** 0.508*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.061) (0.058) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female -0.036*** -0.049*** -0.725*** -0.853*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.155) (0.175) 
Age of Child -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Size -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Child's Birth-order -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.017*** -0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.160*** -0.162*** -0.163*** -0.164*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.057*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.153*** 0.156*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 1.107*** 1.105*** 1.169*** 1.172*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
     
Observations 91899 91899 91899 91899 
Number of  Mother_id  40486  40486 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of children from age 6 to 18 in the DHS-India. Only those children 
with married mother with at least two children are included. 
 
Table E5. Linear Probability Models for School Attendance-Baseline Results from Twins‟ 
Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female -0.039 -0.033 0.006 -0.003 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.049) (0.046) 
Gender Ratio Gap -0.021 -0.025 0.084 -0.158 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.185) (4.644) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female 0.026 0.023 -0.431 -0.225 
 (0.120) (0.121) (0.300) (0.703) 
Age of Child -0.007 -0.008 -0.008** -0.080*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.024) 
Household Size -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.011 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.252) 
Child's Birth-Order -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.047*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) 
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First Wealth Quintile -0.117** -0.117** -0.114** -0.162 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.047) (2.096) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.019 -0.016 -0.017 -0.030 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.042) (1.921) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.055 0.063 0.052 0.121 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.038) (1.745) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.144*** 0.147*** 0.154*** 0.249 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.041) (1.793) 
Constant 0.829*** 0.830*** 0.848*** 1.597 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.069) (2.193) 
     
Observations 1377 1377 1377 1377 
Number of Mother_id  670  670 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of living twin-pairs (and triplets) from age 6 to 18 in the DHS-India. 
Only those children with married mother with at least two children are included. 
 
Table E6. Models for Child‟s Weight-for-Height Z-Scores –Baseline Results from Siblings‟ 
Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female -0.030* -0.030* -0.000 -0.019 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.223) (0.193) 
Gender Ratio Gap -0.040 -0.021 0.646** 0.658** 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.274) (0.297) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female -0.088 -0.106 -1.132 -0.995 
 (0.067) (0.065) (1.098) (1.043) 
Age of Child -0.119*** -0.116*** -0.120*** -0.117*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Household Size 0.011** 0.011** 0.007 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Child's Birth-Order -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.058*** -0.060*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.282*** -0.281*** -0.279*** -0.280*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.140*** -0.142*** -0.137*** -0.141*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.327*** 0.327*** 0.325*** 0.326*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) 
Mother's Body Mass Index 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -2.773*** -2.775*** -2.682*** -2.690*** 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.069) (0.074) 
     
Observations 20975 20975 20975 20975 
Number of Mother_id  14909  14909 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of children under age 5 in the DHS-India. Only those children with 
married mother with at least two children are included. 
 
Table E7. Models for Child‟s Weight-for-Height Z-Scores –Baseline Results from Twins‟ Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female 0.067 0.131 0.576* 0.502*** 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.293) (0.177) 
Gender Ratio Gap -0.179 -0.023 -0.666 0.852 
 (0.554) (0.477) (0.914) (1.276) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female -0.358 -0.408 -2.162 -3.772*** 
 (0.650) (0.544) (1.322) (1.407) 
Age of Child -0.002 -0.004 -0.016 -0.043 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.055) (0.139) 
Household Size -0.023 0.005 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.046) (0.096) 
Child's Birth-Order 0.001 -0.036 -0.035 -0.046 
 (0.043) (0.039) (0.046) (0.048) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.146 -0.125 -0.079 -0.021 
 (0.310) (0.320) (0.257) (0.646) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.158 -0.090 -0.045 -0.005 
 (0.250) (0.250) (0.263) (0.660) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.464* 0.424* 0.422* 0.319 
 (0.239) (0.242) (0.240) (0.605) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.775*** 0.705*** 0.607** 0.400 
 (0.257) (0.250) (0.269) (0.646) 
Mother's Body Mass Index 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.069 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.022) (0.058) 
Constant -2.179*** -2.275*** -2.142*** -3.226** 
 (0.735) (0.723) (0.560) (1.423) 
     
Observations 317 317 317 317 
Number of Mother_id  152  152 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of living twin-pairs under age 5 in the DHS-India. Only those 
children with married mother with at least two children are included. 
 
Table E8. Linear Probability Models for School Attendance-Results from Siblings‟ Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.026 -0.011 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.029) (0.025) 
Gender Ratio Gap 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.475*** 0.505*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.062) (0.059) 
Mother's Bargaining Power 0.005** 0.005** -0.000 -0.001 
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 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female -0.035*** -0.048*** -0.675*** -0.801*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.161) (0.182) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining Power -0.013 -0.013 -0.097** -0.117*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.042) (0.045) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining      
Power*Female 0.035** 0.039*** 0.178*** 0.200*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.060) (0.059) 
Age of Child -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Size -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Child's Birth-order -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.017*** -0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.161*** -0.162*** -0.164*** -0.165*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.057*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.150*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 1.105*** 1.102*** 1.165*** 1.166*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
     
Observations 91899 91899 91899 91899 
Number of  Mother_id  40486  40486 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of children from age 6 to 18 in the DHS-India. Only those 
children with married mother with at least two children are included. 
 
 
Table E9. Linear Probability Models for School Attendance-Results from Twins‟ Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female -0.033 -0.030 0.007 0.016 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.050) (0.040) 
Gender Ratio Gap 0.000 -0.005 0.249 0.259 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.190) (0.249) 
Mother's Bargaining Power 0.043** 0.041** 0.038** 0.037 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.028) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female 0.010 0.013 -0.609* -0.683 
 (0.121) (0.122) (0.311) (0.442) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining Power -0.185** -0.181** -0.199 -0.165 
 (0.094) (0.090) (0.201) (0.282) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining      
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Power*Female 0.143 0.128 0.203 0.157 
 (0.126) (0.118) (0.283) (0.359) 
Age of Child -0.007 -0.007 -0.008** -0.010* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Household Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
Child's Birth-Order -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.032*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.121** -0.120** -0.123*** -0.123* 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.047) (0.072) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 -0.010 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.043) (0.066) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.054 0.060 0.050 0.057 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.038) (0.060) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.128*** 0.132*** 0.137*** 0.144** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.041) (0.063) 
Constant 0.806*** 0.809*** 0.847*** 0.867*** 
 (0.079) (0.080) (0.069) (0.100) 
     
Observations 1377 1377 1377 1377 
Number of Mother_id  670  670 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of living twin-pairs (and triplets) from age 6 to 18 in the DHS-
India. Only those children with married mother with at least two children are included. 
 
 
Table E10. Models for Child‟s Weight-for-Height Z-Scores -Results from Siblings‟ Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female -0.031* -0.031* -0.000 0.005 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.230) (0.196) 
Gender Ratio Gap -0.042 -0.023 0.676** 0.673** 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.278) (0.299) 
Mother's Bargaining Power -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.022 -0.017 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female -0.084 -0.103 -1.173 -1.158 
 (0.067) (0.065) (1.119) (1.052) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining Power 0.067 0.052 -0.001 0.078 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.231) (0.239) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining      
Power*Female -0.081 -0.059 -0.168 -0.248 
 (0.072) (0.070) (0.320) (0.306) 
Age of Child -0.119*** -0.116*** -0.120*** -0.117*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Household Size 0.010* 0.011* 0.006 0.006 
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 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Child's Birth-Order -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.059*** -0.061*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.277*** -0.276*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.138*** -0.140*** -0.136*** -0.138*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.114*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.345*** 0.343*** 0.340*** 0.339*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.035) 
Mother's Body Mass Index 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -2.773*** -2.775*** -2.679*** -2.684*** 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.070) (0.074) 
     
Observations 20975 20975 20975 20975 
Number of Mother_id  14909  14909 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of children under age 5 in the DHS-India. Only those children 
with married mother with at least two children are included. 
 
 
 
Table E11. Models for Child‟s Weight-for-Height Z-Scores -Results from Twins‟ Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS GLS 2SLS IV-GLS 
Child is female 0.037 0.099 0.554* 0.543** 
 (0.176) (0.172) (0.322) (0.239) 
Gender Ratio Gap -0.180 -0.075 -0.754 1.295 
 (0.560) (0.500) (0.957) (3.045) 
Mother's Bargaining Power -0.122 -0.172 -0.134 -0.398 
 (0.151) (0.150) (0.150) (0.809) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Female -0.501 -0.345 -2.265 -4.450* 
 (0.663) (0.569) (1.430) (2.311) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining Power -0.207 -0.206 -1.297 7.275 
 (1.092) (0.943) (1.336) (6.903) 
Gender Ratio Gap*Bargaining      
Power*Female -0.904 -0.465 -0.312 -4.914 
 (1.094) (0.853) (1.812) (3.380) 
Age of Child 0.019 0.016 0.005 -0.043 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.056) (0.413) 
Household Size -0.006 0.010 0.022 -0.012 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.047) (0.270) 
Child's Birth-Order -0.015 -0.040 -0.051 -0.055 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.048) (0.060) 
First Wealth Quintile -0.082 -0.071 -0.001 0.253 
 (0.309) (0.318) (0.259) (2.134) 
Second Wealth Quintile -0.076 -0.045 0.026 0.311 
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 (0.246) (0.245) (0.271) (1.959) 
Fourth Wealth Quintile 0.508** 0.457* 0.465* 0.171 
 (0.245) (0.245) (0.240) (1.907) 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 0.820*** 0.769*** 0.644** 0.113 
 (0.265) (0.259) (0.272) (2.453) 
Mother's Body Mass Index 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.247 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.023) (0.620) 
Constant -2.529*** -2.578*** -2.577*** -6.786 
 (0.722) (0.723) (0.586) (13.233) 
     
Observations 317 317 317 317 
Number of Mother_id  152  152 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The sample consists of living twin-pairs (and triplets) under age 5 in the DHS-India. Only 
those children with married mother with at least two children are included. 
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Appendix F. Additional Results and Summary Statistics for Essay 3 
 
Table F1. Description and Weighted Summary Statistics by Gender for the Variables Used in the 
Models  
  Boys (N=2972) Girls (N=3054) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Schooling Outcome  
    High School Completion 0.875 0.331 0.898 0.302 
High School Diploma 0.797 0.402 0.838 0.369 
College Enrollment 0.492 0.500 0.591 0.492 
Enrollment |HS Completion  0.558 0.497 0.657 0.475 
Teenage Sex Indicators 
    Had Sex Under 15 0.203 0.402 0.160 0.366 
Had Sex Under 18 0.504 0.500 0.522 0.500 
Sex Partners 5.526 12.436 3.330 5.051 
Age at 1st sex 16.926 3.707 17.142 3.212 
Total Sex 115.064 264.697 153.572 327.993 
Sex Per Partner 2.688 7.013 4.314 10.154 
Teenage dating indicators 
    Had Date Under 15 0.666 0.472 0.533 0.499 
Had Date Under 18 0.937 0.243 0.935 0.247 
Dating Partners 13.851 2.462 14.453 2.077 
Age at 1st Date 16.673 24.673 10.645 16.058 
Total Dates 27.879 84.994 24.006 90.705 
Date Per Partner 3.452 13.439 4.443 22.843 
Controls for Family Background and demographics 
   Black 0.151 0.358 0.161 0.367 
Hispanic 0.061 0.239 0.057 0.233 
White (excluded) 0.724 0.447 0.721 0.448 
Dad college educated 0.533 0.499 0.526 0.499 
Mom college educated 0.506 0.500 0.516 0.500 
Above mean income 0.474 0.499 0.455 0.498 
Rural at age 17 0.279 0.448 0.282 0.450 
Control for teenage marriage and cohabitation 
   Married under 18 0.114 0.318 0.204 0.403 
Cohabited under 18 0.220 0.414 0.359 0.480 
Controls for teenage pregnancy and child bearing 
   Pregnant under 18 (girls) - - 0.216 0.411 
Had kids under 18 0.064 0.244 0.201 0.401 
Instruments 
    Parental church visit1 0.501 0.500 0.508 0.500 
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Parental church visit2 0.123 0.329 0.119 0.323 
Parental church visit3 0.269 0.444 0.258 0.437 
Parental church visit4 0.104 0.305 0.112 0.315 
Parental church visit5 0.002 0.049 0.003 0.059 
Peer church visit 0.257 0.437 0.263 0.440 
Source: Various rounds of NLSY97. 
 
 
    Table F2. Description and Weighted Summary Statistics by Race for the  Variables  
                 Used in the Models 
    Black (N=1578) Hispanic (N=622) White (N=3480) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Schooling Outcomes 
      High School Completion 0.814 0.389 0.815 0.388 0.906 0.292 
High School Diploma 0.740 0.439 0.745 0.436 0.842 0.365 
College Enrollment 0.437 0.496 0.458 0.498 0.571 0.495 
Enrollment |HS Completion  0.532 0.499 0.562 0.496 0.628 0.483 
Teenage Sex Indicators 
      Had Sex Under 15 0.323 0.468 0.200 0.400 0.150 0.357 
Had Sex Under 18 0.640 0.480 0.562 0.496 0.489 0.500 
Sex Partners 5.827 10.587 5.213 11.684 4.085 8.919 
Age at 1st sex 15.878 3.539 16.610 3.750 17.266 3.335 
Total Sex 82.028 213.841 144.391 323.275 147.127 314.717 
Sex Per Partner 1.923 6.890 3.966 11.107 3.832 8.855 
Teenage dating indicators 
      Had Date Under 15 0.519 0.500 0.578 0.494 0.619 0.486 
Had Date Under 18 0.923 0.267 0.934 0.248 0.943 0.232 
Dating Partners 14.508 2.455 14.251 2.359 14.048 2.216 
Age at 1st Date 12.651 19.461 15.919 26.436 13.701 20.478 
Total Dates 17.753 56.116 28.273 106.423 28.079 94.163 
Date Per Partner 2.920 10.920 5.051 32.887 4.193 19.244 
Controls for Family Background and demographics 
    Male 0.481 0.500 0.510 0.500 0.497 0.500 
Dad college educated 0.487 0.500 0.351 0.477 0.544 0.498 
Mom college educated 0.413 0.492 0.285 0.451 0.544 0.498 
Above mean income 0.245 0.430 0.228 0.420 0.527 0.499 
Rural at age 17 0.201 0.400 0.068 0.252 0.329 0.470 
Control for teenage marriage and cohabitation 
    Married under 18 0.075 0.264 0.191 0.393 0.175 0.380 
Cohabited under 18 0.243 0.429 0.304 0.460 0.302 0.459 
Controls for teenage pregnancy and child bearing 
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Notes: About 5.7% of the youth in sample are from other races. In the regression equations these 
are included in the excluded category (whites).  
 
Table F3. First Stage Estimates for the Results Reported in Columns 4 of Tables 14 and 17 in the Main 
Text 
 Endogenous Regressor 
 
VARIABLES  
 
Sex Partners 
Age at 1
st
 
Sex 
Total 
Sex/100 
Dating 
Partners 
Age at 1
st
 
Date 
Total 
Dates/10 
       
Church Visit2 -0.794** 0.236*** -0.384*** -0.607 0.136* 0.648 
 (0.391) (0.086) (0.109) (0.923) (0.077) (0.460) 
Church Visit3 -1.107*** 0.532*** -0.532*** -0.549 0.329*** 0.449 
 (0.312) (0.066) (0.085) (0.687) (0.060) (0.279) 
Church Visit4 -1.111** 0.633*** -0.541*** -1.542* 0.573*** 0.228 
 (0.445) (0.085) (0.107) (0.796) (0.080) (0.343) 
Church Visit5 -1.707* 0.894** -0.869*** -5.525*** 0.633 -0.972** 
 (0.888) (0.406) (0.285) (1.916) (0.559) (0.450) 
Peer Church -0.898*** 0.376*** -0.241*** -0.417 0.063 0.744** 
 (0.276) (0.060) (0.078) (0.652) (0.058) (0.299) 
Male 3.194*** -0.532*** -0.225*** 7.320*** -0.774*** 0.399* 
 (0.262) (0.054) (0.073) (0.558) (0.049) (0.232) 
Black 1.889*** -1.007*** -0.584*** -0.011 0.362*** -0.936*** 
 (0.347) (0.071) (0.079) (0.680) (0.061) (0.268) 
Hispanic 0.562 -0.238** -0.057 1.321 0.161* 0.069 
 (0.490) (0.103) (0.142) (1.084) (0.083) (0.496) 
Dad Col. Educated -0.796*** 0.219*** -0.145* -0.527 0.141*** -0.223 
 (0.284) (0.059) (0.081) (0.595) (0.052) (0.238) 
Mom Col. Educated -0.131 0.292*** 0.009 0.106 -0.043 -0.048 
 (0.288) (0.059) (0.084) (0.611) (0.054) (0.243) 
Above Mean Income -1.074*** 0.435*** -0.252*** 0.910 0.022 0.084 
 (0.278) (0.059) (0.081) (0.628) (0.054) (0.253) 
Rural at Age 17 -0.370 0.145** 0.070 -2.567*** 0.327*** -0.124 
 (0.290) (0.063) (0.090) (0.615) (0.057) (0.268) 
Constant 4.382*** 15.668*** 1.992*** 11.160*** 14.032*** 2.317*** 
 (0.299) (0.064) (0.107) (0.677) (0.060) (0.288) 
First Stage F-Stat [5.70,0.00] [30.76,0.00] [12.21,0.00] [2.33,0.04] [13.65,0.00] [3.35,0.01] 
χ2(.)-Stat for Sargan {1.41,0.825} {1.82,0.77} {1.41,0.84} {2.27,0.69} {9.35,0.053} {17.16,0} 
Pregnant under 18 (girls) 0.328 0.470 0.291 0.454 0.187 0.390 
Had kids under 18 0.215 0.411 0.202 0.402 0.111 0.314 
Instruments 
      Parental church visit1 0.371 0.483 0.454 0.498 0.531 0.499 
Parental church visit2 0.169 0.375 0.139 0.346 0.111 0.314 
Parental church visit3 0.265 0.441 0.275 0.446 0.265 0.442 
Parental church visit4 0.189 0.392 0.091 0.287 0.128 0.334 
Parental church visit5 0.006 0.075 0.002 0.046 0.003 0.058 
Peer church visit 0.260 0.439 0.219 0.414 0.263 0.440 
         Source: Various rounds of NLSY97. 
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Test 
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The first number in the brackets is the value of F-stat for joint significance of the 
instruments in the first stage equation and the second number is the associated p-value. The first 
figure in the set brackets is the value of the Sargan chi-square statistic for testing over identifying 
restrictions and the second number is the associated p-value. 
 
 
Table F4. First Stage Estimates for the Results Reported in Columns 5 of Tables 14 and 17 in Main 
the Text 
 Endogenous Regressor 
 
VARIABLES  
 
Sex Partners 
Age at 1
st
 
Sex 
Total 
Sex/100 
Dating 
Partners 
Age at 1
st
 
Date 
Total 
Dates/10 
Church Visit2 -0.693* 0.202** -0.347*** -0.460 0.115 0.630 
 (0.390) (0.085) (0.107) (0.923) (0.076) (0.464) 
Church Visit3 -0.891*** 0.452*** -0.431*** -0.232 0.283*** 0.386 
 (0.315) (0.065) (0.083) (0.688) (0.060) (0.279) 
Church Visit4 -0.772* 0.531*** -0.462*** -1.052 0.501*** 0.218 
 (0.449) (0.084) (0.106) (0.806) (0.080) (0.350) 
Church Visit5 -1.583* 0.828** -0.748** -5.335*** 0.608 -1.080** 
 (0.818) (0.393) (0.337) (1.942) (0.562) (0.467) 
Peer Church -0.745*** 0.309*** -0.135* -0.188 0.031 0.662** 
 (0.277) (0.059) (0.076) (0.653) (0.058) (0.297) 
Male 3.427*** -0.654*** 0.003 7.676*** -0.821*** 0.197 
 (0.269) (0.054) (0.072) (0.573) (0.049) (0.231) 
Black 2.044*** -1.112*** -0.353*** 0.235 0.332*** -1.159*** 
 (0.355) (0.070) (0.077) (0.686) (0.061) (0.273) 
Hispanic 0.690 -0.280*** -0.015 1.508 0.133 0.052 
 (0.490) (0.101) (0.139) (1.082) (0.083) (0.492) 
Dad Col. Educated -0.720** 0.187*** -0.098 -0.414 0.125** -0.258 
 (0.283) (0.058) (0.078) (0.593) (0.052) (0.240) 
Mom Col. Educated -0.015 0.237*** 0.102 0.281 -0.066 -0.125 
 (0.287) (0.058) (0.082) (0.613) (0.054) (0.242) 
Above Mean Income -0.903*** 0.348*** -0.096 1.171* -0.013 -0.051 
 (0.284) (0.058) (0.079) (0.631) (0.054) (0.251) 
Rural at Age 17 -0.320 0.144** 0.039 -2.500*** 0.316*** -0.077 
 (0.290) (0.062) (0.086) (0.609) (0.057) (0.266) 
Married Under 18 -0.285 -0.247*** 1.026*** -0.279 0.080 -1.213*** 
 (0.323) (0.073) (0.143) (0.788) (0.063) (0.235) 
Cohabited Under 18 2.221*** -0.873*** 1.209*** 3.285*** -0.465*** -0.841*** 
 (0.328) (0.061) (0.100) (0.696) (0.052) (0.237) 
Constant 3.312*** 16.173*** 1.131*** 9.544*** 14.251*** 3.033*** 
 (0.367) (0.073) (0.105) (0.754) (0.069) (0.312) 
First Stage F-Stat [3.70,0.00] [21.97,0.00] [7.94,0.00] [1.78,0.11] [10.06,0.00] [3.02,0.01] 
χ2(.)-Stat for Sargan 
Test 
{1.36,0.85} {1.74,0.78} {1.84,0.76} {2.66,0.62} {8.38,0.08} {16.07,0.00} 
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The first number in the brackets is the value of F-stat for joint significance of the 
instruments in the first stage equation and the second number is the associated p-value. The first 
figure in the set brackets is the value of the Sargan chi-square statistic for testing over identifying 
restrictions and the second number is the associated p-value. 
 
 
Table F5. First Stage Estimates for the Results Reported in Columns 6 of Tables 14 and 17 in the 
Main Text 
 Endogenous Regressor 
 
VARIABLES  
Sex Partners Age at 1
st
 
Sex 
Total 
Sex/100 
Dating 
Partners 
Age at 1
st
 
Date 
Total 
Dates/10 
Church Visit2 -0.693* 0.202** -0.346*** -0.460 0.115 0.630 
 (0.391) (0.085) (0.106) (0.923) (0.077) (0.464) 
Church Visit3 -0.866*** 0.431*** -0.412*** -0.256 0.279*** 0.355 
 (0.316) (0.065) (0.082) (0.688) (0.060) (0.279) 
Church Visit4 -0.750* 0.513*** -0.445*** -1.074 0.497*** 0.190 
 (0.450) (0.084) (0.105) (0.808) (0.080) (0.349) 
Church Visit5 -1.550** 0.801** -0.722** -5.367*** 0.603 -1.121** 
 (0.790) (0.400) (0.354) (1.934) (0.565) (0.461) 
Peer Church -0.710** 0.280*** -0.108 -0.220 0.025 0.618** 
 (0.279) (0.059) (0.075) (0.656) (0.058) (0.297) 
Male 3.546*** -0.753*** 0.097 7.563*** -0.841*** 0.046 
 (0.282) (0.054) (0.074) (0.581) (0.050) (0.241) 
Black 1.930*** -1.018*** -0.443*** 0.343 0.352*** -1.016*** 
 (0.355) (0.070) (0.078) (0.705) (0.062) (0.270) 
Hispanic 0.645 -0.242** -0.051 1.551 0.141* 0.109 
 (0.490) (0.101) (0.138) (1.082) (0.083) (0.492) 
Dad Col. Educated -0.722** 0.189*** -0.100 -0.412 0.125** -0.255 
 (0.283) (0.057) (0.078) (0.593) (0.052) (0.240) 
Mom Col. Educated 0.021 0.207*** 0.131 0.246 -0.073 -0.172 
 (0.286) (0.057) (0.081) (0.611) (0.054) (0.244) 
Above Mean Income -0.846*** 0.300*** -0.050 1.115* -0.023 -0.125 
 (0.288) (0.058) (0.079) (0.637) (0.054) (0.255) 
Rural at Age 17 -0.299 0.126** 0.056 -2.521*** 0.312*** -0.104 
 (0.289) (0.062) (0.086) (0.608) (0.057) (0.267) 
Married Under 18 -0.490 -0.077 0.864*** -0.082 0.115* -0.953*** 
 (0.335) (0.074) (0.140) (0.818) (0.064) (0.227) 
Cohabited Under 18 2.051*** -0.732*** 1.075*** 3.448*** -0.436*** -0.626** 
 (0.318) (0.062) (0.103) (0.709) (0.053) (0.250) 
Had Kids Under 18 0.964** -0.799*** 0.762*** -0.925 -0.165** -1.222*** 
 (0.448) (0.081) (0.149) (0.887) (0.065) (0.203) 
Constant 3.154*** 16.304*** 1.007*** 9.696*** 14.278*** 3.233*** 
 (0.375) (0.074) (0.106) (0.761) (0.070) (0.329) 
First Stage F-Stat [3.45,00] [19.77,0.00] [7.19,0.00] [1.82,0.11] [10.06,0.00] [2.97,0.01] 
χ2(.)-Stat for Sargan 
Test  
 
{1.58,0.81} 
 
{2.08,0.72} 
 
{1.72,0.79} 
 
{2.27,0.69} 
 
{7.22,0.12} 
 
{15.72,0.00} 
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The first number in the brackets is the value of F-stat for joint significance of the 
instruments in the first stage equation and the second number is the associated p-value. The first 
figure in the set brackets is the value of the Sargan chi-square statistic for testing over identifying 
restrictions and the second number is the associated p-value. 
 
Table F6. Number of Sex Partners and High School Completion by Age 19- Linear Probability 
Models  
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex Partners -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.046*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
Male -0.033*** -0.046*** -0.066*** 0.108*** 0.116** 0.089* 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.035) (0.049) (0.050) 
Black -0.037*** -0.049*** -0.032*** 0.037 0.040 0.045 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.033) (0.030) 
Hispanic -0.025 -0.030* -0.023 -0.006 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) 
Dad Col. Educated 0.007 0.004 0.004 -0.032* -0.034* -0.031 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) 
Mom Col. Educated 0.089*** 0.083*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.073*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Above Mean Income 0.107*** 0.099*** 0.089*** 0.055*** 0.053** 0.049** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
Rural at Age 17 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.016 0.017 0.016 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Had Kids Under 18   -0.158***   -0.112*** 
   (0.016)   (0.031) 
Married Under 18  -0.026** 0.007  -0.041** -0.016 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.021) (0.021) 
Cohabited Under 18  -0.083*** -0.055***  0.028 0.040 
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.039) (0.036) 
Constant 0.811*** 0.855*** 0.878*** 0.981*** 0.987*** 0.993*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.043) (0.043) (0.039) 
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table F7. Age at First Sex and High School Completion by Age 19- Linear Probability Models 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age at 1st Sex 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.095*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
Male -0.027*** -0.038*** -0.057*** 0.011 0.012 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) 
Black -0.017 -0.029** -0.016 0.048*** 0.050** 0.054*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) 
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Hispanic -0.022 -0.026 -0.020 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Dad Col. Educated 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Mom Col. Educated 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.071*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Above Mean Income 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.084*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.060*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Rural at Age 17 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.019* 0.019* 0.018* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Had Kids Under 18   -0.142***   -0.080*** 
   (0.016)   (0.023) 
Married Under 18  -0.020 0.009  -0.004 0.012 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.014) 
Cohabited Under 18  -0.065*** -0.042***  0.007 0.017 
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.020) (0.019) 
Constant 0.361*** 0.443*** 0.513*** -0.771*** -0.801*** -0.704** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.218) (0.275) (0.290) 
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table F8. Frequency of Teenage Sex and High School Completion by Age 19- Linear Probability 
Models 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Sex/100 -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.113*** -0.120*** -0.115*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027) 
Male -0.044*** -0.054*** -0.073*** -0.068*** -0.054*** -0.062*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Black -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.039*** -0.118*** -0.105*** -0.095*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) 
Hispanic -0.028 -0.032* -0.025 -0.040* -0.039* -0.036 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Dad Col. Educated 0.008 0.005 0.005 -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Mom Col. Educated 0.089*** 0.084*** 0.077*** 0.085*** 0.091*** 0.088*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Above Mean Income 0.108*** 0.100*** 0.091*** 0.077*** 0.086*** 0.083*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Rural at Age 17 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Had Kids Under 18   -0.156***   -0.070** 
   (0.016)   (0.031) 
Married Under 18  -0.018 0.013  0.094*** 0.103*** 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.032) (0.029) 
Cohabited Under 18  -0.079*** -0.053***  0.064* 0.070** 
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.037) (0.035) 
Constant 0.818*** 0.855*** 0.876*** 1.000*** 0.960*** 0.965*** 
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 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.037) (0.028) (0.026) 
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table F9. Number of Dating Partners and High School Completion by Age 19- Linear Probability 
Models 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dating Partners -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.045** -0.043** -0.040** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) 
Male -0.038*** -0.052*** -0.071*** 0.286** 0.276* 0.230 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.134) (0.166) (0.153) 
Black -0.042*** -0.054*** -0.036*** -0.052 -0.050 -0.028 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) 
Hispanic -0.026 -0.031* -0.024 0.028 0.031 0.035 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.055) (0.057) (0.054) 
Dad Col. Educated 0.010 0.006 0.006 -0.017 -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) 
Mom Col. Educated 0.090*** 0.083*** 0.076*** 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.084*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) 
Above Mean Income 0.111*** 0.102*** 0.092*** 0.149*** 0.151*** 0.135*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.033) (0.037) (0.034) 
Rural at Age 17 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.030*** -0.081 -0.073 -0.071 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.054) (0.059) (0.055) 
Had Kids Under 18   -0.161***   -0.196*** 
   (0.016)   (0.042) 
Married Under 18  -0.026** 0.008  -0.040 0.002 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.037) (0.035) 
Cohabited Under 18  -0.088*** -0.058***  0.056 0.082 
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.080) (0.077) 
Constant 0.805*** 0.851*** 0.875*** 1.282*** 1.247*** 1.250*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.196) (0.201) (0.190) 
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table F10. Age at First Date and High School Completion by Age 19- Linear Probability Models 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age at 1st Date 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.121*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) 
Male -0.029*** -0.042*** -0.062*** 0.064*** 0.054** 0.028 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) 
Black -0.049*** -0.060*** -0.042*** -0.101*** -0.106*** -0.086*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Hispanic -0.030* -0.034** -0.027 -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.045** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
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Dad Col. Educated 0.007 0.004 0.004 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Mom Col. Educated 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.077*** 0.091*** 0.089*** 0.082*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Above Mean Income 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.091*** 0.105*** 0.101*** 0.092*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Rural at Age 17 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.027*** -0.011 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Had Kids Under 18   -0.158***   -0.138*** 
   (0.016)   (0.018) 
Married Under 18  -0.027** 0.006  -0.041*** -0.010 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.015) (0.015) 
Cohabited Under 18  -0.082*** -0.053***  -0.021 -0.001 
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.020) (0.019) 
Constant 0.563*** 0.638*** 0.674*** -1.132*** -1.044** -0.871** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.354) (0.418) (0.410) 
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table F11. Frequency of Teenage Dating and High School Completion by Age 19- Linear 
Probability Models 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Dates 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.048** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Male -0.043*** -0.055*** -0.074*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.076*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) 
Black -0.041*** -0.053*** -0.035*** 0.008 0.004 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) 
Hispanic -0.027 -0.032* -0.025 -0.034 -0.037 -0.032 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028) 
Dad Col. Educated 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.019 0.017 0.016 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
Mom Col. Educated 0.090*** 0.083*** 0.076*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.082*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) 
Above Mean Income 0.111*** 0.101*** 0.091*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.095*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
Rural at Age 17 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.040** 0.037** 0.035** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
Had Kids Under 18   -0.159***   -0.099*** 
   (0.016)   (0.030) 
Married Under 18  -0.024* 0.009  0.039 0.054** 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.026) (0.022) 
Cohabited Under 18  -0.088*** -0.059***  -0.040 -0.026 
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.025) (0.021) 
Constant 0.796*** 0.843*** 0.868*** 0.647*** 0.670*** 0.702*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.051) (0.065) (0.067) 
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table F12. First Stage Estimates for the Results Reported in Column 4 of Table 20 in the Main Text 
 Endogenous Regressor 
 
VARIABLES  
 
Sex Partners 
Age at 1
st
 
Sex 
Total 
Sex/100 
Dating 
Partners 
Age at 1
st
 
Date 
Total  
 Dates/10 
       
Church Visit2 -0.240 0.205** -0.318*** 0.043 0.136* 0.662 
 (0.420) (0.090) (0.113) (0.967) (0.083) (0.524) 
Church Visit3 -1.022*** 0.513*** -0.479*** -0.488 0.327*** 0.409 
 (0.304) (0.067) (0.085) (0.697) (0.064) (0.304) 
Church Visit4 -1.176*** 0.598*** -0.502*** -1.917** 0.583*** 0.230 
 (0.413) (0.089) (0.107) (0.794) (0.085) (0.390) 
Church Visit5 -1.399 0.769* -0.824*** -5.408*** 0.597 -1.131** 
 (0.897) (0.414) (0.285) (1.898) (0.562) (0.463) 
Peer Church -1.016*** 0.391*** -0.154* -0.343 0.054 0.851** 
 (0.256) (0.060) (0.079) (0.656) (0.061) (0.331) 
Male 2.521*** -0.440*** -0.240*** 6.563*** -0.722*** 0.366 
 (0.265) (0.057) (0.073) (0.578) (0.053) (0.260) 
Black 2.039*** -0.999*** -0.434*** 0.350 0.334*** -0.948*** 
 (0.365) (0.076) (0.082) (0.724) (0.066) (0.306) 
Hispanic 0.729 -0.308*** -0.069 0.645 0.189** 0.266 
 (0.512) (0.118) (0.143) (1.048) (0.093) (0.597) 
Dad Col. Educated -0.989*** 0.204*** -0.094 -0.446 0.158*** -0.277 
 (0.275) (0.062) (0.083) (0.616) (0.057) (0.272) 
Mom Col. Educated 0.223 0.233*** -0.015 0.287 -0.109* -0.103 
 (0.283) (0.062) (0.085) (0.627) (0.058) (0.277) 
Above Mean Income -0.738*** 0.309*** -0.121 0.868 -0.058 0.016 
 (0.273) (0.061) (0.081) (0.643) (0.057) (0.277) 
Rural at Age 17 -0.271 0.086 -0.006 -2.506*** 0.338*** -0.265 
 (0.281) (0.066) (0.087) (0.641) (0.060) (0.292) 
Constant 4.044*** 15.876*** 1.770*** 11.059*** 14.132*** 2.551*** 
 (0.313) (0.071) (0.110) (0.728) (0.066) (0.342) 
First Stage F-Stat [7.34,0.00] [27.44,0.00] [9.15,0.00] [2.73,0.02] [12.12,0.00] [3.54,0.00] 
χ2(.)-Stat for Sargan  
Test 
{6.71,0.15} {10.78,0.00} {9.14,0.06} {22.68,0.00} {28.61,0.00} {3.76,0.44} 
Observations 5208 5208 5208 5208 5208 5208 
R-squared 0.039 0.096 0.017 0.029 0.061 0.005 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The first number in the brackets is the value of F-stat for joint significance of the 
instruments in the first stage equation and the second number is the associated p-value. The first 
figure in the set brackets is the value of the Sargan chi-square statistic for testing over identifying 
restrictions and the second number is the associated p-value. 
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Table F13. First Stage Estimates for the Results Reported in Column 5 of Table 20 in the Main Text 
 Endogenous Regressor 
 
VARIABLES  
 
Sex Partners 
Age at 1
st
 
Sex 
Total 
Sex/100 
Dating 
Partners 
Age at 1
st
 
Date 
Total 
Dates/10 
Church Visit2 -0.155 0.171* -0.278** 0.188 0.118 0.645 
 (0.419) (0.089) (0.110) (0.967) (0.082) (0.528) 
Church Visit3 -0.812*** 0.430*** -0.384*** -0.133 0.281*** 0.370 
 (0.312) (0.067) (0.083) (0.698) (0.064) (0.304) 
Church Visit4 -0.874** 0.495*** -0.430*** -1.426* 0.511*** 0.280 
 (0.420) (0.088) (0.107) (0.803) (0.086) (0.397) 
Church Visit5 -1.293 0.716* -0.731** -5.213*** 0.579 -1.223** 
 (0.833) (0.402) (0.332) (1.918) (0.565) (0.481) 
Peer Church -0.863*** 0.323*** -0.056 -0.074 0.025 0.777** 
 (0.258) (0.059) (0.077) (0.656) (0.061) (0.329) 
Male 2.750*** -0.551*** -0.052 6.977*** -0.762*** 0.189 
 (0.273) (0.057) (0.071) (0.593) (0.053) (0.258) 
Black 2.178*** -1.081*** -0.263*** 0.619 0.317*** -1.148*** 
 (0.367) (0.075) (0.081) (0.725) (0.067) (0.310) 
Hispanic 0.840* -0.351*** -0.022 0.833 0.165* 0.251 
 (0.510) (0.116) (0.141) (1.044) (0.092) (0.592) 
Dad Col. Educated -0.923*** 0.177*** -0.059 -0.332 0.145** -0.298 
 (0.274) (0.061) (0.080) (0.613) (0.057) (0.274) 
Mom Col. Educated 0.317 0.188*** 0.059 0.455 -0.126** -0.170 
 (0.282) (0.060) (0.082) (0.629) (0.057) (0.275) 
Above Mean Income -0.594** 0.239*** -0.003 1.128* -0.083 -0.097 
 (0.278) (0.060) (0.079) (0.643) (0.057) (0.274) 
Rural at Age 17 -0.235 0.082 -0.027 -2.457*** 0.326*** -0.210 
 (0.283) (0.065) (0.083) (0.636) (0.060) (0.291) 
Married Under 18 -0.026 -0.209*** 0.856*** 0.228 0.105 -1.400*** 
 (0.352) (0.079) (0.141) (0.844) (0.068) (0.236) 
Cohabited Under 18 2.122*** -0.881*** 1.142*** 3.647*** -0.436*** -0.679** 
 (0.331) (0.067) (0.105) (0.735) (0.057) (0.283) 
Constant 3.047*** 16.337*** 1.046*** 9.286*** 14.316*** 3.172*** 
 (0.360) (0.078) (0.106) (0.785) (0.074) (0.357) 
First Stage F-Stat [4.62,0.00] [19.16,0.00] [5.91,0.00] [2.12,0.06] [8.92,0.00] [3.29,0.01] 
χ2(.)-Stat for Sargan Test {6.39,0.17} {9.77,0.04} {10.17,0.04} {44.27,0.00} {24.50,0.00} {3.43,0.49} 
Observations 5208 5208 5208 5208 5208 5208 
R-squared 0.048 0.129 0.066 0.035 0.070 0.009 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The first number in the brackets is the value of F-stat for joint significance of the 
instruments in the first stage equation and the second number is the associated p-value. The first 
figure in the set brackets is the value of the Sargan chi-square statistic for testing over identifying 
restrictions and the second number is the associated p-value. 
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Table F14. First Stage Estimates for the Results Reported in Column 6 of Table 20 in the Main Text 
 Endogenous Regressor 
 
VARIABLES  
 
Sex Partners 
Age at 1
st
 
Sex 
Total 
Sex/100 
Dating 
Partners 
Age at 1
st
 
Date 
Total 
 Dates/10 
Church Visit2 -0.147 0.166* -0.274** 0.189 0.117 0.637 
 (0.420) (0.088) (0.110) (0.967) (0.082) (0.527) 
Church Visit3 -0.783** 0.413*** -0.370*** -0.132 0.278*** 0.341 
 (0.313) (0.066) (0.083) (0.698) (0.064) (0.304) 
Church Visit4 -0.845** 0.477*** -0.416*** -1.425* 0.507*** 0.251 
 (0.422) (0.087) (0.107) (0.806) (0.086) (0.396) 
Church Visit5 -1.267 0.701* -0.719** -5.212*** 0.576 -1.248*** 
 (0.796) (0.409) (0.346) (1.919) (0.567) (0.477) 
Peer Church -0.821*** 0.298*** -0.036 -0.073 0.019 0.735** 
 (0.258) (0.059) (0.077) (0.658) (0.061) (0.329) 
Male 2.878*** -0.629*** 0.009 6.982*** -0.777*** 0.062 
 (0.289) (0.057) (0.073) (0.602) (0.054) (0.268) 
Black 2.027*** -0.989*** -0.335*** 0.614 0.335*** -0.998*** 
 (0.365) (0.075) (0.080) (0.744) (0.067) (0.308) 
Hispanic 0.776 -0.312*** -0.052 0.831 0.173* 0.315 
 (0.514) (0.116) (0.140) (1.048) (0.092) (0.593) 
Dad Col. Educated -0.931*** 0.182*** -0.063 -0.332 0.146*** -0.290 
 (0.274) (0.061) (0.080) (0.613) (0.056) (0.274) 
Mom Col. Educated 0.351 0.167*** 0.076 0.456 -0.130** -0.204 
 (0.282) (0.060) (0.082) (0.626) (0.057) (0.277) 
Above Mean Income -0.536* 0.204*** 0.025 1.130* -0.090 -0.155 
 (0.282) (0.060) (0.080) (0.649) (0.057) (0.277) 
Rural at Age 17 -0.212 0.067 -0.016 -2.456*** 0.323*** -0.234 
 (0.281) (0.065) (0.083) (0.635) (0.060) (0.292) 
Married Under 18 -0.274 -0.058 0.737*** 0.219 0.134* -1.154*** 
 (0.363) (0.081) (0.138) (0.866) (0.069) (0.225) 
Cohabited Under 18 1.945*** -0.773*** 1.058*** 3.641*** -0.415*** -0.504* 
 (0.317) (0.068) (0.109) (0.746) (0.058) (0.295) 
Had Kids Under 18 1.277** -0.774*** 0.610*** 0.045 -0.154** -1.260*** 
 (0.547) (0.094) (0.162) (1.003) (0.076) (0.221) 
Constant 2.881*** 16.437*** 0.967*** 9.280*** 14.336*** 3.336*** 
 (0.365) (0.078) (0.108) (0.789) (0.075) (0.371) 
First Stage F-Stat [4.15,0.00] [17.35,0.00] [5.51,0.00] [2.11,0.06] [8.74,0.00] [3.22,0.01] 
χ2(.)-Stat for Sargan Test {6.65,0.16} {10.06,0.04} {10.11,0.04} {40.69,0.00} {23.28,0.00} {3.49,0.48} 
Observations 5208 5208 5208 5208 5208 5208 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The first number in the brackets is the value of F-stat for joint significance of the 
instruments in the first stage equation and the second number is the associated p-value. The first 
figure in the set brackets is the value of the Sargan chi-square statistic for testing over identifying 
restrictions and the second number is the associated p-value. 
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Table F15. Linear Probability Models for College Enrollment at or Before 
age 20 Conditional on  High School Completion (Girls) 
 OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex partners -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.097*** -0.102*** -0.088** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.033) (0.035) 
Age at 1
st
 sex 0.043*** 0.031*** 0.021*** 0.126*** 0.119*** 0.092** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.028) (0.034) (0.039) 
Total sex /100 -0.019*** -0.010*** -0.007** -0.169*** -0.167*** -0.156*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.042) (0.053) (0.060) 
Dating Partners -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.019 0.018 0.017 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) 
Age at 1
st
 date 0.013*** 0.008 0.004 0.166*** 0.151** 0.105 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.053) (0.066) (0.066) 
Total Dates/10 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.086* 0.064 0.053 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.050) (0.042) (0.039) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2696 2696 2696 2696 2696 2696 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Notes: Each of the sex and dating experience indicators were separately entered the regression 
equations.  
 
Table F16. Linear Probability Models for College Enrollment at or Before 
age 20 Conditional on  High School Completion (Boys) 
 OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex partners -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.047*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
Age at 1
st
 sex 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.036) (0.041) (0.041) 
Total sex /100 -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.249*** -0.244*** -0.241*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.073) (0.087) (0.086) 
Dating Partners -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.030* -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) 
Age at 1
st
 date 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.181*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) 
Total Dates/10 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.073*** 0.068** 0.068** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
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Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2512 2512 2512 2512 2512 2512 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Notes: Each of the sex and dating experience indicators were separately entered the regression 
equations.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Notes: Each of the teenage sex and dating experience indicators were separately entered the 
regression equations. 
aaa
The IV-Probit models assumes continuity in the endogenous regressor 
which does not strictly hold for the indicators of teenage dating/sex whose marginal effects are 
reported in this tables. 
Table F17. Marginal Effects from Probit Models for High School Completion by Age 19 
 Probit IV-Probit
aaa
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex partners -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age at 1
st
 sex 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.110*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) 
Total sex /100 -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.107*** -0.114*** -0.113*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Dating Partners -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age at 1
st
 date 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.154*** 0.157*** 0.151*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.022) (0.024) 
Total Dates/10 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
Table F18. Marginal Effects from Probit Models for High School Completion by Age 19 
(Girls) 
 Probit IV-Probit
aaa
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex partners -0.003** -0.002** -0.001 -0.065*** -0.070*** -0.066*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
Age at 1
st
 sex 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.011*** 0.095*** 0.099*** 0.082** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.021) (0.028) (0.034) 
Total sex /100 -0.006*** -0.004** -0.001 -0.099*** -0.106*** -0.100*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.018) (0.025) 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Notes: Each of the teenage sex and dating experience indicators were separately entered the 
regression equations. 
aaa
The IV-Probit models assumes continuity in the endogenous regressor 
which does not strictly hold for the indicators of teenage dating/sex whose marginal effects are 
reported in this tables. 
Table F19. Marginal Effects from Probit Models for High School Completion by Age 19 
(Boys) 
 Probit IV-Probit
aaa
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex partners -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age at 1
st
 sex 0.0195*** 0.0181*** 0.0175*** 0.115*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
 (0.00241) (0.00239) (0.00239) (0.0203) (0.0223) (0.0221) 
Total sex /100 -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.120*** -0.128*** -0.128*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Dating Partners -0.001*** -0.000** -0.001** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age at 1
st
 date 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.156*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
Total Dates/10 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2696 2696 2696 2696 2696 2696 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Notes: Each of the teenage sex and dating experience indicators were separately entered the 
regression equations. 
aaa
The IV-Probit models assumes continuity in the endogenous regressor 
which does not strictly hold for the indicators of teenage dating/sex whose marginal effects are 
reported in this tables. 
Dating Partners 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age at 1
st
 date 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.006** 0.155*** 0.167*** 0.122 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.035) (0.051) (0.075) 
Total Dates/10 0.009** 0.007** 0.004* 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2696 2696 2696 2696 2696 2696 
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Table F20. Marginal Effects from Probit Models  for College Enrollment at or Before age 
20 Conditional on  High School Completion  
 Probit IV-Probit
aaa
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex partners -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.041*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age at 1
st
 sex 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.145*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) 
Total sex /100 -0.018*** -0.009*** -0.007** -0.136*** -0.139*** -0.137*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
Dating Partners -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age at 1
st
 date 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.179*** 0.176*** 0.169*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.024) (0.029) 
Total Dates/10 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 5208 5208 5208 5208 5208 5208 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Notes: Each of the teenage sex and dating experience indicators were separately entered the 
regression equations. 
aaa
The IV-Probit models assumes continuity in the endogenous regressor 
which does not strictly hold for the indicators of teenage dating/sex whose marginal effects are 
reported in this tables. 
 
Table F21. Marginal Effects from Probit Models  for College Enrollment at or Before age 
20 Conditional on  High School Completion (Girls) 
 Probit IV-Probit
aaa
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex partners -0.009** -0.007** -0.004 -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.066*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) 
Age at 1
st
 sex 0.0503*** 0.040*** 0.027*** 0.124*** 0.114*** 0.084* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.026) (0.036) (0.047) 
Total sex /100 -0.017*** -0.008** -0.004 -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.107*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.022) (0.033) 
Dating Partners -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age at 1
st
 date 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.010* 0.172*** 0.167** 0.096 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.038) (0.071) (0.136) 
Total Dates/10 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Control Vars.       
Background &       
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Demographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2696 2696 2696 2696 2696 2696 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Notes: Each of the teenage sex and dating experience indicators were separately entered the 
regression equations. 
aaa
The IV-Probit models assumes continuity in the endogenous regressor 
which does not strictly hold for the indicators of teenage dating/sex whose marginal effects are 
reported in this tables. 
 
Table F22. Marginal Effects from Probit Models  for College Enrollment at or Before age 
20 Conditional on  High School Completion (Boys) 
 Probit IV-Probit
aaa
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex partners -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0023) 
Age at 1
st
 sex 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
Total sex /100 -0.018*** -0.010** -0.009* -0.159*** -0.163*** -0.164*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Dating Partners -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age at 1
st
 date 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.184*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) 
Total Dates/10 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Control Vars.       
Background & 
Demographics  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Cohabitation 
& Marriage 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Teenage Children  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2512 2512 2512 2512 2512 2512 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Notes: Each of the teenage sex and dating experience indicators were separately entered the 
regression equations. 
aaa
The IV-Probit models assumes continuity in the endogenous regressor 
which does not strictly hold for the indicators of teenage dating/sex whose marginal effects are 
reported in this tables.  
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